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The Use and Disuse of the Magna Carta: Due
Process, Juries, and Punishment
Robert W. Emerson † & John W. Hardwicke ††

Foreword: In Remembrance of John W. Hardwicke
My co-author, the late John W. Hardwicke, Sr., was a most
impressive man. Lawyer, teacher, scholar, elected official, and
judge were just five of his many prominent, public roles.
With a panoramic view of life far beyond what he needed for
work, my co-author was, truly, a Renaissance man. He passionately
explored, learned, and then shared almost anything imaginable.
Some of this was, no doubt, his just being “a character” —always
ready to engage in philosophical jousting, historical “what ifs,” and
pronouncements on matters grand and small.
A lover of word play, linguistics, and good grammar, John
Hardwicke understood in his bones a writer’s need to use just the
right word. Nonetheless, always looking for the broad and historical
nature of language, he would first turn to etymology before
synonymy. And he was continually learning, whether a new
language (e.g., Greek, learning it on his own late in life), a new
biography, or a new composer, composition, or performance. To my
co-author, a meaningful life meant a life of non-stop learning. One
learns for its own sake, even in fields where one has no professional
goals or even a personal agenda. Consider, for example, my coauthor and his lifelong love affair with classical music. John
Hardwicke knew more about classical music than anyone not
fortified with a couple doctorates and a lifetime of work
concentrating exclusively on that subject. Since he was a teenage
boy in the 1940s buying records, John Hardwicke did not acquire or
use his newfound knowledge for any practical purpose; he just
learned the music, loved the music, and shared that love with others.
† Huber Hurst Professor, Univ. of Florida. J.D., Harvard Law School
†† Former Chief Administrative Law Judge, Maryland Office of Administrative Hearings.
J.D., George Washington Univ. Law School
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It was this, his magnificent love of all forms of learning, that
brought my co-author to what became our article, published herein
(“The Use and Disuse of the Magna Carta: Due Process, Juries, and
Punishment”). First, though, permit me to provide a brief
biographical sketch.
Judge Hardwicke lived a very full,
accomplished 82 years, and some attention should be paid to his bill
of particulars, as he might have said.
A Biographical Sketch
Born in Winston-Salem, North Carolina in 1927, John
Hardwicke entered the University of North Carolina, qualifying by
examination at age 16 in June 1943. Two years later, he commenced
teaching Latin, English, History, and Mathematics in the North
Carolina public schools. Armed with a UNC Bachelor’s degree, in
1950 John Hardwicke traveled northward. He graduated from
George Washington University Law School in 1953 and was
admitted to the Maryland Bar that year. After short, two-year stints
as Assistant Counsel to the Controller of the Currency in
Washington, D.C. and then as an Associate with the firm of Piper
and Marbury in Baltimore, John Hardwicke served as corporate
counsel for a large chemical company. He continued in that role for
over three decades. Also, from 1968 to 1990, John Hardwicke
maintained his own law practice. Based in the City of Baltimore and
Harford County, Maryland, he had a wide-ranging, general practice,
but with an emphasis on corporate contract negotiations, national
energy curtailment and supply, and environmental and product
liability law. John Hardwicke founded the Florida Phosphate
Council (Lakeland, Florida) in 1969 and was co-founder and
counsel to the Maryland Industrial Group (representing industrial
consumers of natural gas and electricity) from 1974 to 1990.
Coexisting with his legal career was John Hardwicke’s long and
distinguished life of service in both state and county government.
He was elected as a Member of the Maryland House of Delegates
from Harford County (1963–1967), and he proudly and without
reservation had already been an early advocate of the Civil Rights
movement in Maryland. Harford County’s voters followed up by
electing John Hardwicke as a delegate to Maryland’s Constitutional
Convention, 1967–68. In 1973, he sought a seat in Congress and in
the late 1970s a nomination to be governor. In the early 1980s, he
was strongly considered for appointment to a U.S. District Court
judgeship. Throughout those years, John Hardwicke did find
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numerous successes in local politics. From 1972–74, he was an
elected Member of the Harford County Council, and then the voters
elected him President of the Council for three successive terms,
from 1978 through 1990.
By 1990, John Hardwicke, now in his sixties, already had a
lifetime as a teacher, a lawyer, and a political leader. Yet it was that
year—at a time in life when many retire, slow down, or at least
review their pensions more than upcoming job prospects—that John
Hardwicke entered a new career path. It turned out to be the pinnacle
of his professional life when John Hardwicke secured his
appointment by Governor William Donald Schaefer as Maryland’s
first Chief Administrative Law Judge. In this role, he oversaw the
creation and development of a state central hearing agency—the
Office of Administrative Hearings—to resolve conflicts between
citizens and the state. In 1996, Governor Parris Glendening
appointed him to a second six-year term. By the conclusion of his
tenure in 2002, Judge Hardwicke was recognized as the foremost
authority on state administrative law in the United States, having
effectively created a model for a vital state agency that was adopted
throughout the nation.
A prolific writer, speaker, and mentor, Judge Hardwicke
continued to work and to serve even while in retirement. He was a
fellow of the American Bar Association and an Officer, including
Chair, of the ABA Judicial Division’s National Conference of the
Administrative Law Judiciary. Judge Hardwicke testified at legal
symposia and provided expert testimony at a Congressional hearing
on administrative law, and he served as President of the National
Association of Administrative Law Judiciary (NAALJ), 1995-1996,
as well as Executive Director for NAALJ from 2003 to 2006. In
2003, the NAALJ Board of Governors awarded Judge Hardwicke
its highest honor for significant contributions to the field of
administrative adjudication, the Victor J. Rosskopf Award. Finally,
in June 2009 the Maryland State Bar Association, Administrative
Law Section, awarded him the first Annual John W. Hardwicke
Award for leadership, vision, and invaluable contributions to the
field of administrative law both in Maryland and throughout the
United States.
Last but far from least, Judge Hardwicke served as a superlative
educator for his entire adult life. To the end of his days, Judge
Hardwicke remained actively engaged in delivering important
information, meaningful reflections, and vital lessons for living a
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purposeful life. That educational mission is a key to understanding
the man. From his late teens and early twenties in North Carolina
teaching high schoolers, all the way to his eighties still speaking
before law conferences, civic assemblies, and religious
congregations, he remained a passionate advocate for and exemplar
of an educated society. Indeed, Judge Hardwicke was awarded a
lifetime achievement award from Johns Hopkins University for over
forty years of outstanding contributions as an adjunct professor of
business law at Johns Hopkins. Furthermore, in addition to
authoring several law review articles and an article about H.L.
Mencken, he was my co-author of a textbook, Business Law, first
published by Barron’s in 1987 and now in its 6thth edition. Long
considered a readable, even interesting text, it is studied each year
by many thousands of business law students and businesspersons
worldwide.
The Magna Carta
Certainly, Judge Hardwicke’s was a rich life, a life well led and
lived well. However, what gave the Judge purpose until the end of
his life was the very thing that also resulted in his leaving behind
unfinished business—that is, one more project in need of
completion. And that is where I entered the picture.
For his last few years, Judge Hardwicke worked intermittently
on a discussion of the Magna Carta and its role in English and
American law. I recall several conversations about the work, and
even some reviewing of his initial outline and a very rough draft.
But then time itself intervened. It was the one thing that could stop
John Hardwicke, a.k.a. Force of Nature, from continuing to read and
write. Judge Hardwicke died on Christmas Eve, 2009. He was
preceded in death by his beloved wife of 52 years, Mary (née Mary
Elizabeth Bunker, 1928-2001). And he left behind many friends and
colleagues in addition to a family that included six children,
seventeen grandchildren and one great-grandchild (now up to nine).
My co-author’s life certainly seems complete. Still, knowing the
man as I do, his unfinished “symphony,” his cache of research
books, notes, and historical accounts must have left him with a tiny
regret over his partial, tentative Magna Carta project. Later, in the
first months and years looking at what the great man had left behind,
I came to realize and appreciate much more the work of historians
trying to pick up where a prior archivist had left off. It was at first a
daunting task. On and off, over the years, the work was arduous.
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Though I love history, and I teach some legal history, including
our Constitution, the Magna Carta has never been my research
focus. I primarily write about everything related to franchise law as
well as occasional works on comparative civil procedure. But
minding and mining the Magna Carta became a fun task, not just to
learn about the Great Charter, but to glean from his notes or his
citations the major concerns of my co-author: how he thought and
what he felt. And it became a joy to work hard taking Judge
Hardwicke’s preliminary notes and very rough draft on the
medieval Magna Carta and the 17th Century jurisprudence of Lord
Coke, and then developing a much larger and different law journal
article than what my co-author would have, with much more time,
produced. I believe the end-product is still worthy, something my
co-author would have approved. I added many new learning streams
and made our joint effort empirical, based on a U.S. constitutional
framework, and filled with at least as much or more law than
history, as much or more theory and case law than simple
description.
The Family
Certainly, my efforts for this article were and are a personal
choice, not merely professional. They are much more than a desire
to help someone, now deceased, with whom I had co-authored a
textbook and worked on some court cases and other legal matters
over the years.
Full disclosure is required. My co-author, John W. Hardwicke,
Sr., was also my father-in-law (“Dad”). Forty years ago, I married
his youngest daughter, Heidi.
When you marry into a family, you do not always get what you
want. If you are lucky, you get what you need. And, if you are really
lucky, you get both - your needs and your desires. * I hit the jackpot,
both with the wife and the family! So, in a small way, working on
this article was a way to honor the man who was, in effect, my
second father, John W. Hardwicke, Sr.
Surely our article is not exactly as Dad imagined the work would
end, but I am confident he would have approved. I know Dad would
have heartily approved of the publisher. It is a highly felicitous
*
Hats off to the Rolling Stones for those classic lyrics, “You can't always get what
you want/ But if you try sometimes you just might find/ You get what you need.” THE
ROLLING STONES, YOU CAN’T ALWAYS GET WHAT YOU WANT (London Records 1969).
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coincidence, for a North Carolina native, born and raised in the Tar
Heel state, a proud graduate of UNC, that our article is appearing in
the flagship international law journal at the University of North
Carolina.
Though no one in life gets exactly what he or she expected, one
can come away satisfied. My father-in-law certainly lived such a
life: Patriarch of a large and talented family, professionally admired
(even adored), blessed with a powerful mind and a strong moral
compass, and endowed with rigorous training that cultivated, inter
alia, crucial scholarly habits and a resolute, patient judicial
demeanor. The latter in turn suited him as a legislator, a teacher, a
corporate counselor, an executive, and—of course—a judge. He had
the tools to achieve consensus, to let everyone have a chance to
speak, to put issues in perspective, and to act as a friend. This article
thus has some language and reasoning, particularly in the early
historical parts, for which I give credit to my co-author’s sense of
history as well as his hours in the library, to both his sense of
proportion and his reasoning. Those who recognize Dad’s voice will
certainly still hear it when they read some language about King
John, Henry III, and Lord Coke. I believe my father-in-law was at
my side throughout this endeavor, and so—even to this day—he has
been a teacher, a mentor, and an inspiration. Thanks, Dad!
Robert W. Emerson
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I. Introduction
“Every present has a past of its own.” 1 Likewise, every past has
a past of its own. Our law’s history may be likened to a vast,
seemingly now still sea, with the inspiration for our present rights
often having humble origins—small swells forming ripples leading
to waves that may crash ashore and dramatically change the legal
landscape. The Magna Carta 2 was, and remains, a key part in this
1 R.G. COLLINGWOOD, THE IDEA OF HISTORY 247 (1956). In the Revised Edition,
this thought receives further elaboration: “The present is composed in this way of two ideal
elements, past and future. The present is the future of the past and of the future.” R.G.
COLLINGWOOD, THE IDEA OF HISTORY 247 (Jan van der Dussen ed., 1994).
2 In this Article, “Magna Carta” refers to the formal document dated 1225 and
printed under the name of Henry III. However, the Magna Carta covers many subjects.
To this day, three Caps., including the “due process” provisions of Cap. 29, are still part
of English statute law. “Cap.” is the abbreviation of the Latin “Capital” or “Article.” The
basic principles of Cap. 29, as modified in the time of Edward III, are the principal interests
of this Article and, unless the context requires otherwise, it is in that sense that we refer to
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ebb and flow of Anglo-American history that continues to play a
role in the legal and cultural aspects of our society. 3 As a complex
document from feudal and medieval times, the Magna Carta is best
understood by looking at its ancient past, during thirteenth-century
England, as well as its evolution throughout history to the time of
Sir Edward Coke in the early seventeenth century. 4
The power and influence of Coke brought the Magna Carta to
America as part of the English tradition. 5 Thereafter, language from
the Magna Carta was adopted, almost verbatim, in the U.S.
Constitution 6 and numerous state constitutions. 7 It is, therefore,
unsurprising that the U.S. Supreme Court has looked to the Magna
Carta when interpreting the nature of the rights protected by the U.S.
Constitution, as demonstrated both historically and currently, in
cases both federal and state, both appellate and trial. The legally,

the Magna Carta.
3 Matthew Shaw, Modern America and Magna Carta, BRIT. LIBR. (Mar. 13, 2015),
https://www.bl.uk/magna-carta/articles/modern-america-and-magna-carta
[https://perma.cc/YXT7-LGZ5]; JAY-Z, MAGNA CARTA HOLY GRAIL (ROC Nation LLC
2013) (naming his certified Platinum album after the Magna Carta); The Simpsons:
Magical History Tour (Fox television broadcast Feb. 8, 2004) (portraying one of the main
characters, Homer, as King Henry VIII using the Magna Carta as a napkin); Dr. Who: The
King’s Demon (BBC television broadcast Mar. 15, 1983) (involving a plot where one
character, the Master, plots to overthrow King John to prevent the signing of the Magna
Carta); Lawrence van Gelder, A Magna Carta for Taxi Passengers, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 18,
1995), https://www.nytimes.com/1995/08/18/nyregion/a-magna-carta-for-taxi-passengers
.html [https://perma.cc/EY9T-E4XZ] (dubbing a proposed Bill of Rights for taxi
passengers as the “Magna Carta of hack hires”); Hannah Keyser; 15 Illustrious Facts
About Magna Carta, MENTAL FLOSS (June 15, 2015) (reporting over 43,00 people applied
for tickets to see the four surviving Magna Carta in 2015), http://mentalfloss.com/
article/64805/15-illustrious-facts-about-magna-carta [https://perma.cc/V68A-HP5L].
4 J.C. Holt summarizes Coke’s recognition of the importance of looking to the past:
“His aim was to call in the past in order to support his arguments about the present.” See
J.C. HOLT, MAGNA CARTA 9 (2d ed. 1992).
5 See generally Elizabeth F. Cohen, Jus Tempus in the Magna Carta: The
Sovereignty of Time in Modern Politics and Citizenship, 43 PS: POL. SCI. & POLS. 463
(2010); H.D. Hazeltine, The Influence of Magna Carta on American Constitutional
Development, 17 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1917); David W. Saxe, Teaching Magna Carta in
American History: Land, Law, & Legacy, 43 HIST. TCHR. 329 (2010).
6 The Magna Carta, NAT’L ARCHIVES, (Aug. 4, 2017), https://www.
archives.gov/exhibits/featured-documents/magna-carta [https://perma.cc/K6LY-9RAW]
(noting the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution tracks language from the Magna
Carta).
7 See GA. CONST. art. I, § 1, para. 11; TENN. CONST. art. XI, § 12; ARIZ. CONST. art.
II, § 24.
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politically, and culturally extraordinary U.S. Supreme Court
decision, Obergefell v. Hodges, 8 offers one such example.
The purpose of this Article is to analyze the treatment of the
Magna Carta from its adoption in England to its modern
jurisprudence as elaborated in U.S. Supreme Court decisions. The
Article’s overview of history and jurisprudence leads to an
examination of American Magna Carta case law concerning due
process, juries, and punishment.
To facilitate our journey into jurisprudence, we may recognize
five basic types of legal arguments, as William Huhn postulated:
text, intent, precedent, tradition, and policy analysis. 9 Text is the
primary source of law. 10 An example of a text is the Constitution. 11
Within the text, a person can look at the plain meaning, the canons
of construction, and intratextual meanings. 12 Intent looks to the
person who wrote a document, such as the founders with respect to
the U.S. Constitution. 13 For determining intent, one can look to
previous versions of the text, words in the text itself, the history of
the text, official comments, and contemporary commentary. 14
When making an argument based on precedent, one needs to look
to case similarities and differences. 15 Tradition arguments usually
look to common law or the “law of the land,” 16 while a policy

8 576 U.S. 644, 723 (2015) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (discussing Clause 39 of the
1215 Magna Carta as foundation for the holding of a fundamental right to marriage under
the U.S. Constitution’s Due Process Clauses).
9 WILLIAM HUHN, THE FIVE TYPES OF LEGAL ARGUMENT 13 (2d ed. 2008).
10 Id. at 17.
11 Id.
12 Id. at 19–25.
13 Id. at 31.
14 Id. at 34–39.
15 HUHN, supra note 9, at 42–43.
16 Id. at 45. Oppressed men and women have often turned to the Magna Carta for
solace or support, no matter their own place of origin. For example, in 1964, Nelson
Mandela praised the Magna Carta when he was on trial in Pretoria. Alexander Lock,
Magna Carta in the 20th Century, BRIT. LIBR. (Mar. 13, 2015), https://www.bl.uk/magnacarta/articles/magna-carta-in-the-20th-century [https://perma.cc/B7B2-G52B].
Much
earlier in the 20th Century, the Magna Carta played an important role in the fight for
women’s rights worldwide. In 1911, the Magna Carta was cited in a suffragette newspaper
to justify action against authorities. Likewise, in 1915, a suffragette said that it was
“expressly contrary to the Magna Carta” to deny women a right to vote. In the 1960s in
the Bahamas, women looked to the Magna Carta while fighting for women’s rights. Id.
In 2009, the Philippines passed a law known as the Magna Carta for Women. The Magna
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argument is unique from the other types of argument: it is the only
form of argument that does not look to authority, but to the future,
for confirmation. 17 All five of Huhn’s types of legal argument can
be found in this Article.
Philip Bobbitt states that there are six types of constitutional
arguments: historical, textual, structural, prudential, doctrinal, and
ethical. 18 Historical examines the writer’s intent. 19 Textual
considers the present meaning of the words. 20 Structural looks to
“claims that a particular principle or practical result is implicit in
the structures of government and the relationships that are created
by the Constitution among citizens and governments.” 21 Prudential
means being “self-conscious to the reviewing institute and [the]
need not [to] treat the merits of the particular controversy (which
itself may or may not be constitutional), instead advocating
particular doctrines according to the practical wisdom of using the
courts in a particular way.” 22 Doctrinal depends upon the
quintessential common law rule of stare decisis— 23 a review of

Carta of Women, Rep. Act. No. 9710 (July 28, 2008) (Phil.); Magna Carta for Philippine
Internet Freedom, Rep. Act. No. 10175 (Sept. 12, 2012) (Phil.); see, e.g., Sofia Santelices,
Know What Protects You: A Guide to Philippine Laws on Women, PREEN.PH (July 31,
2019), https://preen.ph/98828/know-what-protects-you-a-guide-to-philippine-laws-onwomen [https://perma.cc/Y59C-ZJKE] (“The Magna Carta of Women or the Republic Act
9710 conveys a framework of women’s rights, based directly on international law. It seeks
to eliminate discrimination through the recognition, protection, fulfillment, and promotion
of the rights of Filipino women ⎯ especially to those that belong in the marginalized sectors
of society.”).
17 HUHN, supra note 9, at 51.
18 PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION 246
(Oxford Univ. Press 1982).
19 Id. Certainly, any examination of constitutional principles in a common law nation
must include historical analysis. Precedent matters, and one may view the Great Charter
itself as a type of precedent. Indeed, the principles of the Magna Carta have played an
influential role in the creation of national constitutional provisions as well as international
human rights treaties. Derek P. Jinks, The Anatomy of an Institutionalized Emergency:
Preventative Detention and Personal Liberty in India, 22 MICH. J. INT’L L. 311, 354–56
(2001) (noting that, in emergency situations, international human rights treaties recognize
that the scope of the right to personal liberty could be limited and determined by public
policy; public health and safety concerns may trump individual freedom).
20 BOBBITT, supra note 18, at 7.
21 Id.
22 Id.
23 The principle is that judges rely on previous judicial determinations when deciding
the same points or principles of law. Stare Decisis, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed.
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precedent, both judicial and academic. 24 Finally, ethical involves
the characterization of American institutions, and the role within
those institutions of the American people. 25 We also utilize these
six types of arguments in this Article.
Taken in tandem with both the federal and state constitutions’
reliance on the Magna Carta for borrowed language, it is clear that
to understand the role of the Magna Carta in present and future
American jurisprudence, we must first understand its past. 26 In the
manner of Coke, Part I of this Article begins with the Magna Carta’s
own past, throughout Anglo-American history and including the
treatment of and impact upon the American Colonies. The Magna
Carta is best understood by looking at its evolution through the
centuries.
At the heart of the Article, the past Magna Carta is taken to the
present. Part II details the U.S. Supreme Court’s treatment of the
Magna Carta in its jurisprudence concerning: substantive due
process, 27 the right to a jury trial, 28 and cruel and unusual
punishment. 29 The language of Clause 29 of the Magna Carta has
provided support for the conclusion that the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments’ protections include substantive due process
guarantees, not only procedural guarantees. 30 More importantly,
2014).
BOBBITT, supra note 18, at 7.
Id. at 94.
26 See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
27 See infra Part II.A; see also infra Appendix A (listing 43 cases).
28 See infra Part II.B; see also infra Appendix B (listing 21 cases).
29 See infra Part II.C; see also infra Appendix C (listing 14 cases); Planned
Parenthood of Middle Tenn. v. Sundquist, 38 S.W.3d 1, 33 (Tenn. 2000) (describing the
origins of the Due Process Clauses and the Constitution’s “law of the land” clause in the
Magna Carta’s Clause 29 “per legem terrae” clause); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145,
196 (1968) (discussing Magna Carta’s Clause 39 foundations for the modern jury trial);
McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 816 (2010) (referencing the Magna Carta’s
influence in the development of the Privileges or Immunities Clause); McClenskey v.
Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 339 (1987) (“The Constitution was framed fundamentally as a
bulwark against governmental power, and preventing the arbitrary administration of
punishment is a basic ideal of any society that purports to be governed by the rule of law.”);
Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Kelco Disposal, 492 U.S. 257, 268 (1989) (analyzing
petitioners’ argument that the Excessive Fines Clause developed from the “use and abuse
of ‘amercements’” prior to the Magna Carta).
30 The Due Process Clause has a substantive component is firmly established through
case law. See generally, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (holding
prohibition of contraceptive devices violated protected privacy rights under the penumbra
24
25
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future citation to the Magna Carta is likely to encompass historical
discussions of the meaning of the terms “life, liberty, or property.” 31
As for its Sixth Amendment jurisprudence, the Supreme Court has
cited to the Magna Carta as the foundation of the right to a jury
trial. 32 Finally, the Court’s Eighth Amendment analysis may rely
on the Magna Carta as embodying a proportionality principle
toward penalties, especially fines and allegedly excessive liability
awards 33 and the case law thereof. 34
We come to see that the Magna Carta, as currently imagined,
invoked, and employed, speaks to these issues 35 as much as any
others. 36 Finally, the Appendix provides data about Supreme Court
cases that cite the Magna Carta. 37 Overall, the Article shows how
of the first, third, and fourth amendments); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510
(1925) (finding parents have a liberty interest in controlling the education of their
children).
31 See Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986) (discussing the Magna Carta in
reference to the protection of individuals from “arbitrary exercise of the powers of
government”); Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 527 (1884) (discussing the role of the
Magna Carta in due process as a safeguard against arbitrary government action); Cty. of
Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 845 (citing Hurtado and further discussing the Magna
Carta’s influence on due process). See generally Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545
U.S. 748 (2005) (discussing the relation between an individual’s property interest,
restraining orders, and due process).
32 See McDonald, 561 U.S. at 816.
33 See Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Kelco Disposal, 492 U.S. 257, 293–96 (1989)
(discussing the Magna Carta’s development of the principle of proportionality and the
principles relation to fines under the Eighth Amendment).
34 DANIEL BARSTOW MAGRAW, ANDREA MARTINEZ & ROY E. BROWNELL II, MAGNA
CARTA AND THE RULE OF LAW 113 (2014).
35 See id. at 268–73 (discussing the Magna Carta’s influence on contemporary
understanding of cruel and unusual punishment); Calvin R. Massey, The Excessive Fines
Clause & Punitive Damages: Some Lessons from History, 40 VAND. L. REV. 1233, 1252–
53 (1987) (discussing the development of a standard for cruel and unusual punishment
under the Eighth Amendment through case law dicta).
36 See, e.g., Horne v. Dep’t of Agric., 576 U.S. 351, 358 (2015) (discussing the
principle of the Magna Carta which protected crops from uncompensated takings);
Obergefell, 576 U.S. at 723–25; McDonald, 561 U.S. at 818 n.4 (discussing the Magna
Carta’s influence on the Privileges and Immunities Clause); S. Union Co. v. U.S., 567 U.S.
343, 370 (2012) (Breyer, J. dissenting); Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church &
School v. E.E.O.C., 565 U.S. 171, 182 (2012) (discussing Magna Carta as foundation for
religious freedom); Borough of Duryea, Pa. v. Guarnieri, 564 U.S. 379, 395–97 (2011)
(discussing the origins of the right to petition).
37 Appendix A discusses Due Process. Appendix B shows cases that cite the Magna
Carta for jury trials and Appendix C shows cases that cite the Magna Carta for cruel and
unusual punishment.
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the Magna Carta has influenced not just our fundamental legal
precepts but continues to inform our case law.
II. A History of the Magna Carta
The Magna Carta did not necessarily erect anything new. 38 It
came into English history as an assertion of feudal privileges and
liberties that existed before the Norman Conquest 39 and were also
outlined in numerous charters throughout medieval Europe. 40
Generally, these charters guaranteed justice from monarchs, lords,
and other leaders. 41 The charters were contracts, and as such,
required mutuality: protection, fairness, and justice from the lord, as
well as loyalty, respect, and service from the vassal. 42 A breach by
either party dissolved the contract and freed the other from the
mutual obligation. 43 The Magna Carta did not arise by plan; it arose
by impulse from a series of medieval charters that created a political
principle akin to the rule of law. 44
The Norman invasion and conquest of England 45 was the start

38 See, e.g., 1 SIR FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC W. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF
ENGLISH LAW BEFORE THE TIME OF EDWARD I 172 (London, Cambridge Univ. Press 2d ed.
1898) (“[T]he charter contains little that is absolutely new. It is restorative. John in these
last years has been breaking the law; therefore the law must be defined and set in writing.”).
39 See HOLT, supra note 4, at 35 (explaining that the Magna Carta affirmed grants of
feudal privileges that barons, knights, and townsfolk had long since come to expect).
40 See generally Cary J. Nederman, The Liberty of the Church and the Road to
Runnymede: John of Salisbury and the Intellectual Foundations of the Magna Carta, 43
PS: POLI. SCI. & POL. 457, 457–61 (2010).
41 Holt explains that these medieval charters “were the natural reaction of feudal
societies to monarchical importunity.” See HOLT, supra note 4, at 27.
42 See MARC BLOCH, FEUDAL SOCIETY 451 (2d ed. 1962) (“Vassal homage was a
genuine contract and a bilateral one. If the lord failed to fulfill his engagements, he lost his
rights.”).
43 See id.
44 Nederman, supra note 40, at 457–61; see Michael Steenson, Roots of
Constitutional Government: Magna Carta at 800, 72 BENCH & B. OF MINN. 18, 21 (2015)
(“Magna Carta was initially intended to constrain John’s abuses of power, but as to a select
group of his subjects. The notion that power is subject to the rule of law evolved from its
limited application in 1215 to a concept--a tailor-made argument--that power must be
subject to limits.”).
45 The story of the Norman invasion and conquest of England begins with the story
of Edward the Confessor. Edward the Confessor ruled England from 1042 to 1066. Still
unmarried by the age of forty, he had no designated successor. Thereafter, a conflict
developed over who would become the next King. There were four claimants to the throne
and William the Conqueror was one of them. See 3 J. B. BURRY, THE CAMBRIDGE
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of a new chapter in England’s history. After the Battle of Hastings
in 1066, William the Conqueror became the first Norman king of
England (William I), and he sought to earn legitimacy by claiming
to be an heir to Edward the Confessor. 46 William I and his
successors promised to continue the liberties contained in the social
contract, which they attributed to Edward the Confessor. 47 For
example, consider the coronation of Henry I in 1100: when William
I’s immediate successor, his son William II, died, William I’s
youngest son, Henry I, rather than his oldest son Robert, 48 then
became King of England.
Consistent with feudal custom, Henry I’s coronation oath
outlined a charter confirming to his English vassals the liberty and
justice inherited from his royal Anglo-Saxon predecessors. 49
English kings after the time of Henry I continued to deliver similar
promises in their coronation oaths, thereby perpetuating the AngloSaxon freedoms that had extended down a long line of monarchs. 50
Indeed, much earlier, by 1086, when William I still ruled, ancient
Anglia already had a new French aristocracy; although in place due
to the Norman Frenchman William I’s conquest of England, this
MEDIEVAL HISTORY 390–93 (1922).
46 Because conquest was a poor justification of title, William the Conqueror’s claim
to the throne required that Edward the Confessor be a legitimate conduit of power. William
the Conqueror therefore legitimized his title by claiming to be the Confessor’s lawful heir.
See J.C. Holt, The Ancient Constitution in Medieval England, in THE ROOTS OF LIBERTY:
MAGNA CARTA, ANCIENT CONSTITUTION, AND THE ANGLO-AMERICAN TRADITION OF RULE
OF LAW 22, 69 (Ellis Sandoz ed., 1993).
47 Although Edward the Confessor is romanticized in history as “the good king,”
there is no evidence that Edward the Confessor promulgated any system of law of any
historical importance. See HOLT, supra note 4, at 121–51.
48 Perhaps that shows the ranking of the kingdoms. Robert remained as ruler of
Normandy, while the more junior Henry took charge of England. Regardless, William the
Conqueror’s children, especially Henry and Robert, constantly sought to outdo one
another. In fact, Maitland suggests that if William the Conqueror had had only one son,
the course of English history would have been entirely different. While two of William
the Conqueror’s sons became Kings of England (William II, from 1087 to 1100, and Henry
I from 1100 to 1135), Robert remained on the continent and became a crusader.
Eventually, Henry I imprisoned him. See 3 FREDERIC W. MAITLAND, THE COLLECTED
PAPERS OF FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND 15 (H.A.L. Fisher ed., 1911).
49 See S. E. Thorne, Henry I’s Coronation Charter, Ch. 6, 93 ENG. HIST. REV. 369,
794 (1978); Henry L. Cannon, The Character and Antecedents of the Charter of Liberties
of Henry I, 15 AM. HIST. REV. 37, 37–46 (1909).
50 Holt, supra note 46, at 69 (emphasizing that concern for the antecessor was deeply
ingrained in English law).
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new ruling class was quick to assert the very rights held by those
they had replaced through force of arms. 51
The prior English monarchs were treated as, in effect, the
Norman Frenchmen’s legal forbears. 52 Ever as demanding as the
Anglo-Saxon nobility had been, these new patricians of the Norman
realm reacted just as strongly as the former had against any
encroaching powers exerted by their king. 53 These aristocrats, of
course, considered themselves entitled to the charter promises of
Henry I and his successors. 54
These charter promises became their opening salvo against King
John, 55 who ruled England from 1199 to 1216. 56 From the
beginning of King John’s reign, the barons perceived him as
devious and untrustworthy. 57 The barons demanded an unequivocal
limitation on the executive power of King John that would also bind
all future heirs to the throne. 58 At first, in his confrontation with the
51 John Hudson, Maitland and Anglo-Norman Law, in 89 THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH
LAW: CENTENARY ESSAYS ON “POLLOCK AND MAITLAND” 21, 39 (John Hudson ed., British
Academy 1996) (“[B]y 1086 England had a new, French aristocracy. These men brought
their customs to England not in writing but in their heads. Prominent therein were ideas
concerning lordship . . . Norman ideas, together with the consequences of Conquest and
settlement, gathered more closely the elements of personal lordship, landholding, and
jurisdiction.”).
52 Id.
53 Id.
54 See HOLT, supra note 4, at 267 (explaining that some of the motives of the
aristocrats in challenging King John may have been selfish but others were defenders of
liberty for themselves and for the English nation as well).
55 King John (1167–1216) was the youngest child of Henry II (1133–1189) and
Eleanor of Aquitaine (1122–1204). John was the great-grandson of King Henry I, who
ruled England from 1100 to 1135 and the great-great-grandson of William I (“William the
Conqueror”), who ruled England from 1066 to 1087. See Nicholas Vincent, The Origins
of Magna Carta, BRIT. LIBR. (Mar. 13, 2015), https://www.bl.uk/magna-carta/articles/theorigins-of-magna-carta [https://perma.cc/43LG-LN26].
56 Holt, supra note 46, at 25 (“The movement against King John had begun with a
cry for the confirmation of the Charter of Liberties of Henry I and the restoration of the
laws of Edward the Confessor.”).
57 See BRYCE LYON, A CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL HISTORY OF MEDIEVAL
ENGLAND 234–43 (1980) (“The unsavory character of John had never bred devotion or
loyalty in the rank and file of his vassals, but generally a distrust; they felt his insatiable
greed for money knew no bounds.”).
58 The agenda of the barons was allegedly drawn from ancient charters that the
barons considered as the laws of Henry I and Edward the Confessor. See WILLIAM S.
MCKECHNIE, MAGNA CARTA: A COMMENTARY ON THE GREAT CHARTER OF KING JOHN
WITH AN HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION 32 (James MacLehose & Sons 1905).
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barons, King John was in a superior position. That lasted until 1209,
when John was excommunicated because of a quarrel with Pope
Innocent III over the naming of the archbishop of Canterbury. 59 By
1212, King John had become so unpopular that an attempt had been
made on his life. 60 The following year, the king placed himself
under the protection of Pope Innocent III 61 and was declared a
vassal of the Pope, thus owing tribute to the papacy. 62
Unfortunately for King John, a military disaster at the Battle of
Bouvines resulted in the loss of all English holdings in France. 63
When John returned to England in the winter of 1214, the royal
treasury had no funds. 64
Being in dire financial straits, King John parlayed for peace with
the barons but did not succeed. 65 The accumulation of unaddressed
grievances led the barons to declare John in breach of his feudal

59 Claire Breay & Julian Harrison, Magna Carta: An Introduction, BRIT. LIBR. (July
28,
2014),
https://www.bl.uk/magna-carta/articles/magna-carta-an-introduction
[https://perma.cc/T8PH-3AVT].
60 MAGRAW ET AL., supra note 34, at 24–25. The assassination attempt, influenced
by baron and rebel Robert Fitzwalter, illustrated the growing discontent among the barons
with King John.
See Mike Ibeji, King John and the Magna Carta, BBC,
http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/british/middle_ages/magna_01.shtml
[https://perma.cc/S7AT-ERQA] (last updated Feb. 17, 2011); James Holt, John: King of
England, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/biography/John-kingof-England [https://perma.cc/B34E-KELQ] (last updated Jan. 14, 2021).
61 Article 61 in the 1215 version severely limited the kings’ power by establishing a
security council that would oversee the king. Limiting the kings’ powers the barons were
also limiting the pope’s powers, which would obviously be unfavorable in a time when the
church was interested in establishing its power. Pope Innocent III annulled this version of
the Magna Carta but then approved the later versions that did not include Article 61. This
shows that the intentions behind the original Magna Carta were to separate church and
state. See Nederman, supra note 40, at 457–61.
62 MAGRAW ET AL., supra note 34, at 25; Katherine Har, Papal Overlordship of
England: The Making of an Escape Clause for Magna Carta, BRIT. LIBR. (July 9, 2015),
http://britishlibrary.typepad.co.uk/digitisedmanuscripts/2015/07/papal-overlordship-ofengland-the-making-of-an-escape-clause-for-magna-carta.html [https://perma.cc/LWA69DRL].
63 MAGRAW ET AL., supra note 34, at 55.
64 Hugh Schofield, The Most Important Battle You’ve Probably Never Heard Of,
BBC NEWS (July 26, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-28484146
[https://perma.cc/5Y7D-XHQ8].
65 See id. (“All [King John’s] taxation had gone to waste. He was weakened, and the
barons saw their opportunity.”)
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agreement. 66 Thereafter, the parties prepared for war. 67 The barons’
stance was straightforward: they sought all the ancient liberties
derived from Edward the Confessor and those promised in accord
with the coronation oath since the time of Henry I. 68 King John
expressed a willingness to address specific grievances; however, he
was inconsistent and appeared willing to promise everything, but do
nothing. 69 After joint discussions, the barons and King John agreed
to meet at Runnymede 70 to resolve their differences. 71
Under oath, 72 the barons and King John agreed to a document
that confirmed medieval ancient rights and eliminated specific
abuses attributed to King John—this document is known as the
Magna Carta. 73 In anticipation that King John would attempt to
66 See J.E.A. JOLIFFE, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF MEDIEVAL ENGLAND: FROM THE
ENGLISH SETTLEMENT TO 1485 158 (3d ed. 1954) (“The maxim that the power of a king
who acts as a tyrant is illegitimate . . . was thus in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries the
cornerstone of legal security . . . . [W]hen refused legal redress, the aggrieved party is
entirely within his rights in declaring his obligation of vassalage at an end, making war
upon his lord”).
67 See Ibeji, supra note 60.
68 See MCKECHNIE, supra note 58, at 58–60.
69 For a detailed description of the struggle between King John and the barons, see
Holt, supra note 46, at 22–29.
70 Ironically, squatters living in this area in modern times claimed a right to live there
under the Rights Afforded to Common People in the 1215 version of the Magna Carta.
They were evicted in recent years. Arrests Made at Runnymede ‘Magna Carta’ Squatters’
Eviction, BBC NEWS (Sept. 16, 2015), http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-england-surrey34269232 [https://perma.cc/BDA2-8SN9]; see also Carolyn Harris, The Charter of the
Forest, MAGNA CARTA CAN. (Dec. 17, 2013), http://www.magnacartacanada.ca/thecharter-of-the-forest/ [https://perma.cc/MAU7-ZPHX] (“The Magna Carta began the
process of transforming the forests into common land that served the needs of
communities. According to the 1215 version of the Great Charter, ‘All evil customs
relating to forests . . . are at once to be investigated in every county . . . and within forty
days of their enquiry the evil customs are to be abolished completely and irrevocably.’
This clause was eliminated from future reissues of Magna Carta as the Charter of the Forest
expanded . . . . ”).
71 See Vincent, supra note 55.
72 The oral exchanges of oaths and the King’s seal, the Great Royal Seal, established
the validity of the document. King John did not sign the Magna Carta. In fact, there is no
evidence that King John could even write. See HOLT, supra note 4, at 255.
73 See Vincent, supra note 55. An example of one such abuse was the absolute
control over forest lands. With the signing of the Magna Carta, the land was released to
the common folk. The Magna Carta of John (1215), 17 John 1, cl. 47 (Eng.) [hereinafter
Magna Carta (1215)], available at English Translation of Magna Carta, BRIT. LIBR. (July
28,
2014),
https://www.bl.uk/magna-carta/articles/magna-carta-english-translation
[https://perma.cc/AK6G-96W6].
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circumvent his obligations, the Magna Carta contains tightly drawn
limitations on the executive power of the king:
Cap. 39. No Freeman shall be taken, or imprisoned, or
dispossessed, of his free tenement, or liberties, or free customs, or
be outlawed, or exiled, or in any way destroyed; nor will we
condemn him, nor will we commit him to prison, excepting by the
legal judgment of his peers, or by the law of the land.
Cap. 40. To none will we sell, to none will we deny, to none will
we delay right or justice. 74

The Magna Carta was unique in that it not only affirmed ancient
rights, but also contained provisions that protected the foundation
of modern rights. 75 Later in English history, the Magna Carta would
serve a dual role as both foundation and statute.
A. The Great Charter’s First Four Centuries
Treatment of the Magna Carta has varied throughout English
history. 76 In thirteenth century courts, the “Great Charter” 77 was
invoked when, with grand principles at play, it furnished support for
counsel’s legal arguments. 78 The Magna Carta, however, fell into
disuse in the fourteenth century once lawyers, absorbed with more
mundane or practical concerns, found much of the document’s
broad, ambitious language to be unwieldy. 79 Still, the failure to use
the Magna Carta, even in the face of a flagrant violation of one of
its clauses, 80 is not a testimony to its impotence. Instead, it is a nod
Magna Carta (1215), supra note 73, cl. 39, 40.
See generally Steven M. Richman, Magna Carta - Its Essence and Effect on
International Law, 294 N.J. LAW. MAG. 5 (2015).
76 The Magna Carta has actually been altered three times. It was first created in 1215,
then altered in 1225, finally adopted into law in 1297. Interestingly, in the beginning of
its life, the Magna Carta was of little or no use to the ordinary British subject. Despite
such a “Great Charter,” the churches, kings, and barons were unchecked in their power.
Breay & Harrison, supra note 59.
77 “Great Charter” is a translation of “Magna Carta.” Id.
78 See HOLT, supra note 4, at 2 (“Lawyers have been responsible for much of Magna
Carta’s survival and for the residual veneration of the Charter.”).
79 See generally id. (explaining that the Magna Carta fell into disuse primarily after
the time of Edward I, king from 1272 to 1307, when lawyers became more interested in
building a citizen and client practice than dealing with broad constitutional questions,
which were rarely matters at issue).
80 Occasionally, the Magna Carta’s sixty-three provisions or parts are referred to as
“chapters.” However, given the relatively short length of a single-parchment document
having about 3,600 words, it seems entirely more accurate to call such short provisions
74
75

2021

THE USE AND DISUSE OF THE MAGNA CARTA

589

to circumstance and practicality. While the Magna Carta is the
foundation of many modern-day rights, it is only foundational: what
matters is not just the underlying principles, but what emanates
therefrom, as its clauses have been incorporated into amendments,
statutes, and case law. As demonstrated later in this Article, the
Magna Carta’s purposes are mainly restricted to explaining the
extent of protection or the historical grounds for why protections
exist. It is much more practical to cite to the statutes and case law
because of our judicial process. 81 It is this Article’s goal to
demonstrate that the Magna Carta does provide, and should
continue to provide, substantive rights in U.S. common law.
The following discussion begins with the treatment of the
Magna Carta during the reign of King John’s successor, Henry III,
a king who gave even greater standing to the charter by reaffirming
it four times. 82 The Article then studies the Magna Carta’s role
during King Edward I’s reign, a period that saw the establishment
of a written system of statutory law that gave practical effect to the
Great Charter. 83 Discussion thereupon proceeds in a completely
opposition direction, to the lack of any genuine reference to the
Magna Carta during the Tudor period, more than a century of
English history (1485 to 1603) featuring a powerful monarchy. 84
The Magna Carta was kept on a shelf, where it gathered dust until
picked up and revived by Sir Edward Coke in the early seventeenth

“clauses” instead of using a word typically indicating a much more substantial length. In
fact, “clauses” does seem to be the usual term. See, e.g., English Translation of Magna
Carta, supra note 73 (referring to the divisions of the Magna Carta as clauses).
81 The purpose of the judiciary is to interpret the rules created by Congress and to
determine whether an individual broke those rules. Thus, statutes and Constitutional
provisions will have a stronger weight than the Magna Carta’s clauses. Secondly,
precedent created by previous cases are binding under the principle of stare decisis.
82 The charter was reaffirmed in 1216, 1217, 1225, and then again in 1237. The 1237
affirmance was significant because King Henry had finally reached the age of adulthood.
David Carpenter, Revival and Survival: Reissuing Magna Carta, BRIT. LIBR. (Mar. 13,
2015),
https://www.bl.uk/magna-carta/articles/revival-and-survival-reissuing-magnacarta [https://perma.cc/RG73-ZD66].
83 Richard H. Helmholz, The Myth of the Magna Carta Revisited, 94 N.C. L. REV.
1475, 1480 (2016); see also Susan Crennan, Honourable Just., High Court of Austl.,
Magna Carta, Common Law Values and the Constitution, Oration at the Victoria L. Found.
(May 21, 2014), reprinted in 39 MELB. U. L. REV. 331, 338–39 (2015) (noting that King
Edward I referred to the Magna Carta as the “Great Charter of the Liberties”).
84 See infra Part I.A.iii.
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century. 85
1. Reaffirmation but Disuse
Historians generally agree that King John had no intention of
abiding by the Magna Carta. 86 When he died in 1216, 87 a new
opportunity was given to the charter. 88 Upon King John’s passing,
King Henry III, a mere nine years old at the time, came into power. 89
King Henry III’s counsel, William Marshal, known for unseating
the future King Richard I, the Lionheart, from his horse in battle,
served as the king’s regent after King John’s death. 90 William also
took charge at a crucial time in England’s history. Just before King
John died, the French had invaded England. 91 The invasion would
have been successful, but William was able to defeat the invader,
King Louis, and ensure Henry took the throne. 92 This, along with
William’s other achievements provided him with a prominent status
in 13th Century England. 93
85 Carolyn Harris, The Rebirth of Magna Carta, MAGNA CARTA CAN. (Jan. 12, 2014),
http://www.magnacartacanada.ca/the-rebirth-of-magna-carta/ [https://perma.cc/QW6LHK4W]. This revival is examined infra Part I.B.
86 See HOLT, supra note 4, at 228 (“Not all the men involved were men of good will,
the king least of all. Throughout, even when he sealed the Magna Carta, John had not the
slightest intention of giving in or permanently abandoning the powers which the Angevin
kings had come to enjoy. He would surrender to force if he had to.”). This lack of faith is
demonstrated by his attempt to invalidate it a few months after signing. Eric T. Kasper,
The Influence of Magna Carta in Limiting Executive Power in the War on Terror, 126 POL.
SCI. Q. 547, 550 (2011).
87 See POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 38, at 507; NAT’L ARCHIVES, MAGNA
CARTA TIMELINE 2, http://nationalarchives.gov.uk/documents/education/magna-cartatimeline.pdf [https://perma.cc/N9SU-SLD7].
88 It was clear that John and Pope Innocent opposed the Magna Carta. By the time
of John’s death, Pope Innocent had also passed. With both of its opponents dead, the
Magna Carta had none of its previous obstacles to overcome. See Kasper, supra note 86,
at 551.
89 King John’s successor, Henry III, ruled England from 1216 to 1272. See POLLOCK
& MAITLAND, supra note 38, at 507.
90 William Marshal - The Flower of Chivalry, MEDIEVAL WARFARE,
http://www.medievalwarfare.info/marshal.htm [https://perma.cc/QD6K-6WWH] (last
visited Aug. 12, 2020).
91 See Gavin Morgan, Guildford, the Magna Carta and the Forgotten Invasion of
1216, SURREY LIVE, https://www.getsurrey.co.uk/news/nostalgia/guildford-magna-cartaforgotten-invasion-11446262 [https://perma.cc/8UKQ-3MA3] (last updated June 9,
2016).
92 Id.
93 See id.
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Harnessing his power and fame, Marshal reissued the Magna
Carta twice while serving as the regent. 94 Although Henry III did
not promptly make an open commitment to the charter, the Magna
Carta was backed by his advisors during his minor years. 95 In fact,
one of his principal advisors, Hubert de Burgh, advised him to
confirm the Magna Carta when he was of full age. 96 As soon as
King Henry III turned eighteen years old in 1237, he confirmed the
Magna Carta in full for the first time in English history. 97 He
reconfirmed the charter in the years 1248, 1249, and 1255 and
demanded personal participation in the formal ceremonies to
confirm the charter. 98 Although Henry III’s bolstering the Magna
Carta gave it great importance, the Great Charter fell out of use
during this period. 99 Ongoing disputes were solved not by reference
to the generally accepted Magna Carta, but by changes in custom. 100
2. Perpetuation as Statute
The Magna Carta was again given new importance during King
Edward I’s reign when the charter became part of England’s
statutory law. 101 Edward I began a system of written statutory law 102
94 Scott Alan Metzger, Magna Carta: Teaching Medieval Topics for Historical
Significance, 43 HIST. TCHR. 345, 353 (2010); Magna Carta, HISTORY.COM,
https://www.history.com/topics/british-history/magna-carta
[https://perma.cc/FB6BYTT5] (last updated Sept. 20, 2019) (noting that the document was reissued in 1216, 1217,
and 1225).
95 William Marshal was entrusted by King John to protect Henry III and served king
regent after King John’s death. The Magna Carta was reissued at least twice during his
governance. See William Marshall – The Flower of Chivalry, supra note 90.
96 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 38, at 550.
97 Carpenter, supra note 82.
98 JOLIFFE, supra note 66, at 294.
99 Harris, supra note 85.
100 See id.
101 See id. As Henry III’s son and heir, Edward I ruled England from 1272 to 1307.
See David S. Bachrach, The Ecclesia Anglicana Goes to War: Prayers, Propaganda, and
Conquest During the Reign of Edward I of England, 1272–1307, 36 ALBION 393, 393–94,
394 n.6 (2004). Edward I has often been called the “Justinian” of the Law of England.
Reginald Francis Treharne, Edward I: King of England, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA,
https://www.britannica.com/biography/Edward-I-king-of-England
[https://perma.cc/WG3A-67ZV] (last updated July 3, 2020).
102 See Treharne, supra note 101. Coincident with the beginning of written statutory
law, the reign of King Edward I saw the development of a judicial institution. See Jonathan
Rose, The Legal Professional Medieval England: A History of Regulation, 48 SYRACUSE
L. REV. 1, 34–37 (1988). King Edward I began a formal judiciary that included the King’s
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that gradually supplemented, but did not supplant, the common
law. 103
He assembled a group of advisers—an incipient
parliament—that would participate with the king in statutory
government. 104 In 1295, a broad summons was issued for a “Model
Parliament” that included bishops, earls, knights, and locals. 105 The
Model Parliament confirmed all ancient charters, including the
Magna Carta, into statutory law. 106
Between 1331 and 1368, Parliament gave new power and
responsibility to the Magna Carta through interpretation of its
language. 107 Parliament passed six statutes that clarified Clause
29. 108 Parliament concluded that the phrase “lawful judgment of
peers” meant trial by jury. 109 Additionally, Parliament interpreted
the phrase “law of the land” to mean “due process of law,” which at
the time meant procedure by original writ or indicting jury. 110
Moreover, Parliament changed the beginning phrase of Clause 29
from “no free man” to “no free man of whatever estate or condition
he may be.” 111 There are reasons in logic and common sense that
Bench, Common Pleas, and Yearbooks for recording judicial decisions. See LYON, supra
note 57, at 440–41, 619–22. Additionally, legal practitioners who received training at the
Inns of Court directly represented citizens in English Courts. See id. at 625–28.
103 Mark A. Kishlansky et al., United Kingdom - Edward I (1272-1307),
ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/place/United-Kingdom/Edward
-I-1272-1307 [https://perma.cc/R3S3-FSLT] (last updated Jan. 31, 2021); see also Rose,
supra note 102, at 34–37.
104 See Richard D. Rosen, Funding “Non-Traditional” Military Operations: The
Alluring Myth of Presidential Power of a Presidential Power of the Purse, 155 MIL. L.
REV. 1, 30–31 (1998) (discussing the need behind the creation of a parliament under King
Edward I’s reign).
105 J. H. Round, The House of Lords and the Model Parliament, 30 ENG. HIST. REV.
385, 395 (1915) (providing the Model Parliament date).
106 Metzger, supra note 94, at 354.
107 Id.
108 Holt, supra note 46, at 46–47. “No free man shall be taken, or imprisoned, or
dispossessed, of his free tenement, or liberties, or free customs, or outlawed, or exiled, or
in any way destroyed; nor will we condemn him, nor will we commit him to prison,
excepting by a legal judgment of his peers, or by the law of the land. To no one will we
sell, to none we will deny, to none we will delay right or justice.” Id. at 16.
109 Id. at 61–62 (noting that, while the law progressed to include a trial by jury, it by
no means had that interpretation in 1215).
110 Id. at 62.
111 Holt explains that the reason for the addition of the language “of whatever estate
or condition he may be” was not to give the unfree complete access to the courts. Instead,
the addition of the language became necessary because the term “freeman” had become
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explain the passage of statutes interpreting the Magna Carta. For
example, such statutes give the Great Charter its effect through its
application to specific situations. Law is not self-operating merely
because it is on the books; it is, instead, Parliament’s interpretation
of the Magna Carta that gave effect to the provisions contained in
the Magna Carta.
3. Decline Under the Tudors
During the Tudor period, the Magna Carta fell into obscurity. 112
The House of Tudor commenced with King Henry VII in 1485 and
marked the advent of a powerful monarchy with practically no
reference to the Magna Carta. 113 Henry VII was determined to
consolidate the power of the monarchy by shifting power from the
barons to himself and his Tudor successors. 114 In this endeavor,
Henry VII succeeded—he created an almost tyrannical kingship for
Tudor powers throughout the sixteenth century. 115 For example, his
son and successor, King Henry VIII, drafted a “Statute of
Proclamation” in 1539 which granted him the royal power to create
any law without Parliamentary authority. 116 During his early years
as king, Henry VIII was personally admired as he worked adroitly
with Parliament, although rarely with unanimity. 117 Those personal
synonymous with “franklin,” a term referring to a member of a social class that was not a
“serf.” See id. at 62–63.
112 See CHARLES BÉMONT, CHARTES DES LIBERTÉS ANGLAISES [CHARTERS OF ENGLISH
FREEDOM] (1100–1305), xlviii–l (1892) (“Le Parlement approuva docilement les coups
d’état politiques et religieux du XVe et du XVIe siècle, et la Grande Charte resta dans
l’ombre.” [“The Great Charter rested in the shade during the fifteenth and sixteenth
centuries.”]) Id. at L.
113 Alexander Reginald Myers & John S. Morrill, Henry VII: King of England,
ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/biography/Henry-VII-king-ofEngland [https://perma.cc/D22F-JY7U] (last updated Jan. 24, 20121) (providing a
background for Henry VII’s seizure of the throne); England in the 15th Century: Henry
VII (1485-1509), ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/place/UnitedKingdom/England-in-the-15th-century#ref482910 [https://perma.cc/5ZZG-7H9L ] (last
visited July 28, 2020) (“He had to . . . develop organs of administration directly under his
control . . . . ”).
114 J.R. TANNER, TUDOR CONSTITUTIONAL DOCUMENTS, A.D. 1485–1603 3 (1922)
(“Henry VII perceived that what the English needed in his day was an efficient central
administration controlled by a strong and wealthy house; and he set his policy steadily in
this direction.”).
115 See LYON, supra note 57, at 588.
116 TANNER, supra note 114, at 529–30, 532–35.
117 See id. at 13.
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skills proved useful but unnecessary for the king and his successors,
even after the Statute of Proclamation was repealed upon Henry
VIII’s death in 1547. 118 In addition to the Magna Carta, Henry VIII
also absorbed the powers of the papacy and passed the Act of
Supremacy, which declared that he would be the leader of the
English Church. 119
Additionally, King Henry VII exercised great power by
expanding the scope of the crime of “treason.” 120 Henry VII created
the Star Chamber, an English court of law that was given exclusive
control over crucial areas of criminal and civil activity. 121 He then
expanded the Treason Statute of 1351 to allow the Tudor monarchs
to reach any action that the king, through Parliament, might deem
threatening or potentially threatening. 122 The Act of Supremacy
would later be considered one of the most influential acts, second
only to the Magna Carta. 123 During the Tudor dynasty, “treason”
had a very broad definition, which included “constructive
treason.” 124 Thus, violations could be determined judicially ex post
118 Indeed, long after Henry VIII’s death, “Henry VIII clauses” have continued to
exist. “Henry VIII clauses” are enacted and called that because power is given to a minister
to amend or repeal primary legislation without having to look to Parliament. For a detailed
discussion of “Henry VIII clauses,” see generally, Dennis Morris, Henry VIII Clauses:
Their Birth, a Late 20th Century Renaissance and a Possible 21st Century Metamorphosis,
2007 LOOPHOLE 14 (2007).
119 The Act of Supremacy was in response to the Roman Catholic Church’s refusal to
grant his divorce from Katherine of Aragon. Patrick Williams, Katherine of Aragon, 69
HIST. REV. 36, 36–41 (2011). These events marked the beginning of the constantly shifting
religious landscape in England throughout the Tudor period. See id. at 40. In an attempt
to muster support for his reign, King Henry VIII’s advisors created propaganda that painted
King John’s resistance to both Pope Innocent III and to the baron’s initial Magna Carta
proposal in a positive light, thus paralleling King John’s supposed bravery to King Henry
VIII’s. See id. at 39–41; see also Carole Levin, A Good Prince: King John and Early
Tudor Propaganda, 11 SIXTEENTH CENTURY J. 23, 24 (1980).
120 Stanford E. Lehmberg, Star Chamber: 1485-1509, 24 HUNTINGTON LIBR. Q. 189,
195 (1961).
121 The court heard cases ranging from attempted murder to land tenure; it is believed
that the majority of the cases involved allegations of riot. Id.
122 See TANNER, supra note 114, at 5–6. It is also interesting to note that this statute
served as the foundation for the “Treason Clause” of the U.S. Constitution. Carlton F. W.
Larson, The Forgotten Constitutional Law of Treason and the Enemy Combatant Problem,
154 U. PENN. L. REV. 863, 869 (2006).
123 Larson, supra note 122, at 870.
124 During the sixteenth century, treason included “adhering to the king’s enemies.”
Id. at 869. Such a definition could include almost any political offense. See id. at 869–
70. As time went on, Henry VIII engaged in two areas of monarchical contests: (1)
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facto. 125 Under these circumstances, an appeal to the Magna Carta
could be viewed as an attempt to limit the king’s power; therefore,
such an appeal could be conceived as “treason” against the Crown.
When Elizabeth I came to power in 1558, 126 there was
practically no reference to the Magna Carta. Elizabeth I continued
the pattern established by Henry VII: she controlled Parliament by
the force of her personality and tactful manipulation. 127 However,
she was capable of more direct interference than Henry VII. For
example, she dissolved Parliament twice, once in 1567 and again in
1571. 128 In 1593, Elizabeth I stated: “‘It is in me and my power’ (I
speak now in her maj.’s person) ‘to call Parliaments; and it is in my
power to end and determine the same; it is in my power to assent or
dissent to anything done in [Parliament].’” 129
When Elizabeth I died in March 1603, the Tudor line of
monarchs passed over to the House of Stuart. The new monarch,
King James I of England, 130 perceived himself to be a philosopher
disengagement from a series of wives who caused him much “pain,” and (2) independence
from the Papacy because of its abusive and frequently exercised power of
excommunication. See Henry VIII (1509-47), ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, https://www.
britannica.com/place/United-Kingdom/Henry-VIII-1509-47
[https://perma.cc/H7YLFH42] (last visited Jan. 17, 2021).
125 Having retroactive force or effect: for example, under the heading of constructive
treason, Parliament found Catherine Howard guilty of “treason” by reason of her
“infidelity.” Catherine Howard: Queen of England, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA,
https://www.britannica.com/biography/Catherine-Howard
[https://perma.cc/CWB56WNU] (last updated Feb. 9, 2020). The Treason Act of 1534 hinged upon the deprivation
of the “dignity” of the king. See TANNER, supra note 114, at 379–80 (discussing a number
of actions brought by Parliament to shelter or further promote the monarchy).
126 Stephen J. Greenblatt et al., Elizabeth I: Queen of England, ENCYCLOPEDIA
BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/biography/Elizabeth-I [https://perma.cc/4MSRPL4Q] (last updated Jan. 28, 2021).
127 Id. (“[Her image] was the result of a carefully crafted, brilliantly executed
campaign in which the queen fashioned herself as a glittering symbol of the nation’s
destiny.”).
128 Queen Elizabeth I did not dissolve Parliament during these years. She vetoed a
bill passed by Parliament in between 1566 and 1571. In 1576, Elizabeth I and Parliament
finally came to an agreement on several statutes. J. Randy Beck, The False Claims Act
and the English Eradication of Qui Tam Legislation, 78 N.C. L. REV. 539, 587 (2000).
129 1 WILLIAM COBBETT, COBBETT’S PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY OF ENGLAND: FROM
THE NORMAN CONQUEST, IN 1066, TO THE YEAR, 1803 889 (1806).
130 James VI had initially become King of Scotland in 1567 as an infant upon the
death of his mother, Mary Queen of Scots. ADAM NICOLSON, GOD’S SECRETARIES: THE
MAKING OF THE KING JAMES BIBLE 3–5 (2005). In 1603, James VI, King of Scotland,
became James I, King of England. Id. His reign ushered in England’s Stuart Period (1603–
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king, whose motto was taken from the Sermon on the Mount—beati
pacifici—blessed are the peacemakers. 131 As a rex pacificus—king
of peace—James had much work to do. 132 England had been at war
with Spain throughout much of Elizabeth I’s reign. 133 Additionally,
England often fought with other Catholic neighbors, namely France,
and even with James’ native Scotland, 134 a country despised by
English nobility and members of both Houses of Parliament. 135
King James had a personal program for achieving peace with
Spain and for solving disagreement over religious doctrine by a
Biblical translation bearing his name, the King James Bible. 136 He
sought to be a personal participant in both endeavors. 137 However,
James I’s reign saw a rebellious Parliament that had long been
subservient to the Tudor monarchs. 138 During his reign, the Magna
Carta remained in the shade, where it would remain until Edward
Coke picked it up and used it as a powerful tool to argue against the
pretensions of the Crown.
B. The Magna Carta’s Renaissance
Sir Edward Coke, one of the most revered jurists in the entire

1714).
The Stuarts, The ROYAL FAMILY, https://www.royal.uk/stuarts
[https://perma.cc/NK6G-NZWG] (last visited Jan. 17, 2021).
131 LEANDA DE LISLE, AFTER ELIZABETH: THE RISE OF JAMES OF SCOTLAND AND THE
STRUGGLE FOR THE THRONE OF ENGLAND 45 (2007).
132 See Pauline Croft, Rex Pacificus, Robert Cecil, and the 1604 Peace with Spain, in
THE ACCESSION OF JAMES I: HISTORICAL AND CULTURAL CONSEQUENCES 140, 140 (Glen
Burgess, Rowland Rymer & Jason Lawrence eds., 2006).
133 See id.
134 The alliance between Scotland and France against England became known as the
Auld Alliance. See William Ewald, James Wilson and the Scottish Enlightenment, 12 U.
PA. J. CONST. L. 1053, 1073 (2010).
135 Id. at 1077 (“The Scottish Parliament made clear its determination to safeguard
‘the fundamentall lawes, Ancient privilegeis, offices and liberteis of this kingdome.’ The
Scots lawyers argued that, if the two legal systems were to be united, then the common
law should be abandoned . . . Scotland continued to be ruled by King James VI of Scotland
and the Scottish Parliament; England was ruled by King James I of England and the
English Parliament.”).
136 NICOLSON, supra note 130, at 3–5.
137 Id.
138 See David Mathew, James I: King of England and Scotland, ENCYCLOPEDIA
BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/biography/James-I-king-of-England-and-Scotla
nd#accordion-article-history [https://perma.cc/3VYK-B8DS] (last updated Dec. 22,
2020).

2021

THE USE AND DISUSE OF THE MAGNA CARTA

597

history of the common law, 139 was responsible for the Magna
Carta’s renaissance in the early seventeenth century. Coke is an
iconic figure in the history of liberty—“iconic” in the sense that so
great was his stature that his writing was sufficient authority for its
own truth or historicity. 140 He turned his hand to every aspect of
law: advocate, judge, councilor, prosecutor, and parliamentarian. 141
A core premise of Coke’s jurisprudence is that liberty can be
achieved only through the law’s supremacy as defined in the Magna
Carta and the ancient common law of England. 142 Coke asserted
that the liberties protected in the Magna Carta were beyond the
reach of the Stuart kings. 143 Unsurprisingly, Coke became the focal
point of opposition to the Stuart kings.
Supporters of the Stuart Kings argued that the liberties
contained in the Magna Carta did not form part of the common law;
instead, they argued that the liberties were statutory in nature and,
therefore, subject to repeal and modification. 144 Their reasoning
was that only events prior to the coronation of Richard I on
September 3, 1189 were meant to be treated as ancient times that
139 There is a bas-relief of Sir Edward Coke barring King James I from the court on
the bronze door of the U.S. Supreme Court; there is another bas-relief of King John being
forced to sign the Magna Carta by the Barons on the door as well. OFF. OF THE CURATOR,
SUP. CT. OF THE U.S., THE BRONZE DOORS: INFORMATION SHEET 2, http://www.
supremecourt.gov/about/bronzedoors.pdf [https://perma.cc/4FFF-9XRF]. Of the eight
panes on the bronze door, three depict scenes from British legal history: one of King John’s
signing of the Magna Carta in 1215, one of the publishing of the Westminster Statute in
1275, and finally, the scene of Sir Edward Coke and King James I. See id. at 1–2.
140 See generally Harold J. Berman, The Origins of Historical Jurisprudence: Coke,
Selden, Hale, 103 YALE L.J. 1651 (1994) (discussing Coke’s relation to English Law and
historicism); Bernadette Meyler, Towards a Common Law Originalism, 59 STAN. L. REV.
551 (2006) (discussing Coke’s role in developing the common law theory).
141 Early in his career, Coke became regarded the pre-eminent lawyer in England. He
found consistent favor with the popular Elizabeth I and remained the King’s Man into the
first years of King James I. As a speaker of the Crown, he became Speaker of the House
of Commons in 1593 and was named Attorney General the following year. As the King’s
Attorney, it was his lot to be the chief prosecutor of the Gunpowder conspirators in 1603
and Sir Walter Raleigh’s trial for treason. See ALLEN D. BOYER, SIR EDWARD COKE AND
THE ELIZABETHAN AGE 40–67 (2003).
142 See Frederick Mark Gedicks, An Originalist Defense of Substantive Due Process:
Magna Carta, Higher-Law Constitutionalism, and the Fifth Amendment, 58 EMORY L.J.
585, 598–600 (2009); see also JAMES MCCLELLAN, LIBERTY, ORDER, AND JUSTICE: AN
INTRODUCTION TO THE CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 347 (3d
ed. 2000).
143 Gedicks, supra note 142, at 598–600.
144 See HOLT, supra note 4, at 14.
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would form part of the common law. 145 It followed, therefore, that
because the Magna Carta was established after 1189, the cutoff date
would exclude the protections of the Magna Carta from the common
law. However, the liberties contained in the Magna Carta would in
fact form part of the common law because the liberties were not
created in 1215. Instead, the rights protected and affirmed by the
Magna Carta dated to times “immemorial”; this may have inspired
the language of the United States Declaration of Independence. 146
Coke placed the authority of the common law—and thus the
Magna Carta—unequivocally above the actions of the Parliament
and the Crown. Take, for example, the Semayne’s case. 147 In that
situation, Coke restricted the reach of the court and king in
confronting the “general warrant,” which was a dangerously broad
document. 148 By likening a man’s home to a “castle or fortress”
(truly an inspiration for future legislation and rights), Coke
proposed that a man in his home should be safe from such general
warrants. 149 In Fuller’s Case, 150 Coke ruled that the king could not
145 See Richard H. Helmholz, John Hudson, The Formation of the English Common
Law: Law and Society in England from the Norman Conquest to Magna Carta (1996), 29
ALBION 461, 461 (1997) (book review) (noting the long-held view, from Maitland to the
present, that “formation of the basic patterns of English law occurred during the reign of
Henry II”). More recent scholarship has added nuance, but has still not displaced the vital
role generally ascribed to that reign from 1154 to 1189. See generally JOHN HUDSON, THE
FORMATION OF ENGLISH COMMON LAW: LAW AND SOCIETY IN ENGLAND FROM THE
NORMAN CONQUEST TO MAGNA CARTA (David Bates ed., Routledge 2014) (arguing that
the common law essentially formed in that essential time from 1066 to the end of Henry
II’s reign).
146 See WALTER BAGEHOT, THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION AND OTHER POLITICAL
ESSAYS 348 (1920) (“Even in the ‘Great Charter,’ the notion of new enactments was
secondary, it was a great mixture of old and new; it was a sort of compact defining what
was doubtful in floating custom, and was re-enacted over and over again, as boundaries
are perambulated once a year, and rights and claims tending to desuetude thereby made
patent and cleared of new obstructions.”); see also THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE
para. 2 (U.S. 1776) (“We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal,
that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these
are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.”).
147 Semayne’s Case (1604) 77 Eng. Rep. 194; 5 Co. Rep. 91 a.
148 These warrants did not mention a person, place, or evidence for which to be
searched. See Laura K. Donohue, The Original Fourth Amendment, 83 U. CHI. L. REV.
1181, 1208 (2016).
149 Id.
150 For a description of the Fuller case, see RENE A. WORMSER, THE LAW: THE STORY
OF LAWMAKERS, AND THE LAW WE HAVE LIVED BY, FROM THE EARLIEST TIMES TO THE
PRESENT DAY 288 (1949).
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decide common law issues; instead, the courts had the exclusive
responsibility for making such decisions. 151 Coke and his
colleagues successfully reinvigorated the English common law and
effectively established it as the supreme law of the land - the English
Constitution. 152 His judgment in Bonham’s Case 153 is perhaps his
most influential. There, Coke stated that judicial review could be
required of actions of both Parliament and the Crown. 154 Although
Coke appears to have acknowledged that the common law was a
form of positive law, he was careful to place the power of altering
it in the hands of judicial officers. 155
C. The Great Charter in the American Colonies
The Magna Carta was brought to the American colonies as part
of the English common law. 156 English settlement in America began
in 1606 with James I’s granting of the first Virginia charter. 157 In
the Virginia charter, the king, in addition to claiming the right to
colonize the New World, also asserted the colonists’ entitlement to
the same rights possessed by Englishmen in the homeland. 158
151 See Gareth H. Jones, Sir Edward Coke: English Jurist, ENCYCLOPEDIA
BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/biography/Edward-Coke [https://perma.cc/
MVT5-EUCH] (last updated Jan. 28, 2021) (quoting Coke, “[T]he king in his own person
cannot adjudge any case”).
152 See id.; DAVID CHAN SMITH, SIR EDWARD COKE AND THE REFORMATION OF THE
LAWS 195 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2014) (stating that the court ruled only judges may
construe the statutes of England and its letters patent).
153 Bonham’s Case (1610) 77 Eng. Rep. 646; 8 Co. Rep. 114 a; Bonham’s Case,
ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/event/Bonhams-Case [https:/
/perma.cc/2EKC-D9NP] (last updated Nov. 21, 2013).
154 See Richard H. Helmholz, Bonham’s Case, Judicial Review, and the Law of
Nature, 1 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 325, 327 (2009) (noting the Bonham case is the
“fountainhead of the doctrine of judicial review”); Charles M. Gray, Bonham’s Case
Reviewed, 116 PROCEEDINGS OF THE AM. PHIL. SOC’Y 35, 35 (1972).
155 At the time, it was known that judges had less authority to change the law than
Parliament. Parliament’s laws were supreme. Thus, the idea of questioning a Parliament
created law was extremely uncommon. See Helmholz, supra note 154, at 330.
156 Many colonial charters in the early 1600s promised the “liberties, franchises, and
immunities” of an Englishman. See A.E. DICK HOWARD, THE ROAD FROM RUNNYMEDE:
MAGNA CARTA AND CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AMERICA 19–23 (1968) (noting that a plaque
in Virginia states English common law arrived in 1607).
157 See id. at 19.
158 See Hazeltine, supra note 5, at 7 (explaining that this principle made English
colonization in the American colonies distinct because in ancient times the colonists of
other countries did not have the privilege to enjoy the same constitutional rights accorded
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Additionally, colonists were granted the power to create their own
laws so long as those laws were not inconsistent with the laws of
England. 159
Although colonial charters set forth the principle that the
colonists enjoyed the rights guaranteed to them under the English
common law and the British Constitution, 160 the colonists
recognized the need to set forth their own rights in their colonial
statutes. John Winthrop, the first governor of the Massachusetts Bay
Colony, recognized the need to have a general law like the Magna
Carta. He explained:
The deputies having conceived great danger to our State in regard
that our magistrates for want of positive law in many cases might
proceed according to their discretion, it was agreed that some men
should be appointed to frame a body of grounds of law, in
resemblance to a Magna Carta, which being allowed by some of
the ministers and the General Court, should be received for
fundamental laws. 161

to them under the legal system of their home country).
159 See id. at 8. For an example, see R.I. ACTS AND ORDERS of 1647, § 4.
160 Whether rights under the British Constitution extended as equally to colonists as
to subjects residing in Britain was and still is debatable, along with other issues (e.g.,
parliamentary jurisdiction and the power of the Crown in America) rendered moot once
the colonies won their independence. See DAVID AMMERMAN, IN THE COMMON CAUSE:
AMERICAN RESPONSE TO THE COERCIVE ACTS OF 1774 53–61 (1974) (explaining the
consensus among most American politicians and advocates was that Parliament exercised
no right of control over colonial affairs, such as trade); CHARLES HOWARD MCILWAIN, THE
AMERICAN REVOLUTION: A CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 192 (1923) (noting that by
the time of the Declaration of Independence in 1776 Americans had moved beyond
claiming their rights as the King’s subjects and protesting allegedly unlawful actions of
Parliament; these Americans were now revolutionaries with grievances against the King,
basing their arguments not as much on supposedly unconstitutional statutes enacted in
Britain, but on the executive’s (i.e., the King’s) violations of the colonists’ natural rights).
In effect, the proto-revolutionaries’ position by the early-to-mid 1770s had to be that the
colonists should have rights similar to those in the homeland, not that they already had
them. As summarized by Professor Ammerman: “[T]hat King and Parliament [] claim[ed]
the absolute dependency of the colonies on the British government, brought the colonists
first to dismantle the supremacy of Parliament on constitutional grounds and then to
rebuild it on the natural rights of compact and consent[.]” David Ammerman, The British
Constitution and the American Revolution: A Failure of Precedent, 17 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 473, 475 (1976). By that point in time (circa 1776), these Americans wanted their
own completely independent government – their own “parliament” and any other
governing structures (e.g., an executive and a judiciary) not answerable to superior
authorities in London. See id. at 473–76.
161 Hazeltine, supra note 5, at 10.
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Soon after, the Massachusetts Body of Liberties was adopted. 162
It was the first legal code in the colonies, and it took language
directly from the Magna Carta. 163 A few years earlier, in 1638,
Maryland passed a bill that King Charles I ultimately rejected, a bill
recognizing the Magna Carta as a part of the law of the colony. 164
Other colonies followed suit in taking language from the Magna
Carta and incorporating it into their own statutes. For example, in
1647, Rhode Island passed a law incorporating Clause 39 of the
2015 Magna Carta 165 and declaring that the “law of the land” phrase
did not refer to the law of England; instead, the Rhode Island law
asserted that the phrase referred to the law that the Rhode Island
General Assembly itself enacted. 166 The Magna Carta was,
therefore, influential not only in serving as a model for major
colonial statutes, but by laying out the rights that American
colonists relied upon to demand relief from the Crown. 167
In addition to serving as a model for colonial statutes, the Magna
Carta also served as a model for early state constitutions. 168 For
162 See Ryan C. Williams, The One and Only Substantive Due Process Clause, 120
YALE L.J. 408, 435 (2010).
163 MASS. BODY OF LIBERTIES of 1641, para. 1 (“No mans life shall be taken away, no
mans honour or good name shall be stayned . . . unless it be by virtue or equitie of some
expresse law . . . . ”).
164 MD. ACT FOR THE LIBERTIES OF THE PEOPLE of 1638; Hazeltine, supra note 5, at 12.
165 R.I. ACTS AND ORDERS of 1647, § 4.
166 See Hazeltine, supra note 5, at 12.
167 See id. at 17–18. One may see a similar impact in other former British colonies.
See R v. Sec’y of St. for Foreign & Commonwealth Aff. [2001] QB 1067 at 1094–95
(Eng.) (explaining that while the Magna Carta “does not . . . curtail the sovereignty of the
proper [colonial] lawmaker to make what laws seem fit to him[,] . . . [s]o far as it is a
proclamation of the rule of law, [the Magna Carta] may indeed be said to follow the flag”);
Calder v. Att’y-Gen. of B.C., [1973] S.C.R. 313, 395 (Can.) (“[The] Magna Carta [] has
always been considered to be the law throughout the Empire. It was a law which followed
the flag as England assumed jurisdiction over newly-discovered or acquired lands or
territories.”); Irina Spector-Marks, “The Indian’s Own Magna Carta”: Britishness and
Imperial Citizenship in Diasporic Print Culture, 1900-1914, 16 J. COLONIALISM &
COLONIAL HIST. 1, 9 (2015) (speaking not to the later issue of independence for colonies,
but concluding that Indians residing throughout the British Empire, 700 years after the
Great Charter’s signing at Runnymede, asserted their rights emanating from the Magna
Carta as a proclamation of their “imperial citizenship as both a racially neutral category
and as steeped in British cultural, national, and racial cachet”).
168 See 3 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER
ORGANIC LAWS 1688 (Francis N. Thorpe ed., 1909) [hereinafter 3 FEDERAL AND STATE
CONSTITUTIONS]; see also GA. CONST. art. I, § 1, ¶ XI; TENN. CONST. art. I, § 9; ARIZ.
CONST. art. II, § 24.
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example, in their state constitutions, Delaware, 169
North
170
171
Carolina,
and South Carolina
tracked the language of the
Magna Carta. 172 As a result, the Magna Carta and English common
law are of central relevance to courts when analyzing the original
meaning of constitutional requirements. 173 The Magna Carta has
likewise played a role in the context of U.S. Supreme Court
jurisprudence on substantive due process, the right to a jury trial,
and individual protection against cruel and unusual punishment. 174
III. U.S. Supreme Court Jurisprudence
Like Coke, the U.S. Supreme Court has looked to the past—
specifically the English common law and the Magna Carta—to
make arguments about the present. 175 Historically, the Court’s
citations to the Magna Carta have largely been cursory, something
naturally found in many common law countries, particularly those
with strong ties to the English crown. 176 The Court has mainly cited
See DEL. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS OF 1776, §§ 10–17.
See N.C. CONST. of 1776, § 12.
171 See S.C. CONST. of 1778, § XLI.
172 3 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 168, at 1688; see also GA.
CONST. art. I, § 1, ¶ XI; TENN. CONST. art. I, § 9; ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 24; Hazeltine,
supra note 5, at 15.
173 See, e.g., Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 967 (1991) (“[N]ot only is the
original meaning of the 1689 Declaration of Rights relevant, but also the circumstances of
its enactment, insofar as they display the particular ‘rights of English subjects’ it was
designed to vindicate.”); Duncan, 391 U.S. at 169–70 (Black, J., concurring) (citing the
Magna Carta when discussing the origin of the Due Process Clause); Kerry v. Din, 576
U.S. 86, 91–92 (2015) (discussing the impact of the Magna Carta and Edward Coke on
due process); Horne, 576 U.S. at 358 (referencing the Magna Carta as inspiration for the
Takings Clause as well as the Massachusetts Body of Liberties).
174 The influence of the Magna Carta can also be seen when discussing the rights of
war prisoners and habeas corpus. Robert Pallitto, The Legacy of the Magna Carta in
Recent Supreme Court Decisions on Detainees’ Rights, 43 PS: POL. SCI. & POLS. 483, 483
(2010) (referring to Hamdi v. Rumsfeld and Boumediene v. Bush).
175 See Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 967; Duncan, 391 U.S. at 169; Kerry, 576 U.S. at 91–
92; Horne, 576 U.S. at 358.
176 Consider Australia and New Zealand. By the time both countries became
independent, English common law and legislation had already exerted a strong influence.
Australia was colonized in 1770 and received its independence in 1901. Colonisation:
Disposition, Disease and Direct Conflict, AUSTRALIANS TOGETHER, https://austr
alianstogether.org.au/discover/australian-history/colonisation/ [https://perma.cc/MY45CDQG] (last updated Nov. 17, 2020); 1901: Inauguration of the Commonwealth of
MUSEUM
AUSTL.,
https://www.nma.gov.au/definingAustralia,
NAT’L
169
170
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to the charter to affirm that rights guaranteed by the U.S.
Constitution are long-standing and date back to at least 1215; many
of the rights protected and guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution align
with those present in the Magna Carta. 177 The intent of the framers
of the Constitution is frequently at issue when interpreting the plain
meaning thereof, and the close parallelism of the U.S. Constitution
to the Magna Carta commands a consideration of the charter’s
framed intent. The most in-depth treatment of the Magna Carta is
largely found in concurring and dissenting opinions when a justice
makes a historical argument to narrow the scope of rights—it is
from these concurring and dissenting opinions that the seeds of new
interpretations of law and laws themselves spring. A recent
example of this category of citations is Justice Thomas’s dissenting
opinion in the 2015 same-sex marriage case, Obergefell v.
Hodges. 178
Overall, the Magna Carta continues to play a fundamental role
in courts’ decisions involving fundamental rights and liberties. 179
As new judges are appointed to courts and as new claims or theories
are advanced, new rights can be discovered in the documents, such
as the Magna Carta. 180 Indeed, in just the first five and a half months
moments/resources/federation [https://perma.cc/MCG9-TQZK] (last updated Sept. 9,
2020). New Zealand was brought into the British Colonies in 1840 and received its
independence in 1907. Steve Watters, History of New Zealand 1769-1914, N.Z. HIST.,
https://nzhistory.govt.nz/culture/history-of-new-zealand-1769-1914
[https://perma.cc/97QF-7LY7] (last visited Jan. 28, 2021). A natural jurisprudential
development, therefore, is that in Australia and New Zealand, the Magna Carta is one of
the most cited documents by both litigants and judges. See David Clark, Icon of Liberty:
Status and Role of Magna Carta in Australia and New Zealand Law, 24 MELB. U.L. REV.
866, 866, 868 (2000). Despite its heavy historical influence, the Magna Carta is little used
for practical purposes in these jurisdictions. Id. at 868. By now, the rights it professed are
codified, so the Magna Carta often is used for sentiment in those two nations and to serve
as a connection between modernity and the early development of modern rights. Id.
Because it is so commonly cited, the Magna Carta is in jeopardy of becoming a truism
when courts or other decision makers assert its fundamental liberties.
177 For a list of cases where the U.S. Supreme Court has cited to the Magna Carta and
the nature of the treatment in each case, see infra Appendices A, B, and C.
178 576 U.S. at 721–28 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (describing the formulation of life,
liberty, and property as well as the origin and meaning of due process); the Magna Carta
was later discussed in Breyer’s dissent in the case Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830,
861 (2018).
179 See Justin Fisher, Why Magna Carta Still Matters Today, BRIT. LIBR. (Mar. 13,
2015),
https://www.bl.uk/magna-carta/articles/why-magna-carta-still-matters-today
[https://perma.cc/9P97-X6Y6].
180 See, e.g., Joshua Rozenburg, Magna Carta in the Modern Age, BRIT. LIBR. (Mar.
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of 2020, twenty-seven courts had already cited the Magna Carta in
justification for their decisions. According to a search on Westlaw
on June 13, 2020, since 1956, there have been at least 238 state
appeals court opinions and 344 state supreme court opinions
referring to the historic Magna Carta, with such opinions found in
all fifty states as well as Puerto Rico and the District of Columbia.
Likewise, the same search showed that there have been 183 U.S.
Court of Appeals opinions since 1921 referring to the Magna Carta,
with 101 of those opinions mentioning due process, thirteen
discussing the right to jury trial, and nineteen commenting on cruel
and unusual punishment. As for U.S. District Courts, the same
search showed that they have referred to the Magna Carts in 290
opinions since 1960. Both in the states and in the federal courts,
and at all levels and across jurisdictions, the trend is toward more
referencing of the Magna Carta. 181
The rights granted by the Magna Carta include freedom of
petition, due process, just compensation for takings, freedom from
excessive bail or fines, no cruel or unusual punishment, speedy
trials, public trials for criminal cases, the ability to confront one’s
accusers, and access to a trial by an impartial jury for criminal
charges. 182 Sometimes, Magna Carta references made before the
American courts are, in effect, invocations of hoary concepts of
liberty, as a matter of rhetoric, rather than any sort of precedent. 183
For instance, an early allusion to the protection of liberty occurred
when John Quincy Adams used the Magna Carta’s ideas to
successfully defend the freedom of the Amistad slaves in the
Supreme Court. 184
However, that particular argument was
unsuccessful, and the Court instead granted the slaves their freedom

13,
2015),
https://www.bl.uk/magna-carta/articles/magna-carta-in-the-modern-age
[https://perma.cc/K34E-KGWL] (noting that a 2008 U.S. Supreme Court case traced its
reasoning on a habeas corpus ruling for foreign prisoners of the United States back to the
U.S. Constitution’s provisions, which were drawn from the Magna Carta).
181 See Matthew Shaw, Modern America and Magna Carta, BRIT. LIBR. (Mar. 13,
2015), https://www.bl.uk/magna-carta/articles/modern-america-and-magna-carta [https://
perma.cc/L4J9-CW4E].
182 The English and Colonial Roots of the U.S. Bill of Rights, TEACHING AM. HIST.,
https://teachingamericanhistory.org/resources/bor/roots-chart/ [https://perma.cc/5QHW7PEF] (last visited Feb. 8, 2021) [hereinafter English and Colonial Roots].
183 See Ralph Turner, Magna Carta in the United States, 15 INSIGHTS ON L. & SOC’Y
6, 9–13 (2014).
184 Id. at 10.
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because of their Spanish origin. 185 The same argument did not work
for Dred Scott, who was an American born slave. 186 Nonetheless,
later appeals to the Magna Carta helped further define liberty,
illustrating that while the scope of freedom may change, its
foundation in the Magna Carta remains. 187 So, when looking at
American courts and the Magna Carta, we see the constant conflict
between merely rhetorical declarations and creation of case
precedents.
A. The Magna Carta and Substantive Due Process
Generally, the U.S. Supreme Court cites the Magna Carta to
support the proposition that a right in question is long-standing and
firmly established. 188 The Supreme Court’s citations in the due
process arena—discussing procedural protections—are no
different. The Court has quickly cited to the Magna Carta when
asserting that the due process guarantees are long-standing and
ancient in origin. 189 The Magna Carta has also played a substantive
role in defining due process. As shown below, Clause 29 of the
Magna Carta has helped the Supreme Court shape the argument that
the Due Process Clauses of the U.S. Constitution’s Fifth
Amendment 190 and Fourteenth Amendment 191 protect not only

Id. at 10–11.
See id.
187 See id. at 11.
188 For example, the Court will refer to Magna Carta when the right to a jury trial, due
process, etc. are involved. See Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 413–14 (1945)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring).
189 See, e.g., Malinski, 324 U.S. at 413–14 (1945) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (“The
safeguards of ‘due process of law’ and ‘the equal protection of the laws’ summarize the
history of freedom of English-speaking peoples running back to Magna Carta and reflected
in the constitutional development of our people”); Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372
U.S. 144, 186 (1963) (“Dating back to Magna Carta, however, it has been an abiding
principle governing the lives of civilized men that ‘no freeman shall be taken or imprisoned
or disseised [sic] or outlawed or exiled . . . without the judgment of his peers or by the law
of the land.’”).
190 The Fifth Amendment provides, in relevant part: “No person shall . . . be deprived
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . . ” U.S. CONST. amend. V.
191 The Fourteenth Amendment provides, in relevant part: “[N]or shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV,
§ 1.
185
186
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procedural guarantees, 192 but substantive guarantees as well. 193
1. Linking “Law of the Land” with Due Process
The U.S. Supreme Court has cited the “law of the land” clause 194
of Clause 29 primarily to support the argument that the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments’ Due Process Clauses include substantive,
as well as simply procedural components. 195 The plain language of
the Due Process Clauses guarantee procedural due process. 196
However, the Supreme Court has interpreted “due process” to cover
much more than procedural requirements. 197 When citing to the
Magna Carta to support this proposition, the Court’s line of
reasoning is that the Due Process Clause grew out of the “law of the
land” provision of the Magna Carta, and the “law of the land”
provision guaranteed substantive rights. 198 Essentially, the Court
192 Guarantees of procedural due process include notice and the opportunity to be
heard. See, e.g., Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 137 (1934) (Roberts, J., dissenting)
(explaining that “[p]rocedural due process has to do with the manner of the trial”).
193 Substantive due process is a principle that allows courts to protect individuals
against arbitrary government action that hinges on their life, liberty, or property. See
Williams, supra note 162, at 417–18.
194 The “law of the land” clause (Clause 29) provides: “No freeman shall be taken, or
imprisoned . . . . [save] by the law of the land.” See The Magna Carta of Henry III (1225),
9 Hen. 3, cl. 29 (Eng.) [hereinafter Magna Carta (1225)] (cl. 39 of John’s Charter of 1215),
translated and quoted in EDWARD COKE, THE SECOND PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE
LAWES OF ENGLAND: CONTAINING THE EXPOSITION OF MANY ANCIENT, AND OTHER
STATUTES 45 (E. & R. Brooke 15th ed. 1797) (1642); see also Peter Coss, Presentism and
the ‘Myth’ of Magna Carta, 234 PAST & PRESENT 227, 229 (2017) (“No free man is to be
arrested, or imprisoned . . . . nor will we go against him, nor will we send against him, save
by the lawful judgment of his peers or by the law of the land . . . . to no one will we deny
or delay, right or justice.”).
195 See infra Appendix A for a list of U.S. Supreme Court cases concerning
substantive due process that cite to the Magna Carta.
196 See U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[Nor shall he] be deprived of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law.”); id. §1 (“[N]or shall any state deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law[.]”).
197 See Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 541 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“Were due
process merely a procedural safeguard it would fail to reach those situations where the
deprivation of life, liberty or property was accomplished by legislation which by operating
in the future could, given even the fairest possible procedure in application to individuals,
nevertheless destroy the enjoyment of all three.”). But see McDonald, 561 U.S. at 811
(2010) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“The notion that a constitutional provision that
guarantees only ‘process’ before a person is deprived of life, liberty, or property could
define the substance of those rights strains credulity for even the most casual user of
words.”).
198 For a discussion on the historical meaning of the phrase “law of the land” and
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has relied on the Magna Carta to state that the “law of the land” and
“due process” are one and the same. 199
The Court’s linkage of the “law of the land” provision with the
Due Process Clause is consistent with the English Parliament’s
fourteenth century interpretation of the phrase “law of the land” as
referring to due process. 200 Additionally, this approach is consistent
with Coke’s work in this area. 201 Since the Court has firmly
established through case law that those Due Process Clauses
guarantee substantive due process, the Magna Carta has played a
significant role in the Court’s analyses of the cases elaborating upon
the 5th and 14th Amendment Due Process Clauses’ guarantee of
substantive due process.
2. The Meaning of “Life, Liberty, and Property”
The Court’s use of the Magna Carta has firmly established the
existence of substantive guarantees in the Due Process Clauses, and
whether the phrase was intended to cover substantive rights, see Robert E. Riggs,
Substantive Due Process in 1791, WIS. L. REV. 941, 948–58 (1990).
199 See, e.g., O’Bannon v. Town Nursing Ctr., 447 U.S. 773, 792 n.2 (1980)
(Blackmun J., concurring) (“It is well recognized that the Due Process Clauses of the
United States Constitution grew out of the ‘law of the land’ provision of the Magna Carta
and its later manifestations in English statutory law.”); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 378
(1970) (Black, J., dissenting) (“Both phrases are derived from the laws of England and
have traditionally been regarded as meaning the same thing.”); Davidson v. New Orleans,
96 U.S. 97, 101 (1877) (“The equivalent of the phrase ‘due process of law,’ according to
Lord Coke, is found in the words the ‘law of the land’ in the Great Charter.”); Beckwith
v. Bean, 98 U.S. 266, 294–95 (1878) (Field, J., dissenting) (explaining that due process
and the Magna Carta’s phrase “law of the land’ are synonymous); Murray’s Lessee v.
Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. 272, 276 (1856) (explaining that “the words
‘due process’ of law were undoubtedly intended to convey the same meaning as the words
‘by the law of the land’ in Magna Charta.”).
200 See Coss, supra note 194, at 231 (discussing the impact of the Magna Carta being
the “cornerstone of English liberty, law, and democracy[,]” quoting UNESCO’s
inscription of Magna Carta in its Memory of the World Register); see also O’Bannon, 447
U.S. at 792 n.2.
201 See EDWARD COKE, THE SECOND PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF
ENGLAND; CONTAINING THE EXPOSITION OF MANY ANCIENT AND OTHER STATUTES 50 (The
Lawbook Exchange, Ltd. 2002) (1642) (“Nisi per Legem terrae. But by the law of the
land. For the true sense and exposition of these words, see the statute of 37 E. 3. cap. 8.
where the words, by the law of the land, are rendred [sic], without due proces [sic] of Law,
for there it is said, though it be contained in the great charter, that no man be taken,
imprisoned, or put out of his free-hold without process of the law; that is, by indictment or
presentment of good and lawfull [sic] men, where such deeds be done in due manner, or
by writ original [sic] of the common law.”).
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the Magna Carta may be of further use in defining what rights and
interests are to be protected by substantive due process. 202 Both
Coke and Blackstone understood that the principles contained in the
Magna Carta are capable of producing results greater than what is
readily apparent from the text of the document. 203 By using the
Magna Carta in this manner, courts could begin to expand and
develop rights protected by substantive due process. 204 Where
procedural due process may more readily equate to the fundamental
legal theory found in the Magna Carta—the necessity for adequate
legal procedures when taking away an individual’s life, liberty, or
property—substantive due process requires the government to
justify an infringement on freedom in order to protect against
arbitrary exercise of power. 205 In this way, substantive due process
develops out of the Magna Carta’s legal theory. 206 So also it springs
from the Great Charter’s spirit. 207
In substantive due process cases, courts must determine whether
an individual’s asserted interests are protected by the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments’ protection of “life, liberty, and

202 In other words, instead of limiting the Magna Carta’s use to prove simply that
substantive rights exist, use the Magna Carta to create the specific rights.
203 See Helmholz, supra note 83, at 1492.
204 See Chantal-Aimee Doerries, Magna Carta in 2015: A View from London, 294
N.J. LAW. MAG. 47, 48 (2015) (arguing that the Magna Carta is still relevant for developing
rights in the United Kingdom: “The admonition of Magna Carta is not abstract. Even
today, 800 years later, the need for adherence to its most basic prescription of no delay or
denial of justice can be seen”).
205 ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 935 (Wolters Kluwer 4th ed. 2013).
Countries such as India have adopted the principle that government cannot arbitrarily
deprive individuals of their personal liberty. Jinks, supra note 19, at 354–55. Although
this principle is widely recognized in national constitutions, in its application nations often
disagree over the meaning of the term, “arbitrary.” Id. at 354–56.
206 See Vincent R. Johnson, The Magna Carta and the Beginning of Modern Legal
Thought, 85 MISS. L.J. 621, 641–42 (2016) (discussing the foundational role the Magna
Carta has served in developing modern law).
207 See Paulette Brown, Magna Carta: A Blueprint for Rule of Law in America, 294
N.J. LAW. MAG. 22, 22–24 (2015); William J. Brennan Jr., Assoc. Justice, U.S. Sup. Ct.,
Address at the Rededication of the American Bar Association’s Memorial to Magna Carta
(July 13, 1985), in 19 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 55, 57 (1985) (speaking on the development of
rights and liberties: “[T]hese liberties, taken for granted today, find their root in the spirit
of Magna Carta. Once it was recognized that an individual had rights against the
government and that there was a do-main of personal autonomy and dignity in which the
government had no right to intrude, it was only a matter of time before the full range of
civil rights and liberties were called forth in service of the same ideal.”).
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property.” 208 Answering that question requires a court to precisely
define “life, liberty, and property,” which is often easier said than
done. In defining “life, liberty, and property,” the Court looks to
the past to determine whether the right has been protected
historically. 209 The Court’s emphasis on the past is accompanied by
a reluctance to expand the scope of substantive guarantees; the
reasoning underlying this reluctance is that the Court cannot push
too far ahead as a judicial body. 210
Although the Court places great emphasis on assessing whether
a right has been historically protected, 211 the Court has recognized
that the identification of a right “has not been reduced to any
formula.” 212 In that same vein, the Court has acknowledged that
208 For an example, consider Roe v. Wade, where the court recognized a woman’s
interests in her pregnancy. See generally Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). Those rights
were then protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 153.
209 See e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (“The freedom to marry has
long been recognized as one of the vital personal rights essential to the . . . pursuit of
happiness by free men.”); Moore v. City of East Cleveland, Ohio, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977)
(“Our decisions establish that the Constitution protects the sanctity of the family precisely
because the institution of the family is deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and
tradition.”); Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997) (finding fundamental
rights which are “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition” qualify for
heightened scrutiny under the doctrine of “substantive due process”); Lawrence v. Texas,
529 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (“Individuals are “entitled to respect for their private lives. The
State cannot demean their existence or control their destiny by making their private sexual
conduct a crime. Their right to liberty under the Due Process Clause gives them the full
right to engage in their conduct without intervention of the government.”); Obergefell, 576
U.S. at 647 (“The right to marry is a fundamental right inherent in the liberty of the person,
and under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment
couples of the same-sex may not be deprived of that right and that liberty.”).
210 See, e.g., Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720 (“By extending constitutional protection to
an asserted right or liberty interest, we, to a great extent, place the matter outside the arena
of public debate and legislative action. We must therefore ‘exercise the utmost care
whenever we are asked to break new ground in this field’ . . . lest the liberty protected by
the Due Process Clause be subtly transformed into the policy preferences of the Members
of this Court.”) (quoting Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992));
Richard A. Posner, The Rise and Fall of Judicial Self-Restraint, 100 CAL. L. REV. 519,
520–21 (2012) (defining theory of judicial self-restraint and discussing rationale behind
the theory).
211 See, e.g., Lawrence Rosenthal, Does Due Process Have an Original Meaning? On
Originalism, Due Process, Procedural Innovation . . . and Parking Tickets, 60 OKLA. L.
REV. 1, 4 (2007) (explaining that many of the Court’s opinions “stress that substantive
rights are unlikely to be protected by due process unless they are rooted in historical
understandings”).
212 See Obergefell, 576 U.S. at 663–64 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (quoting Poe, 367 U.S.

610

N.C. J. INT'L L.

[Vol. XLVI

while historical understandings guide the identification of a right,
‘history and tradition’ do not set the right’s outer boundaries.213
This approach is consistent with the idea that courts must be flexible
when defining rights in light of changing norms and customs in
society. 214 This methodology for constitutional interpretation also
follows the practices adopted for interpreting the Magna Carta—
that the “mind” of the document governs the interpretation, and not
necessarily the text alone— 215 this has been evinced by consistent
expansion of the rights protected by the Magna Carta as well as
conformity to social norms and the contemporary ideal of justice
through statutory interpretation. 216 For example, Justice Douglas,
in his dissenting opinion in McGautha v. California, criticized the
majority for relying on only Anglo-American law from the time of
the Magna Carta to conclude that granting a jury unbridled
discretion in determining guilt and punishment in a single trial did
not violate due process requirements. 217
Justice Douglas
emphasized that due process cannot be frozen in content as of one
at 542).
213 See, e.g., Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 572 (holding unconstitutional a Texas statute that
criminalized certain intimate sexual conduct between two persons of the same sex as a
violation of due process and recognizing that although history is the starting point in a
substantive due process inquiry, it is not the ending point in all cases).
214 Consider the end of the “Lochner era.” In the early 1900s, the Supreme Court
recognized a fundamental right to contract and struck down a New York statue for limiting
that right. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 74 (1905) (stating the freedom of master
and employee to contract with each other cannot be interfered with). Then in 1937, the
Supreme Court determined that the fundamental right to contract must be limited by
upholding a minimum wage law for women. See West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S.
379, 392 (1937) (“Freedom of contract is a qualified, and not an absolute, right.”). This
change was likely motivated by the increase in government control during the Great
Depression. Id. at 399–400.
215 Reading between the lines of the Magna Carta shows other meanings to the
document. Nicholas Vincent, A Letter of 9 July 1214 Showing King John’s Disquiet,
MAGNA CARTA PROJECT (Sept. 2014), https://magnacarta.cmp.uea.ac.uk/read/
feature_of_the_month/Sep_2014_2 [https://perma.cc/X2U4-MCC8].
216 Helmholz, supra note 83, at 1490; see also Andrew T. Bodoh, The Road to “Due
Process”: Evolving Constitutional Language from 1776 to 1789, 40 T. JEFFERSON L. REV.
103, 113–14 (2018) (“A series of statutes enacted during Edward III’s reign (1327–1377)
specified and updated the interests protected and the nature of the protections afforded
under the Magna Carta’s law of the land and denial of justice clauses. These statutes are
the original link between due process language and the Magna Carta. . . . . Further, a 1363
statute (37. Edw. 3, ch. 18) interpreted the Magna Carta as prohibiting taking or
imprisoning a man, or putting him out of his freehold, ‘without process of the law.’”).
217 402 U.S. 183, 243–45 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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point in time by saying:
[T]o hold that such a characteristic is essential to due process of
law, would be to deny every quality of the law but its age, and to
render it incapable of progress or improvement. It would be to
stamp upon our jurisprudence the unchangeableness attributed to
the laws of the Medes and Persians. 218

Certainly, Justice Douglas considered the Constitution and, in
effect, the Magna Carta, to be living documents. While his was the
dissenting opinion, Justice Douglas’ reasoning may, as society
evolves, form the basis for a future majority opinion. In light of the
two competing views as to the weight that historical understandings
should have when identifying rights, the Magna Carta will continue
to play a role as a foundation for fundamental rights and liberties
protected by the U.S. Constitution.
The Court has cited the Magna Carta to both expand and limit
the scope of protection that “liberty” entails. For example, one of
the Court’s most recent in-depth treatments of the Magna Carta that
discusses a narrowing of the scope of “liberty” is found in Justice
Thomas’s 2015 dissenting opinion in Obergefell v. Hodges. 219
Justice Thomas relied on William Blackstone’s interpretation of the
Magna Carta as historical support for the proposition that the
original meaning of the term “liberty” does not encompass the
fundamental right to marry. 220 In contrast to the dissenting Justice
Thomas, the majority in Obergefell held that because the right to
marriage is a fundamental right, same-sex couples cannot be
deprived of the right to marry under the Due Process and Equal
Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. 221 Obergefell
218 Id. at 243 (quoting Hurtado, 110 U.S. at 529). Some legal professionals criticize
Douglas’s opinions because “[t]here is too much reliance upon the raw facts of life,
generalities about human liberty and dignity . . . too much Magna Carta[.]” Stephen B.
Duke, Mr. Justice Douglas, 11 HARV. CIV. RTS.-CIV. LIBERTIES L. REV. 241, 241 (1976).
Justice Douglas was known to be ahead of his time in his opinions as he was often
criticized for basing them on moral values instead of previous court decisions. For
example, he wanted to desegregate school years before the Brown v. Board of Education
decision. He was also known for his beliefs against too much government and the
oppression of individual rights. David J. Garrow, The Tragedy of William O. Douglas,
NATION (Mar. 27, 2003), https://www.thenation.com/article/tragedy-william-o-douglas/
[https://perma.cc/9SNH-2ETJ].
219 See 576 U.S. at 720–36 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
220 Id. at 723–25.
221 Id. at 675–76, 681 (majority opinion). “The right of same-sex couples to marry
that is part of the liberty promised by the Fourteenth Amendment is derived, too, from that
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examined due process, which is contained within the Magna Carta,
and used an old right to create a new right for same-sex couples to
marry. When the Magna Carta was written, the writers probably did
not think that one day the Magna Carta’s due process could be used
to give same-sex couples the right to marry. Justice Thomas’s
disagreement with the majority was two-fold and dealt with both the
Fifth Amendment 222 and the Fourteenth Amendment. 223
Justice Thomas explained that his view of “liberty” is based on
Blackstone’s interpretation of Clause 29 of the Magna Carta and
refers only to freedom from physical restraint, and not an
entitlement to government benefits. 224 He further explained that the
Due Process Clause dates back to the Great Charter’s Clause 29,
which provides that “[n]o free man shall be taken imprisoned,
disseised [sic], outlawed, banished, or in any way destroyed, nor
will We proceed against or prosecute him, except by the lawful
judgment of his peers and by law of the land.” 225 Justice Thomas
reasoned that in discussing the “absolute rights of every
Englishman” affirmed and codified by Clause 29, 226 Blackstone
Amendment’s guarantee of the equal protection of the laws.” Id. at 672. “[T]he right to
marry is a fundamental right inherent in the liberty of the person, and under the Due
Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment couples of the samesex may not be deprived of that right and that liberty.” Id. at 675. Other approaches to
this analysis have also been favored. For instance, “the Hawaii Supreme Court held
Hawaii’s law restricting marriage to opposite-sex couples constituted a classification on
the basis of sex and was therefore subject to strict scrutiny under the Hawaii Constitution.”
Id. at 662 (citing Baehr v. Lewin, 74 Haw. 530, 852 P.2d 44 (1930)); see also Evan
Gerstmann, Fourteenth Amendment, Fundamental Rights, and Same-Sex Marriage, 17
INSIGHTS ON L. & SOC’Y 18, 19–21 (2017) (discussing the historical role of the Fourteenth
Amendment and its application to same-sex couples).
222 In a case about the federal Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause, not the Fourth
Amendment (e.g., searches and seizures), the Court held “that racial segregation in the
public schools of the District of Columbia is a denial of the due process of law guaranteed
by the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution.” Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954).
223 First, Justice Thomas explained that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment does not protect substantive rights. Obergefell, 576 U.S. at 722 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting) (“By straying from the text of the Constitution, substantive due process exalts
judges at the expense of the People from whom they derive their authority.”). Second,
even if the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause protects substantive rights, the samesex couple petitioners were not deprived of the “liberty” that the Fourteenth Amendment
protects. Id. at 725.
224 Id. at 721–26.
225 Id. at 723.
226 See The English and Colonial Roots of the U.S. Bill of Rights, supra note 182 and
accompanying text (listing some basic rights whose origins trace to the Magna Carta).
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defined “the right of personal liberty” 227 as “the power of
locomotion, of changing situation, or removing one’s person to
whatsoever place one’s own inclination may direct; without
imprisonment or restraint, unless by due process of law.” 228 Justice
Thomas’s dissent illustrates the nexus of Clause 29 and
Blackstone’s interpretation. 229
The Court has also cited the Magna Carta to broaden the scope
of the term “liberty.” For example, the Court has cited the Magna
Carta to discuss and clarify the right to travel. In Kent v. Dulles, 230
the Court ruled that the right to travel is an inherent element of
“liberty” protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment. 231 The Court explained that “[the] right was emerging
at least as early as the Magna Carta” and cited to the Great Charter’s
Article 42:
It shall be lawful to any person, for the future, to go out of our
kingdom, and to return, safely and securely, by land or by water,
saving his allegiance to us, unless it be in time of war, for some
short space, for the common good of the kingdom: excepting
prisoners and outlaws, according to the laws of the land, and of
the people of the nation at war against us, and Merchants who
shall be treated as it is said above. 232

The Supreme Court’s use of the Magna Carta supports the
notion that its principles expand beyond the text itself. Looking to
the “mind” of the Magna Carta gives courts a larger scope of
freedom in making decisions. 233 An example can be seen in Sir
227 See infra Parts II.A, B (noting that the Magna Carta did not create substantive
rights, but affirmed and codified rights present since “time immemorial”).
228 Id. (citing 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *130). Indeed, the Magna
Carta may be considered relevant even after 800 years, as it may foster fundamental rights.
Eric Engle, Death Is Unconstitutional: How Capital Punishment Became Illegal in
America--A Future History, 6 PIERCE L. REV. 485, 488–93 (2008) (arguing that the
principles established by the Magna Carta will lead to the eventual outlawing of the death
penalty).
229 Justice Scalia’s plurality opinion in Kerry v. Din, joined by Justices Roberts and
Thomas and decided only eleven days before Obergefell v. Hodges, reiterates the notion
that the definition of liberty as stated by the Magna Carta is limited to physical liberties.
This opinion rejects the argument that due process was incorrectly denied when the visa
of the spouse of U.S. citizen was denied. Kerry, 576 U.S. at 91–92.
230 357 U.S. 116 (1958).
231 Id. at 125.
232 Id. at 125 n.12 (citing to the 1225 edition of the Magna Carta).
233 Helmholz, supra note 83, at 1490.
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Edward Coke’s interpretation of the charter in his Institutes. 234
Although he supported the declaratory effect the Magna Carta had
on English law and liberty, he recognized the possibility of change
to ancient law. 235 Coke interpreted the Magna Carta to promote the
creation of amendments to existing laws. 236 Further, Coke
interpreted the principles of Magna Carta to impact a greater
purpose in the emergence of future laws. 237 The Framers of the
Constitution had a similar understanding of the significance of the
Magna Carta, specifically in relation to substantive due process. 238
The Constitution’s reliance on an implied meaning of the principles
of the Charter should encourage courts to rely on this interpretation
when exploring new rights.
3. The Magna Carta and Protection of the Internet
With the June 2018 repeal of Net Neutrality, 239 many internet
users—while seeking to protect their unrestrained access to the
internet— 240 have joined the campaign for a “Digital Magna Carta
(DMC)”; 241 this is the result of a 3,000 participant survey conducted
by the British Library with the purpose of creating a top ten list of
internet declarations. 242 Sir Tim Berners-Lee, the inventor of the
Id. at 1490–91.
Id. at 1491.
236 Id.
237 Id. at 1491–92. Coke continued to support the idea that the principles of the Magna
Carta should be interpreted beyond the words of the text. For instance, Coke interpreted
the guarantee of rights to “free men” to apply to both women and men. See id. at 1491–
92. The rights of these “free men” were to be protected by the Charter’s text. See id.; see
also Crennan, supra note 83, at 337.
238 See Helmholz, supra note 83, at 1475.
239 Alina Selyukh, FCC Takes Another Step Toward Repeal of Net Neutrality, NPR
(Feb. 22, 2018), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2018/02/22/587896608/fccsrepeal-of-net-neutrality-on-track-to-go-into-efffect [https://perma.cc/Q9PR-MDHR]; see
also Keith Collins, Net Neutrality Has Officially Been Repealed. Here’s How that Could
Affect You., N.Y. TIMES (June 11, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/11/
technology/net-neutrality-repeal.html [https://perma.cc/S94K-TZ92].
240 Alex McClintock, 8 Ways Magna Carta Still Affects Life in 2015: Net Neutrality,
ABC NEWS, http://www.abc.net.au/news/2015-06-15/magna-carta-800-years/6538364
[https://perma.cc/2399-K5UD] (last updated Oct. 9, 2016).
241 Id.
242 Jamie Redman, Millennials Demand Web Freedoms in ‘Digital Magna Carta’,
COINTELEGRAPH (June 16, 2015), https://cointelegraph.com/news/millennials-demandweb-freedoms-in-digital-magna-carta [https://perma.cc/FA7J-HTLC].
234
235
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World Wide Web, has expressed his support for the DMC. 243
Broadly interpreted, this may be viewed as a reaffirmation of rights
that have been in existence since time immemorial. The technology
is new, but the rights are venerable, and a long-revered document
espousing basic rights, such as the Magna Carta or the U.S.
Constitution, may apply to internet freedom.
This provides an interesting question with respect to how far the
Great Charter’s protection of rights can evolve. Certainly,
unrestrained internet access was not contemplated by the drafters of
either the Magna Carta or U.S. Constitution. This begs the question:
can the Magna Carta protect net neutrality moving forward? The
Magna Carta provides a due process safeguard for “liberties,” which
can be an extremely broad term. 244 This can be likened to the United
Nations’ Universal Declaration of Human Rights (“UDHR”) and
the European Convention on Human Rights (“ECHR”), both
inspired by the Magna Carta and both calling for a respect of one’s
privacy. 245 This right is embodied in the Magna Carta because these
treatises represent the new natural law, which the Magna Carta must
match. 246 It is not difficult to imagine such protection when the
internet provider might be likened to a modern day version of King
John. With the internet being the primary source by which
information is currently disseminated, the danger of net neutrality
repeal cannot be overstated. Without neutrality, companies will
theoretically be able to restrict which websites individuals may be
able to access freely moving forward. 247 The ultimate reality of
which websites are accessible without a fee or amercement may
come down to arbitrary decisions made under unbridled individual
or institutional authority. 248
The Magna Carta’s influence on the protection of an open and
Id.
Magna Carta (1225), cl. 49, supra note 194 at 45.
245 G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 12 (Dec. 10,
1948); Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
[European Convention on Human Rights] art. 8, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221.
246 See JOHN M. FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS (2d ed. 2011)
(providing an overview and introduction to natural law and its various theories); infra notes
371–379 and accompanying text (discussing natural law and the Magna Carta).
247 McClintock, supra note 240. This may also involve issues regarding First
Amendment speech, but for the sake of this Article, the discussion is limited to “liberty”
and the Magna Carta.
248 Selyukh, supra note 239.
243
244
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neutral internet hinges on its definition as a liberty interest. The
Magna Carta protects human rights through its imposition of due
process, and among those rights are the rights to freedom of
expression, the press, and speech. The First Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution protects the right to free speech and freedom of the
press: this is especially important in the context of free internet
access to younger generations, who increasingly derive news
information and communicate through social media platforms. 249 In
addition to free access to the internet being protected under Magna
Carta due process principles and U.S. Constitution free speech
principles, the United Nations added internet access to the
UDHR. 250 It did so by interpreting UDHR Article 19, which
encompasses the uninhibited right to receive or disseminate
information through any medium, as a universal human right, to
internet access. 251
Multiple sovereigns opposed the resolution under the UDHR
protecting free internet access, but the United States was not one of
them. 252 Though the United States did not oppose the resolution, it
has not been motivated to strictly abide U.N. declarations and
resolutions. 253 Article 19 was made to address more extreme
249 J. Clement, Internet Usage of Millennials in the United States – Statistics & Facts,
STATISTA (Nov. 20, 2019), https://www.statista.com/topics/2576/us-millennials-internetusage-and-online-shopping/ [https://perma.cc/FT4R-KRHR] (stating that 48% of adults
between the ages of 18 and 29 report that they are online “almost constantly”); Tim
Berners-Lee, We Need a Magna Carta for the Internet, 31 NEW PERSP. Q. 39, 40 (2014)
(describing the internet as a public utility); see also U.S. CONST. amend. I.
250 Catherine Howell & Darrell M. West, The Internet as a Human Right, BROOKINGS
(Nov. 7, 2016), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/techtank/2016/11/07/the-internet-as-ahuman-right/ [https://perma.cc/NC5B-X4Y7] (“Section 32 adds [to UDHR Article 19]
‘The promotion, protection and enjoyment of human rights on the Internet’ and another 15
recommendations that cover the rights of those who work in and rely on internet access.
It also applies to women, girls, and those heavily impacted by the digital divide.”).
251 UDHR Article 19 does not expressly include the word “access” but instead
mentions the right to freely express opinions, including the right to receive and disseminate
those opinions without interference: “Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and
expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek,
receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers.”
G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, supra note 245, art. 19. In effect, the universal right embraces a
right to access, as declared in an interpretative, non-binding resolution. Now, 193 U.N.
members have signed and adopted the resolution, which marked a global shift towards
internet access truly being recognized as a human right. Howell & West, supra note 250.
252 See Howell & West, supra note 250.
253 That could be seen as indicated by the United States’ refusal to follow the UDHR’s
trend of prohibiting the death penalty. The Article certainly could be classified as merely
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instances of internet restriction: one such U.N. report was released
to address the total shutdown of Syria’s internet because of political
unrest. 254 It has become clear that on the international scene, the
United States’ position is that the right to free internet access is a
basic human right. Domestically, however, it is not clear how far a
U.S. citizen’s right to the internet extends when taken in comparison
to an internet service provider’s right to profit therefrom.
With the Federal Communication Commission’s repeal of Net
Neutrality, the U.S. Supreme Court will likely have to confront this
issue. The Supreme Court has not addressed whether internet
access is a right, only saying that overbroad restriction of the
internet raises constitutional concerns. 255 Recently, the Court of
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit deferred to 2005 precedent with the
court deciding to uphold the FCC’s decision to strip neutrality rules
from the internet, but the FCC cannot block states from writing their
own neutrality laws. 256 The public’s protection against the overbroad restriction of the internet in many ways hearkens back to the
due process guaranteed through the Magna Carta, as well as its
incorporation into the U.S. Constitution’s First Amendment.
B. The Magna Carta and the Right to a Jury Trial
The Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution guarantees the
various rights of criminal defendants, including the rights to a trial
by jury, to an attorney, and to a trial without unnecessary delay. 257
“soft law.” Id.
254 Id.; Nicholas Thompson, Why Did Syria Shut Down the Internet, NEW YORKER
(May 8, 2013), https://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/why-did-syria-shutdown-the-internet [https://perma.cc/LBZ9-4ZEK].
255 Reno v. Am. Civ. Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 844 (1997) (holding that facially
overbroad restrictions of internet content were in violation of the First Amendment). But
see United States v. Am. Libr. Ass’n, 539 U.S. 194, 194 (2003) (requiring libraries to
utilize internet filters to protect children from vulgar content as a requisite for the receipt
of federal funding not a violation under the First Amendment).
256 See Nilay Patel, The Court Allowed the FCC to Kill Net Neutrality Because
Washing Machines Can’t Make Phone Calls, VERGE (Oct. 4, 2019),
https://www.theverge.com/2019/10/4/20898779/fcc-net-neutrality-court-of-appealsdecision-ruling [https://perma.cc/C7V5-46WB]. The court declined to rehear the case on
February 6, 2020. David Shepardson, U.S. Appeals Court Will Not Reconsider Net
Neutrality Repeal Ruling, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Feb. 6, 2020),
https://www.usnews.com/news/technology/articles/2020-02-06/us-appeals-court-willnot-reconsider-net-neutrality-repeal-case [https://perma.cc/423Z-AWNN].
257 The Sixth Amendment states:
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The U.S. Supreme Court has relied on the Magna Carta for
historical support in interpreting these rights. In its Sixth
Amendment jurisprudence, the Supreme Court has specifically
cited to Clause 39 of the Magna Carta, which states in relevant part:
“[n]o free man 258 shall be seized or imprisoned, . . . except by
lawful judgment of his equals or by the law of the land.” 259 The
Court has also cited to language in Clause 40 which states: “To no
one will we sell, to no one deny or delay right or justice.” 260
Much of the Magna Carta’s Clause 40 language was
incorporated into the Virginia Declaration of Rights in 1776 and
from there into the Sixth Amendment. 261 The Speedy Trial
provision is “an important safeguard to prevent undue and
oppressive incarceration prior to trial” 262 and serves “a societal
interest in providing a speedy trial which exists separate from and
at times in opposition to the interests of the accused.” 263 The public
benefit is centered around the considerable expense of supporting
persons in jail, as well as the hardship to the accused persons’

In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall
have been committed, which district shall have previously ascertained by law, and
to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with
the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in
his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
258 Freemen constituted a small percentage of the population at the time of the Magna
Carta’s drafting; freemen were held to be tenant farmers who maintained “freehold title to
their farms” or estates. This definition expanded over time to include “all Englishmen (not
women)[.]” Magna Carta Guaranteed the Freemen of the Kingdom Their Liberties
Forever (1215), ONLINE LIBR. OF LIBERTY, https://oll.libertyfund.org/quotes/508
[https://perma.cc/Y3YR-SS7X] (last visited Jan. 21, 2021); see MCKECHNIE, supra note
58, at 114–16.
259 Magna Carta (1215), supra note 73, cl. 39. But see Thomas J. McSweeney, Magna
Carta and the Right to Trial by Jury, in MAGNA CARTA: MUSE AND MENTOR 139, 146–49
(Randy J. Holland ed., Thomson Reuters 2014) (noting that cl. 39 originally did not
guarantee a right to a jury trial). The fallacy will be further discussed later.
260 Magna Carta (1215), supra note 73, cl. 40; see also Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386
U.S. 213, 223 (1967) (quoting Clause 40 of the 1215 Magna Carta).
261 7 THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER
ORGANIC LAWS OF THE STATES AND TERRITORIES NOW OR HERETOFORE FORMING THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 3813 (Francis N. Thorpe ed., 1909), as reprinted in H. Doc.
No. 357 (2d Sess. 1909).
262 United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116, 120 (1966).
263 Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 519 (1972).
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families; furthermore, any delay might stymie the deterrent and
rehabilitative effects of the criminal law. 264
The U.S. Supreme Court has also cited to the Magna Carta in
Sixth Amendment jurisprudence to support the proposition that the
right to a trial by jury is a long-standing right that dates back to the
Magna Carta. 265 However, the Court later acknowledged that the
Magna Carta itself may not have referred to a jury trial. 266 As early
as 1879, the U.S. Supreme Court cited Blackstone in his
Commentaries to explain that the right to a jury trial was enshrined
in the Magna Carta. 267 In 1898, in a case that has now been
overturned, the Court asserted, “[w]hen [the] Magna Carta declared
that no freeman should be deprived of life, etc., ‘but by the judgment
of his peers or by the law of the land,’ it referred to a trial by twelve
jurors.” 268
1. Clause 29
In McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, a plurality of the Court concluded
that the constitutional right to a jury trial does not apply in juvenile
cases. 269 Justice Douglas’ dissenting opinion in McKeiver cited to
264 See id.; Dickey v. Florida, 398 U.S. 30, 42 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring). The
Speedy Trial Act of 1974, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161–3174, codified the law with respect to the
right, intending “to give effect to the sixth amendment right to a speedy trial.” S. REP. NO.
1021, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., at 1 (1974).
265 See, e.g., United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 239 (2005) (asserting that “the
right to a jury trial [has] been enshrined since the Magna Carta”); Walton v. Arizona, 497
U.S. 639, 711 (1990) (explaining that “by the time our Constitution was written, jury trial
in criminal cases . . . carried impressive credentials traced by many to Magna Carta”
(quoting Duncan, 391 U.S. at 150 (1968))); McDonald, 561 U.S. at 815 (2010) (Thomas,
J., concurring) (recognizing that certain basic liberties, including the right to a jury trial,
date back to the Magna Carta).
266 See infra notes 273–279 and accompanying text.
267 See Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 308–09 (1879) (“Blackstone, in his
Commentaries, says, ‘The right of trial by jury, or the country, is a trial by the peers of
every Englishman, and is the grand bulwark of his liberties, and is secured to him by the
Great Charter.’”).
268 See Thompson v. Utah, 170 U.S. 343, 349 (1898).
269 See McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 545 (1971) (concluding that the right
to a jury trial does not apply to juveniles, explaining that the Sixth Amendment rights that
apply to juveniles, including the right to a lawyer or the right to cross-examination, are
guaranteed to juveniles for fact-finding purposes, reasoning, however, that a jury is not a
necessary component of accurate fact-finding, and concluding also that the Sixth
Amendment’s right to a jury trial does not apply in the context of juvenile court because
juvenile prosecution considered neither civil nor criminal).
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the Magna Carta as historical support for the argument that the right
to a jury trial is not limited in scope to the protection of adults. 270
Justice Douglas quoted the language of Clause 29 of the Magna
Carta, which provides that freemen should not be imprisoned unless
by the lawful judgment of his peers. 271 Justice Douglas explained
that like adults, juveniles also fit within the Magna Carta’s reference
to a “freeman,” and as such should enjoy the same constitutional
rights. 272
Despite this promising reference to the Magna Carta with
respect to an accused’s right to a speedy trial, scholars generally
agree that Clause 29’s mention of the phrase “judgment of his
peers” does not refer to a jury trial. 273 At the time of the Magna
Carta’s drafting, England did not have jury trials. 274 As jury trials
began to frequently occur, 275 interpreting the Magna Carta’s
reference to “lawful judgment of his peers” to mean “trial by jury”
served as a natural progression of the interpretation of the Magna
Carta with changing times and legal procedures. 276 As such, many
people, including Supreme Court justices, construed “judgment of
his peers” to equate to a right to trial by jury. 277 For example, in his
Id. at 563 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
Id.
272 Id.
273 See POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 38, at 25, 184 n.124 (“[I]t is now generally
admitted that the phrase iudicium parium does not point to trial by jury . . . [but rather that]
‘No man shall be judged by his inferior who is not his peer[.]”); MCKECHNIE, supra note
58, at 84 (“One persistent error, adopted for many centuries, and even now hard to dispel,
is that the Great Charter guaranteed trial by jury.”); Felix Frankfurter & Thomas G.
Corcoran, Petty Federal Offenses and the Constitutional Guaranty of Trial by Jury, 39
HARV. L. REV. 917, 922 n.14 (1926) (referring to the linkage between “judgment of his
peers” and a trial by jury as an ancient error).
274 See Donald S. Lutz, The State Constitutional Pedigree of the U.S. Bill of Rights,
22 PUBLIUS 2, 19–20 (1992) (“Although I know whenever the great rights, the trial by jury,
freedom of the press, or liberty of conscience, come in question [in Parliament] the
invasion of them is resisted by able advocates, yet their Magna Charta does not contain
any one provision for the security of those rights . . . . ” (quoting James Madison for
comparisons between the U.S. Bill of Rights and the Magna Carta)).
275 See Holt, supra note 46, at 62 (noting that reading “lawful judgment of his peers”
to mean “trial by jury” is an interpretation that is a “natural and logical progression” of the
Magna Carta but in the year 1215 did not exist).
276 See id.
277 See Justin J. Wert, With a Little Help from a Friend: Habeas Corpus and the
Magna Carta After Runnymede, 43 PS: POL. SCI. & POLS. 475, 477 (2010) (discussing that
some scholars argue that the right to jury trial, though not explicit in the Magna Carta,
270
271
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dissenting opinion, Justice Douglas noted that the phrase “judgment
of his peers” in Clause 29 of the Magna Carta is a reference to a jury
trial. 278 Conversely, the U.S. Supreme Court has acknowledged that
it may have been wrong in citing to the Magna Carta to forge a
connection between Clause 29 and the right to a jury trial. 279
Historians have generally interpreted Clause 29 to set forth the
right to a trial, though not necessarily one by jury, because jury trials
did not exist in England at the time the Magna Carta was drafted. 280
By 1215, as long described by commentators and historians, 281
there were three types of trials in England: (1) trial by

could be implied).
278 See McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 571 (recognizing that “‘[j]udgment of his peers’ is a
term expressly borrowed from the Magna Charta, and it means a trial by jury” (citing Ex
parte Wagner, 50 P.2d 1135, 1139 (Okla. Crim. App. 1935))).
279 See Duncan, 391 U.S. at 151 (1968) (explaining that it is sufficient to say that by
the time the U.S. Constitution had been written, jury trial had been in existence in England
for several centuries although it is disputed whether the right to a jury trial can be traced
to the Magna Carta); Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 91 n.27 (1970) (acknowledging
that whether “judgment of his peers” is a reference to a jury is a fact that historians dispute).
280 See, e.g., Laura Logiudice, The Never Ending Story of the Peremptory Challenge:
Racial Discrimination in the New Jersey System, 7 SETON HALL L.J. 617, 623 (1997)
(“Although the Magna Carta supposedly guaranteed a trial by jury, it was not until the
Roman Catholic Church prohibited other forms of justice, and upon a writ by Henry II in
early 1219, that criminal jury trials began to occur on a regular basis.”); MCKECHNIE, supra
note 58, at 250 (arguing that to introduce trial by jury into the Magna Carta is an
unpardonable anachronism because the criminal petty jury had not been invented in 1215);
HOLT, supra note 4, at 10 (explaining that the Magna Carta’s reference to “lawful judgment
of peers” could not have meant trial by jury because the process existed only in “embryo”
in 1215).
281 Walker Clark, Magna Carta and Trial by Jury, 2 N.C. L. REV. 1, 1–2 (1923)
(explaining the three types of trials in England in 1215 and recognizing that the first
authentic instance of a trial by jury in England occurred in the year 1351, long after the
signing of the Magna Carta).
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compurgation, 282 (2) trial by ordeal, 283 and, lastly, (3) trial by
battle. 284 Many defendants actually preferred trials by battle to the
other forms of trials because it was the only way to avoid perjury. 285
As established, Clause 29’s reference to a “judgment of his
peers” does not necessarily refer to a jury trial; instead, the phrase
merely required that every judgment be delivered by the accused
person’s equals. 286 At the time of the Magna Carta’s drafting, King
John frequently and arbitrarily seized the properties of his subjects
without any legal process of confiscation or opportunity for the

282 Trial by compurgation involved the summoning of compurgators, specifically the
defendant’s neighbors and friends, to swear to their belief in the truth of the claim against
the defendant. JOHN BRIGGS, ET. AL, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN ENGLAND: AN
INTRODUCTORY HISTORY 5 (1996). The compurgators would not swear to the truth of the
claim in light of the evidence before them; instead, their swearing was based on their
personal knowledge of the defendant’s reputation and the nature of the alleged offense.
See id. at 4. Even after the compurgators had put in their two cents, the judge ultimately
decided the matter. Clark, supra note 281, at 3 (“Scattered references to a trial by
jury . . . have been shown to refer solely to trial by compurgators, which was simply the
summoning of witnesses for either side who swore only as to their belief as to which party
was right and the matter was decided, not by a jury as we know it, but by the judge.”).
283 In a trial by ordeal, the innocence or guilt of the defendant was determined through
several unpleasant tests. For example, in a trial by hot iron, a defendant was forced to
carry a heated weight of iron throughout a specified distance. If three days later, the
defendant’s hand healed without festering, the defendant was considered innocent. Briggs
also describes in detail other forms of trial by ordeal. For example, a trial by consecrated
bread was normally reserved to determine the guilt or innocence of a cleric. The defendant
is forced to swallow a piece of consecrated bread; if the defendant choked, the defendant
was guilty. See BRIGGS ET AL., supra note 282, at 5.
284 Trials by battle required two persons to fight to the death, often on horseback with
sword, shield, and spear. See POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 38, at 39, 44 (explaining
that William the Conqueror introduced trial by battle into England through “[a]n
apparently genuine ordinance” which allowed Englishmen to choose trial by battle in their
lawsuits but also expressly allowed them to decline the option).
285 See id. at 50.
286 See id. at 173 n.3.
The spirit of the clause is excellently expressed by a passage in the laws ascribed
to David of Scotland: Acts of Parliament, vol. i. p. 318: “No man shall be judged
by his inferior who is not his peer; the earl shall be judged by the earl, the baron
by the baron, the vavassor by the vavassor, the burgess by the burgess; but an
inferior may be judged by a superior.” Some of John’s justices were certainly not
of baronial rank. Just at this same moment the French magnates also were striving
for a court of peers; Luchaire, Manuel des institutions, p. 560; they did not want
trial by jury.
Id. (emphasis in original).
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hearing of objections. 287 As a result, whenever a dispute with the
king arose, usually over land, the barons wanted to ensure that their
disputes with the king would be settled by men of their own rank
and status. 288 By having disputes settled by individuals of similar
socioeconomic status, the barons would be ensured a more
thorough, fair, and reasonable judgment, as opposed to an arbitrary
ruling by the king without any checks or balances. 289
2. A Limited Right: Green v. United States and
Thereafter
In the modern era, Clause 29 of the Magna Carta may no longer
appear in the Supreme Court’s opinions concerning the right to a
jury trial, at least in any significant way. That is due to the general
historical consensus that Clause 29 does not support the right to a
jury trial, but rather to a trial in general. The Supreme Court’s
previous reliance on Clause 29 for historical support was based on
the aforementioned error, and the argument is no longer viable. 290
The possibility of reference is further diminished by the fact that the
Court itself has acknowledged the error. 291
This mistake was discussed in Green v. United States. 292 Justice
Frankfurter’s concurrence noted that the Magna Carta cited in
contemporary jurisprudence is not the same Magna Carta that was
originally created at Runnymede. 293 In Green, the defendants had
violated their surrender orders and were on trial for criminal
contempt without a jury being present. 294 Sentenced to three years
in prison, the defendants argued that the punishment outside of the

See MCKECHNIE, supra note 58, at 214–17, 221–22, 441–44.
See Clark, supra note 281, at 1–3 (“The Barons in their combination against King
John were not only anxious to protect themselves against the arbitrary power of the King
but to fence off and prohibit the jurisdiction of the Common Law Courts of the Kingdom
as to themselves and hence arose the much misunderstood expression in Magna Carta that
they should be tried solely by the judgment (not a jury) of their peers.”).
289 See generally J. C. Holt, The Making of Magna Carta, 72 ENG. HIST. REV. 401
(1957) (discussing the formation of the Magna Carta and the barons’ strategies in
negotiating with the king).
290 See supra notes 269–289 and accompanying text.
291 See supra note 279 and accompanying text.
292 356 U.S. 165, 192–93 (1958).
293 Id. at 189.
294 Id. at 168.
287
288
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presence of a jury exceeded the judge’s authority. 295 Secondly, the
defendants argued that criminal contempt hearings were among
those with a constitutional guarantee to a jury trial. 296 Frankfurter
mentioned the Magna Carta’s involvement and addressed the
existence of a mistake of interpretation in previous jurisprudence.297
He further mentioned that the mistake did not undermine the century
of case law regarding precedent. 298
The Green majority ruled that certain types of contempt,
including the type involved in that case, were not guaranteed a jury
trial. 299 The Green court also noted that the Magna Carta’s
influence in Supreme Court jurisprudence is not absolute. There
had never been a constitutional doubt of punishing for contempt
without the intervention of the jury prior to the defendants’
challenge. 300
The Green decision was, however, later restricted. In Bloom v.
State of Illinois, the Supreme Court held that the denial of a jury
trial for serious charges of contempt was indeed a constitutional
violation. 301 Without mentioning the Magna Carta in the opinion,
this decision was more in line with its “judgment by the law of the
land” principle contained in the original Great Charter’s Clause 39.
Contempt procedures are punitive in nature with the possibility of
arrest or imprisonment. 302 Thus, Clause 29 of the Magna Carta
(1225) is likewise invoked. 303
Despite the mistaken reliance, the Supreme Court is not likely
to completely abandon its use of historical support when discussing
the right to a jury trial. To add historical importance to this right,
the Supreme Court is more likely to cite to the long-standing
recognition of the right in English common law than to cite the

Id.
Id.
297 Id. at 189.
298 Green, 356 U.S. at 189.
299 Id. at 187 (“The principle that criminal contempt of court [is] not required to be
tried by a jury under Article III or the Sixth Amendment is firmly rooted in our
traditions.”).
300 Id. at 190.
301 391 U.S. 194, 201 (1968).
302 Criminal Contempt, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
303 Magna Carta (1225), cl. 29, supra note 194, at 45.
295
296
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language of the Magna Carta specifically. 304 Even then, any
citations to the Magna Carta or English common law are likely to
be a quick reference without any need for elaboration, as the right
to a jury trial is expressly set forth in the Sixth Amendment,305
Article III of the Constitution, 306 and further detailed through a
body of case law. 307
However, the previous mistake does present an interesting
opportunity for the future of the Magna Carta: as noted in Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, a previous decision may only be overturned
based on 1) the workability of any new rules, 2) strong reliance on
the prior holding would lead to special hardships as a consequence
of its overruling, 3) no related principles of law have developed so
far that the decision’s reasoning or rationale is obsolete, and 4) the
facts surrounding the decision have changed to such a degree that
the decision is no longer justified. 308 As noted above, the facts
surrounding the previous Magna Carta decisions have changed.
Thus, one of the requirements has been satisfied. 309 Additionally, a
change in the Supreme Court’s composition may prime the
interpretation of the Magna Carta for a change in its future. 310 In
304 Another possible source of reference may include the English Petition of Rights,
art. III (1628). English and Colonial Roots, supra note 182.
305 “In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial.” U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
306 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3. (“The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of
Impeachment, shall be by Jury.”).
307 See Colleen P. Murphy, The Narrowing of the Entitlement to Criminal Jury Trial,
1997 WIS. L. REV. 133, 145–46 (1997) (outlining the judicially-created tests that courts
apply when determining whether an entitlement to a jury trial exists); see also Green, 356
U.S. at 189 (arguing, in the context of contempt, “[t]he fact that scholarship has shown
that historical assumptions regarding the procedure for punishment of contempt of court
were ill-founded, hardly wipes out a century and a half of the legislative and judicial
history of federal law based on such assumptions”).
308 505 U.S. 833, 854–55 (1992).
309 The change being historians and the Court’s realization that there was no allusion
to a jury trial in the Magna Carta. See Duncan, 391 U.S. at 151 (explaining that it is
sufficient to say that by the time the U.S. Constitution had been written, jury trial had been
in existence in England for several centuries although it is disputed whether the right to a
jury trial can be traced to the Magna Carta).
310 With the passing of Justice Antonin Scalia, Justice Neil M. Gorsuch was
appointed. Current Members, SUP. CT. OF THE U.S., https://www.supremecourt.gov/
about/biographies.aspx [https://perma.cc/P7YU-E457] (last visited July 26, 2020).
Gorsuch’s appointment is not likely to alter any historically-based jurisprudence since he
and his predecessor share a common Constitutional view. Neil Gorsuch, OYEZ,
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the event that an issue regarding the Magna Carta and its protection
of a jury trial arises, the Supreme Court already has one of the keys
to overturning precedent. However, the jury trial is guaranteed
under the U.S. Constitution, 311 hence insusceptible to “reform”
without a strong challenge in court.
In conclusion, the right to a jury is not absolute. For some cases
there is no right for a case to be heard before a jury. As stated in the
Magna Carta, all people are entitled to a “lawful judgment of his
peers.” 312 The procedural protections developed through modern
procedural rules and jurisprudence have continued to uphold and
guarantee this foundational principle of the Great Charter. Though
not often directly cited with respect to an accused’s right to a jury
trial, the principles originally codified by the Magna Carta continue
to be upheld as foundational substantive rights to this day and are
likely to continue to be protected and held as such well into the
future.
C. The Magna Carta and Cruel and Unusual Punishment
In its Eighth Amendment 313 jurisprudence, the U.S. Supreme
Court has relied on the Magna Carta primarily to analyze the
meaning of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause and to
support the proposition that citizens are to be protected against
arbitrary punishments. 314 The linkage of the Eighth Amendment to
the Magna Carta is based on the uniformity in language between the
Virginia Declaration of Rights, the English Bill of Rights, and the
Eighth Amendment. The specific language of the Eighth
Amendment was drawn from Section 9 of the Virginia Declaration

https://www.oyez.org/justices/neil_gorsuch [https://perma.cc/S6Q7-YPX5] (last visited
July 26, 2020). Likewise, moderate-conservative Justice Anthony Kennedy was replaced
by a more conservative Justice, Brett Kavanaugh. Amelia Thomson-DeVeaux, The
Supreme Court Might Have Three Swing Justices Now, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (July 2, 2019),
https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/the-supreme-court-might-have-three-swing-justicesnow/ [https://perma.cc/WUJ2-VG3Z]. The impact on reliance upon the Magna Carta is,
at this early point, unclear.
311 U.S. CONST. amend. VI, VII.
312 Magna Carta (1225), supra note 194, cl. 29.
313 The Eighth Amendment states: “Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive
fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.” U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
314 See infra Appendix C for a list of cases concerning the Eighth Amendment where
the U.S. Supreme Court has cited to the Magna Carta.
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of Rights, 315 which stated: “excessive bail ought not to be required,
nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments
inflicted.” The language of the Virginia Declaration of Rights was
an almost verbatim adoption of Article 10 of the English Bill of
Rights of 1689. 316 This consistency in language has, therefore,
prompted both scholars and the U.S. Supreme Court to interpret the
meaning of the Eighth Amendment by analyzing English history
and interpreting the Magna Carta.
For instance, in determining what constituted cruel and unusual
punishment, the U.S. Supreme Court first referenced the Magna
Carta in 1958. In Trop v. Dulles, the Supreme Court held that the
use of denationalization as a punishment for wartime desertion was
“cruel and unusual punishment” within the meaning of the Eighth
Amendment. 317 In an opinion written by Chief Justice Earl Warren,
the Court explained that although it had not considered the meaning
of “cruel and unusual punishment” at length, the principle it
represents was taken directly from the English Declaration of Rights
of 1688 and dates back to the Magna Carta. 318 The Court ruled that
in determining whether a punishment is cruel and unusual, the
punishment is to be measured by “evolving standards of
decency.” 319
Part 1 of this section analyzes the principle that the punishment
must be proportionate to the crime. Part 2 examines the death
penalty. Part 3 discusses protection against arbitrary punishment.
Finally, Part 4 reviews protections against punitive damages.
1. Proportionality
In addition to the “evolving standard of decency,” the Court is
also guided by the principle of proportionality in interpreting
315 See ROBERT A. RUTLAND, THE BIRTH OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS, 1776–1791 202
(2011); Anthony F. Granucci, “Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishments Inflicted”: The
Original Meaning, 57 CAL. L. REV. 839, 840 (1969); Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263,
287 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting).
316 See RUTLAND, supra note 315, at 202; Granucci, supra note 315, at 840.
317 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958) (explaining that denationalization “is a form of
punishment more primitive than torture, for it destroys for the individual the political
existence that was centuries in the development”).
318 Id. at 99–100.
319 Id. at 101 (“The [Eighth] Amendment must draw its meaning from the evolving
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society”); see also infra text
accompanying notes 230–238.
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whether a fine or punishment violates the Eighth Amendment; this
draws back to Clause 20 of the Magna Carta (1215) which states
“For a trivial offence, a free man shall be fined only in proportion
to the degree of his offence, and for a serious offence
correspondingly, but not so heavily as to deprive him of his
livelihood.” 320 The principle of proportionality requires that a
punishment be proportional to the severity of the crime
committed. 321 On its face, through the repeated use of the term
“excessive,” the language of the Eighth Amendment incorporates a
proportionality requirement in the context of bails and fines.322
Therefore, the Court has readily applied a proportionality analysis
when considering the excessiveness of fines. 323 However, the term
“excessive” is not used in the Punishments Clause; instead, the
Punishments Clause prohibits only “cruel and unusual
punishments.” 324 The Court, inconsistently, has relied on historical
support to justify the implication of the principle of proportionality
to the Punishments Clause. 325
In 1910, the Court held in Weems v. United States that the
imposition of a punishment known as cadena temporal, 326 for the
crime of falsifying public records, was “cruel and unusual” within

320 Rummel, 445 U.S. at 292 (Powell, J., dissenting); see also Magna Carta (1215),
supra note 73, cl. 20.
321 Rummel, 445 U.S. at 292 (Powell, J., dissenting) (explaining that the principle of
proportionality requires measuring “the relationship between the nature and number of
offenses committed and the severity of the punishment inflicted upon the offender”);
Browning, 492 U.S. at 293 (discussing the Magna Carta’s development of a measure of
proportionality). See generally Erwin Chemerinsky, The Constitution and Punishment, 56
STAN. L. REV. 1049 (2004) (explaining that the essence of the proportionality analysis is
about ensuring that the punishment is appropriate for the defendant and his or her crime).
322 See Craig S. Lerner, Does the Magna Carta Embody a Proportionality Principle?,
25 GEO. MASON U. CIV. RTS. L. J. 271, 274 (2015).
323 See United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 324 (1998) (holding that a fine of
$357,144 for failing to disclose the transportation of $10,000 while attempting to leave the
United States was grossly disproportionate to the gravity of the offense and thus violated
the Eight Amendment).
324 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
325 Compare Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 561, 578 (2005) (providing a history
of the Eight Amendment’s origins), with Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976)
(relying on case law to establish the principle of proportionality).
326 217 U.S. 349, 364 (1910) (explaining that cadena temporal is a punishment of a
minimum of 12 years and it requires that a prisoner always carry a chain at the ankle that
hangs from the wrists and be employed at hard and painful labor).
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the meaning of the Eighth Amendment. 327 As support for its
conclusion, the Supreme Court cited to the first English case to
apply the “cruel and unusual punishments” provision of the English
Bill of Rights of 1689. 328 In 1689, the Court noted, the House of
Lords held that the imposition of a $30,000 fine for an assault and
battery was “excessive and exorbitant” and a violation of the Magna
Carta. 329 Additionally, the Court reasoned, “it is a precept of justice
that punishment for crime should be graduated and proportioned to
the offense.” 330 The Weems Court, although not explicitly,
recognized that the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Clause incorporates a proportionality principle that
dates back to the Magna Carta. 331
In addition to the Supreme Court’s indirect use of the Magna
Carta in Weems, the Court has cited directly to the Magna Carta as
evidence that the Eighth Amendment embodies a proportionality
principle. In Solem v. Helm, the Court struck down a life sentence
for a recidivist who was convicted of uttering a no-account check
for $100 because the punishment was not proportionate to the
crime. 332 The Court reasoned that the Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Clause prohibits not only barbaric punishments, such
as whipping, but also punishments that are disproportionate to the
crime committed. 333 To support the conclusion that the Eighth
Amendment requires proportionality, the Court explained that when
the Framers of the Eighth Amendment adopted the language of
Article 10 of the English Bill of Rights, the Framers intended to
adopt English principle of proportionality. 334 The English principle
of proportionality, the Solem Court explained, dated back to the

Id. at 382.
Id. at 371, 372, 376 (1910) (citing The Earl of Devonshire’s Case, 11 How. St. Tr.
1353, 1354 (Parl. 1689)).
329 Id. at 376 (citing The Earl of Devonshire’s Case, at 1354).
330 Id. at 371.
331 But see Rummel, 445 U.S. at 272–73 (1980) (rejecting the argument that the
Weems Court interpreted the Eighth Amendment to embody a proportionality principle
because the type of punishment at issue in Weems was too extreme to analogize to
traditional forms of imprisonment imposed under the Anglo-Saxon system).
332 463 U.S. 277, 303 (1983), overruled by Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 965 (stating the
Eighth amendment has no proportionality guarantee).
333 Id. at 284.
334 Id. at 285–86.
327
328
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Magna Carta. 335
In Solem, the Court cited to Clause 20 of the Magna Carta,
which declared, “[a] freeman shall not be amerced for a small fault,
but after the manner of the fault; and for a great crime according to
the heinousness of it.” 336 An amercement, as the Court explained,
was a form of fine that was the most common criminal punishment
in the thirteenth century. 337 Clause 20 of the Magna Carta thus
required that punishments be proportional to the offense.
Accordingly, the Court concluded that because the Eighth
Amendment was based on the English Bill of Rights, the Eighth
Amendment embodies a proportionality principle. 338
Thus,
although concepts of proportionality were not written into the Cruel
and Unusual Punishment Clause of the 8th amendment, the Court’s
use of the English Bill of Rights and ideologies established in the
Magna Carta have led to an interpretation of the clause as
incorporating principles of proportionality.
Just a few years before Solem, the Court upheld a life sentence
for a recidivist who had been convicted of obtaining $120.75 by
false pretenses in Rummel v. Estelle. 339 In an opinion written by
Justice Rehnquist, the Court rejected the argument that the life
sentence imposed by the recidivist statute was grossly
disproportionate to the crime committed. 340 Justice Powell
Id. at 284.
Id. at 284 n.9 (citing 1 S.D. Codified Laws, p. 4 (1978) (including a translation of
the Magna Carta)).
337 Id. at 284 n.8.
338 Solem, 463 U.S. at 285–86. The principle of proportionality may soon not just be
restricted to the field of punishment. Recent technological advances in military technology
will soon lead to fully autonomous weapons that would be incapable of making certain
value judgments only humans can make. This lack of judgment could lead to harsh results
despite a minor beginning. International laws about warfare use proportionality as one of
its principles in making decisions with regard to life. These machines “would threaten a
target’s right not to be arbitrarily deprived of life.” These technological advances should
soon lead to a heated legal debate in both the international community and in the United
States. See Bonnie Docherty, The Case for a UN Ban on “Killer Robots”, PUB. RADIO
INT’L (June 17, 2016), https://www.pri.org/stories/2016-06-18/case-un-ban-killer-robots
[https://perma.cc/6R3N-Y7QP] (linking to a report by the Harvard Law School
International Rights Clinic and Human Rights Watch on banning autonomous weapons).
339 445 U.S. at 285.
340 Id. at 270–78 (distinguishing the applicability of the principle of proportionality in
cases involving the imposition of the death penalty from cases involving the imposition of
long sentences and concluding that the Court is less likely to conclude that cases involving
the latter violate the principle of proportionality).
335
336
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disagreed: in his dissenting opinion, he emphasized that the
principle of proportionality is deeply rooted in both American and
English constitutional law. 341 As support for his assertion, Justice
Powell cited the principle of proportionality embodied in Clause 20
of the Magna Carta. 342
Lack of uniformity in punishment resulted in the 1987 Federal
Sentencing Guidelines (with a mandatory grid for determining a
defendant’s sentence). 343 While the Booker decision in 2005 held
that mandatory sentences are unconstitutional, judges still must take
the Guidelines into account when determining a person’s
sentence. 344 Booker cites to the Magna Carta. 345 Moreover, many
judges, such as Mark W. Bennett, argue that the Guidelines are too
harsh. 346 Judge Bennett uses policy disagreements to depart from
the Guidelines and the crack-to-cocaine ratio, which he argues has
a disproportionate racial effect. 347 Although Judge Bennett never
cites the Magna Carta, he, as with many judges, sentences
defendants based on a proportionate scheme relative to the nature of
the crimes. 348
Although the Court has relied on the Magna Carta as historical
support for the proposition that the Punishments Clause requires
proportionality, such a requirement has now been fleshed out

Id. at 288 (Powell, J., dissenting).
Id.
343 Booker, 543 U.S. at 268 (holding that the Sentencing Guidelines violated the Sixth
Amendment where they allowed judges to enhance sentences using facts unreviewed by
juries).
344 Id.
345 Id. at 239.
346 See generally Mark W. Bennett, Addicted to Incarceration: A Federal Judge
Reveals Shocking Truths About Federal Sentencing and Fleeting Hopes for Reform, 87
UMKC L. REV. 1 (2018).
347 Mark W. Bennett, A Slow Motion Lynching? The War on Drugs, Mass
Incarceration, Doing Kimbrough Justice, and a Response to Two Third Circuit Judges, 66
RUTGERS L. REV 874, 876–77, 893–96 (2015).
348 One might even apply proportionality to the use of sentencing algorithms. Some
of these algorithms have been shown to produce results that may be racially biased, thus
affecting the proportionality of the punishment to the crime. At the same time, a “good”
algorithm could in theory produce a perfectly proportionate punishment. Adam Liptak,
Sent to Prison by a Software Program’s Secret Algorithms, N.Y. TIMES, May 2, 2017, §
A, at 22 (referring to, inter alia, Loomis v. Wisconsin, 881 N.W.2d 749 (Wis. 2016), cert.
denied, 137 S. Ct. 2290 (2017)).
341
342
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through case law. 349 The beginning of this recognition and the
argument as to what it means in contemporary American
jurisprudence came in Solem v. Helm; the Court established a threepart test for courts to use in determining whether a punishment is
grossly disproportionate to the crime committed. 350 The Court’s
Solem ruling has, however, since been overruled. In Harmelin v.
Michigan, Justice Scalia’s opinion overruled the notion that the
Eighth Amendment contained a guarantee of proportionality. 351
Rather than guaranteeing proportionality, the Harmelin majority
held that the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause of the Eighth
Amendment was directed at prohibiting certain methods of
punishment. 352 In furtherance of this point, the Court opined that
the imposition of mandatory life sentences (i.e., no possibility of
parole) without considering mitigating factors may be cruel,
however it is not unusual in a Constitutional sense. 353 The Eighth
Amendment, as it were to follow, protected against only cruel and
unusual punishments, not offering protection against either alone.
Because it is now settled law that the Punishments Clause does
not embody a proportionality principle, there is no need for the court
to cite to the Magna Carta as support for that proposition. 354
349 See, e.g., Solem, 463 U.S. at 288 (noting that “the Court has continued to recognize
that the Eighth Amendment prohibits grossly disproportionate punishments”).
350 See id. at 292 (“[A] court’s proportionality analysis under the Eighth Amendment
should be guided by objective criteria, including (1) the gravity of the offense and the
harshness of the penalty; (2) the sentences imposed on other criminals in the same
jurisdiction; and (3) the sentences imposed for commission of the same crime in other
jurisdictions.”). But see Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 962 (“We specifically rejected the
proposition asserted by the dissent . . . that unconstitutional disproportionality could be
established by weighing three factors . . . . ”).
351 501 U.S. at 958 (“The guarantee was directed at the arbitrary use of the sentencing
power by the King’s Bench in particular cases and at the illegality, rather than the
disproportionality, of punishments thereby imposed.”).
352 Id.
353 Id. at 994–95 (“Severe, mandatory penalties may be cruel, but they are not unusual
in the constitutional sense, having been employed in various forms throughout our
Nation’s history. As noted earlier, mandatory death sentences abounded in our first Penal
Code. They were also common in the several States—both at the time of the founding and
throughout the 19th century. There can be no serious contention, then, that a sentence
which is not otherwise cruel and unusual becomes so simply because it is ‘mandatory.’”)
(citations omitted).
354 See, e.g., Lerner, supra note 322, at 282–83 (explaining that recent cases have not
cited to the Magna Carta as support for the proposition that the Punishments Clause
embodies a proportionality principle).
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Additionally, although the Magna Carta’s “salvo contenemento
suo” principle presents an opportunity for use of the Magna Carta,
courts generally do not consider a defendant’s ability to pay a
relevant factor in an Eighth Amendment analysis concerning the
Excessive Fines Clause. 355 Use of the Magna Carta in this area is
likely to be confined to a cursory explanation that certain rights are
long-standing.
It is also of note that U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence
concerning the Excessive Fines Clause 356 does not cite the Magna
Carta for its “salvo contenemento suo” principle. 357 Salvo
contenemento suo literally means “saving his livelihood.” 358 The
principle requires that a defendant not be fined an amount that
exceeds his ability to pay. 359 Although there is potential for use of
the Magna Carta in interpreting the Excessive Fines Clause,
American courts are unlikely to rely on the Magna Carta in this area
because a defendant’s inability to pay a fine is generally not
relevant. 360
In a post-Scalia climate, the U.S. Supreme Court began to revert
to its previous interpretation of the Eighth Amendment protection
against cruel and unusual punishment. Less than one month before
Scalia’s death, the U.S. Supreme Court retroactively applied a 2012
decision that made it unconstitutional to sentence minors to life

Id.
The Excessive Fines Clause states: “[N]or excessive fines imposed.” U.S. CONST.
amend. VIII.
357 The salvo contenemento suo principle is embodied in Clause 20 of the Magna
Carta, which states, in relevant part: “For a trivial offence, a free man shall be fined only
in proportion to the degree of his offence, and for a serious offence correspondingly, but
not so heavily as to deprive him of his livelihood.” Magna Carta (1215), supra note 73,
cl. 20.
358 Nicholas M. McLean, Livelihood, Ability to Pay, and the Original Meaning of the
Excessive Fines Clause, 40 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 833, 836 (2013). That can also be
translated as “saving his land.” JOHN F. ARCHBOLD, EDWARD CHRISTIAN & JOHN
WILLIAMS, A TRANSLATION OF ALL THE GREEK, LATIN, ITALIAN, AND FRENCH QUOTATIONS
WHICH OCCUR IN BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 245 (1823).
359 See McLean, supra note 358, at 834–35 (explaining that historical evidence
suggests that the English Bill of Rights’ outlawing of “excessive fines” was intended to
reaffirm the “salvo contenemento suo” principle).
360 But see id. at 835 (explaining that since United States v. Jose, 499 F.3d 105, 113
(1st Cir. 2007), the First Circuit, in a line of cases, has considered the defendant’s ability
to pay a fine as a relevant factor in an Excessive Fines Clause analysis).
355
356
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without parole for a murder conviction. 361 The following year, the
U.S. Supreme Court decided that the use of outdated medical
definitions of intellectual disability violated the Eighth
Amendment’s protection from cruel and unusual punishment. 362
Recently, in Jennings v. Rodriguez the Court denied claims that
sections of the Immigration and Nationality Act granted detained
aliens the right to periodic bond hearings during their detention.363
While the case was decided mostly on due process arguments, the
dissent by Justice Breyer linked principles from the Magna Carta
and the Eighth Amendment to the due process right to a bail hearing
and protection from arbitrary detention. 364
In light of the most recent U.S. Supreme Court cases, as well as
with the confirmation of Justices Neil Gorsuch and Brett
Kavanaugh, it is likely that decisions to expand the Eighth
Amendment right against cruel and unusual punishment will not
soon be based on or swayed by principles of the Magna Carta.
Decisions regarding application of the Eighth Amendment probably
would follow the Scalia logic of only protecting against certain
types of punishment in the near future, though the Magna Carta
could still be referenced in dissents that may have an impact on
future rulings. 365
361 Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 736 (2016) (applying the Miller v.
Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) decision, the Court suggested that “[a] State may remedy a
Miller violation by permitting juvenile homicide offenders to be considered for parole,
rather than by resentencing them . . . Allowing those offenders to be considered for parole
ensures that juveniles whose crimes reflected only transient immaturity – and who have
since matured – will not be forced to serve a disproportionate sentence in violation of the
Eighth Amendment”).
362 Moore v. Texas, 137 S. Ct. 1039, 1053 (2017).
363 Jennings, 138 S. Ct. at 846.
364 Id. at 859, 861 (Breyer J., dissenting).
365 Some states have enacted “three strikes” laws. When a defendant is convicted of
a third offense, then the defendant is subject to a mandatory, severe sentence, such as 25
years to life in prison. In reviewing California’s three strikes law, the U.S. Supreme Court
found the laws to not be in violation of the constitutional right against cruel and unusual
punishment. See generally Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11 (2003); Lockyer v. Andrade,
538 U.S. 63 (2003). The Court issued two 5-4 decisions on the same day, with a total of
five opinions in Ewing and the court majority opinion and one dissent issued in Lockyer,
yet of the six Justices who authored an opinion (Justice O’Connor wrote the plurality
opinion in Ewing and the majority opinion in Lockyer; Justices Scalia and Thomas wrote
opinions concurring in the judgment in Ewing; Justices Stevens and Souter filed dissenting
opinions in Ewing; and Justice Souter authored the dissenting opinions for the four
dissenters in Lockyer) not one Justice referred to the Magna Carta.
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2. The Death Penalty
The Magna Carta was originally written as a guarantee of
liberties against a disliked king. 366 Regardless of the rights the
Magna Carta may provide, it is accepted that the Magna Carta was
not originally meant to apply to the common man. 367 Rather, it was
intended to protect barons and other powerful lords in medieval
England against monarchial overreach. 368 Conversely, as recently
as 2015, eight centuries after its inception, concepts within the
Magna Carta were used to ensure the right of a minority of citizens
to have their marriage recognized by the federal government and
across state lines. 369 This demonstrates the continual value and
evolution of the Magna Carta. Its ability to be reinterpreted
provides it with life through the interpretation of a
“living” U.S. Constitution.
This also demonstrates a possible path for the Magna Carta to
continue down. William Blackstone stated the liberty provided in
the Magna Carta to be “the power of locomotion, of changing
situation . . . without imprisonment or restraint, unless by due
course of law.” 370 It appears to be an entirely procedural guarantee,
but as seen in Obergefell, liberty can be interpreted as a much
broader term.
Consider one of the contemporary substantive right debates: the
right to live. Scholars have noted the Magna Carta’s basis in natural
law, a body of unchanging moral principles regarded as a basis for
all human conduct. 371 Natural law influenced the 40th, 41st, and 48th
Clauses of the Magna Carta, to name a few. 372 Historically, natural
Helmholz, supra note 83, at 1476.
See id. at 1479.
368 Id.
369 Although the Magna Carta was only directly invoked by the dissenters, the Magna
Carta may be seen as inspiring the wording of the very constitutional amendment which
was held to contain the right. Obergefell, 576 U.S. at 724–25 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
370 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *121, *134.
371 Engle, supra note 228, at 490.
372 Richard H. Helmholz, Magna Carta and the Law of Nature, 62 LOY. L. REV. 869,
879 (2016); see, e.g., Magna Carta (1215), supra note 73, cl. 40 (“To no one will we sell,
to no one deny or delay right or justice.”); id. cl. 41 (guaranteeing safe and secure passage
to and from England for all merchants, and limiting the exaction of tax to “ancient and
lawful customs” except in time of war”); id. cl. 48 (declaring all “evil customs” to be
immediately investigated in each county by twelve sworn knights of the same county who
would then abolish the evil customs, “completely and irrevocably”).
366
367
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law dominated the European continent in the early 1200s. 373 This
assertion is bolstered by the parallelisms between the clauses of the
Magna Carta in England and other documents being written in
Europe around the same time. 374 Under contemporaneous natural
law of the 1200s, it was accepted that there are some crimes so
abhorrent that death was an acceptable penalty. 375 Though death
was an acceptable penalty for morally reprehensible crimes
abhorrent to life, Clause 20 of the Magna Carta protected
individuals against punishment disproportionate to their crimes by
stating: “For a trivial offence, a free man shall be fined only in
proportion to the degree of his offence, and for a serious offence
correspondingly, but not so heavily as to deprive him of his
livelihood.” 376 Natural law theory has likewise evolved since the
1200s; the modern theory of natural law wholly proscribes death as
a punishment. 377 With the U.S. Constitution being so influenced by
the Magna Carta, 378 it is argued that to deprive someone of life is a
violation of the natural law, and thus, against the Constitution as
proscribed by the Eighth Amendment protection against cruel and
unusual punishment. 379 This argument is interesting for two
reasons: 1) it would provide another use of the Magna Carta and 2)
it demonstrates the Magna Carta’s ability to evolve.
Since the Magna Carta was written before the new natural law,
it must have been inspired by the original natural law. There are no
provisions regarding the penalty of death for a crime. Thus, it can
be assumed that execution was acceptable as long as the due process
requirements were followed, and the punishment was proportional
to the abhorrence of the crime. Judging by the plethora of execution
Helmholz, supra note 372, at 873.
See id. at 872.
375 Edward Feser, Capital Punishment, Catholicism, and Natural Law: A Reply to
Christopher Tollefsen, PUB. DISCOURSE (Nov. 21, 2017), http://www.thepublicdiscourse.
com/2017/11/20504/ [https://perma.cc/2RBU-8EMT]; see also Magna Carta (1215),
supra note 73, cl. 20.
376 Id.
377 Feser, supra note 375; see also Steven A. Long, God, Death, and the New Natural
Law Theory, THOMISTICA (Mar. 5, 2015), https://thomistica.net/posts/2015/1/8/god-deathand-the-new-natural-law-theory [https://perma.cc/F7UJ-MZCB].
378 Trop, 356 U.S. at 100; Engle, supra note 228, at 495.
379 Engle, supra note 228, at 511; see also U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (“Excessive bail
shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments
inflicted”).
373
374
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methods in the Middle Ages, it is clear that despite the barbarity of
the actions, the Magna Carta originally did not take a stance against
the death penalty. 380
The avoidance of the subject may be attributable to the low
frequency of capital punishment in the Middle Ages. 381 A second
reason could be the vitality of capital punishment’s role. When a
government is in early development, capital punishment is helpful
in demonstrating state power and control over its constituents.382
The 1200s were unstable, as demonstrated by the Barons’ rebellion
leading up to the Magna Carta. Having the ability to demonstrate
control through capital punishment could have been instrumental
for King John in re-securing his role as king. 383
Recently, new natural law theory has been invoked in order to
protect human rights nationally and internationally. 384 Now, over
800 years after its drafting, the Magna Carta is more aligned with
the new natural law approach as opposed to the natural law that
formerly influenced it. As noted in Green, the Magna Carta “has
become [something] very different indeed from the immediate
objects of the barons at Runnymede.” 385 Indeed, while some judges,
especially Justice Hugo L. Black, have objected to a natural law
jurisprudence as giving unfettered freedom to adopt legal standards
based on personal notions of fairness rather than on actual legal
texts, 386 newer concepts of natural law may help introduce general
380 Execution in the Middle Ages, HISTORY.COM, http://www.history.co.uk/shows/
britains-bloodiest-dynasty/articles/execution-in-the-middle-ages [https://perma.cc/SE8LVLZY] (last visited Jan. 21, 2021).
381 RICHARD WARD, A GLOBAL HISTORY OF EXECUTION AND THE CRIMINAL CORPSE 3
(2015).
382 Id. at 11.
383 The 29th Clause of the 1225 Magna Carta states that a man shall not be attacked
except by the lawful judgment of his peers. Magna Carta (1225), supra note 194, cl. 29.
This could be a reservation that allows the King to secure his kingdom and prevent
rebellion.
384 See Mark Searl, A Normative Theory of International Law Based on New Natural
Law Theory, LONDON SCH. OF ECON., DEP’T OF L. 3 (Sept. 2014),
https://etheses.lse.ac.uk/999/1/Searl_A_Normative_Theory_of_International_Law_Base
d_on_New_Natural_Law_Theory.pdf [https://perma.cc/SNJ2-ZCSB].
385 Green, 356 U.S. at 189; see also supra Part II.B.ii (discussing Green).
386 Duncan, 391 U.S. at 168–69 (Black, J., concurring) (opining that due process,
simply a notion of “fundamental fairness,” can “shift from time to time in accordance with
judges’ predilections and understandings of what is best for the country,” that is gives
“unconfined power . . . to judges in our Constitution that is a written one in order to limit
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notions of procedural fairness as tied to core principles of justice,
encompassed in the Magna Carta if not tied directly to a current,
binding positive law such as the Constitution.
The Magna Carta has reached far beyond the common law
countries to impact Civil Law and mixed-law nations as well as the
United Nations. Consider the UDHR, which drew from the Magna
Carta. 387 The UDHR states that all people have the right to life. 388
Judging by the effect on various signatory nations, that line has been
interpreted to disapprove of the death penalty, as 118 nations have
abolished capital punishment since the making of the Declaration. 389
The United States has not followed this trend. 390 In 1976, the
Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the death penalty. 391
In Gregg, the Petitioner was convicted of armed robbery and murder
and sentenced to death. 392 The Supreme Court of Georgia found
governmental power,” and that, instead of “the particular judge’s idea of ethics,” that judge
should decide cases based “on the boundaries fixed by the written words of the
Constitution”); Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 75 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting)
(“[T]he ‘natural law’ formula which the Court uses to reach its conclusion in this case
should be abandoned as an incongruous excrescence on our Constitution.”).
387 Shami Chakrabarti, Magna Carta and Human Rights, BRIT. LIBR. (Mar. 13, 2015),
https://www.bl.uk/magna-carta/articles/magna-carta-and-human-rights
[https://perma.cc/BH6P-96GK]. Eleanor Roosevelt called the UDHR the “international
Magna Carta of all men everywhere.” Karina Weller, Magna Carta: The Origin of Modern
Human Rights, EACHOTHER (Apr. 3, 2017), https://eachother.org.uk/magna-carta-rightstoday/ [https://perma.cc/96KM-7KC6]. In 1948, the United Nations took ideas from the
Magna Carta in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights for freedom of movement,
freedom from arbitrary arrest, and right to a trial by jury. The chairwoman of the
committee, Eleanor Roosevelt, hoped that the declaration would extend the protections of
the Magna Carta around the world and would become “the international Magna Carta of
all men everywhere.” In 1950, the European Convention on Human Rights was ratified,
which used Clause 29 of the Magna Carta in its documents. Lock, supra note 16.
388 G.A. Res. 217A (III) A, supra note 245, art. 3.
389 Richard D. Vogel, The Demise of the Death Penalty in the USA: The Politics of
Capital Punishment and the Question of Innocence, MR ONLINE (Nov. 22, 2019),
https://mronline.org/2009/11/22/the-demise-of-the-death-penalty-in-the-usa-the-politicsof-capital-punishment-and-the-question-of-innocence/ [https://perma.cc/Z278-5W8V].
390 Twenty-nine states allow the death penalty as a sentence. Fortunately, only seven
of those states actually executed someone in 2014. United States of America (United
States): Death Penalty Profile, CORNELL L. SCH.: CORNELL CTR. ON THE DEATH PENALTY
WORLDWIDE, http://www.deathpenaltyworldwide.org/country-search-post.cfm?country=
united+states+of+america#f3-1 [https://perma.cc/RV6X-XZJ2] (last updated Oct. 1,
2020) [hereinafter U.S. Death Penalty Profile].
391 See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 187 (1976).
392 Id. at 160–61.
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that there was no prejudice or arbitrary factors in making the
sentence. Thus, capital punishment was not excessive or
disproportionate. 393 The Petitioner appealed by writ of certiorari to
the U.S. Supreme Court on the grounds that the death penalty was a
violation of the Eighth Amendment’s protection against cruel and
unusual punishment as incorporated to the states through the
Fourteenth Amendment. 394 The U.S. Supreme Court discussed the
relationship of the death penalty with the Eighth Amendment and
concluded that the definition of “cruel and unusual” changes with
time. 395
Prior to their decision in Gregg, the U.S. Supreme Court’s
jurisprudence on the death penalty was in sync with modern
international norms regarding the subject. In Furman v. Georgia,
the defendants were convicted of murder or rape and sentenced to
death. 396 In this instance, the Supreme Court held that the death
penalty was a violation of the Eighth Amendment. 397 Separate
concurring opinions which referenced the Magna Carta were
authored by both Justice Marshall 398 and Justice Douglas. 399 Justice
Douglas’ concurrence noted that the language of the Eighth
Amendment was taken from the English Bill of Rights of 1689’s
prohibition of arbitrary and excessive penalties, which was inspired
by Clause 20 of the Magna Carta. 400 In Justice Marshall’s
concurrence, he noted that it had been previously argued that the
Magna Carta forbade torture. 401
393 This applies to the murder charge. The death sentence with respect to the armed
robbery since in Georgia the death penalty was rarely issued for robbery charges. Id. at
162.
394 Id.
395 Id. at 173 (affirming the Supreme Court of Georgia’s decision, stating, “the
Amendment must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark a
maturing society” (quoting Trop, 356 U.S. at 101)).
396 408 U.S. 238, 239 (1972).
397 Id. at 240.
398 Id. at 316 (Marshall, J., concurring).
399 Id. at. 240 (Douglass, J., concurring).
400 Id. at 242–43.
401 Id. at 316 (describing the use of cruel and unusual punishment on both convicted
defendants and witnesses). With respect to these cases, the Supreme Court has not
condemned the Death Penalty while the Court does acknowledge its permanency. Gregg,
428 U.S. at 187. It has imposed some limitations. See generally Roper, 543 U.S. 551
(holding that death penalty on juvenile offenders is unconstitutional), but more must be
done. The frequency of executions does, however, seem to be diminishing. In 2007, there
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The Magna Carta can be seen as evolving to a “living”
document. This can create a conflict with our Constitution. 402 The
Fifth Amendment reserves a right to deprive a citizen of life as long
as that citizen is afforded a right of due process. 403 If the United
States wishes to be recognized as a “maturing society,” its treatment
of the death penalty should evolve in tandem with the natural law
as has the Magna Carta; thus, the nation must recognize that the
right to life cannot be taken away by the government, even when
citizens are afforded due process. This most significant challenge
thus remains: how to meet the necessity to evolve while adhering to
basic principles.
A longstanding principle is that the U.S. Constitution, like the
Magna Carta, presents for posterity a “living document” capable of
being reinterpreted with respect to changing moral and societal
norms. 404 The living document theory is proposed as the way to
interpret the Constitution because times change. 405 Another view is
originalism, which is the idea that the Constitution should be
interpreted as originally written. 406 Originalists look to the words
of the text and the minds of the Founders when writing the
Constitution. 407 Originalists argue this is the way that the
Constitution should be interpreted because 1) “it binds and limits
any particular generation from ruling according to the passion of the
times[,]” 2) the Founders intended to limit government, 3) it ensures
the separation of power, like preventing the Supreme Court from
were forty-two executions. In 2017, the number of executions dropped to twenty-three for
the entire year, indicating a 50% decrease in ten years. U.S. Death Penalty Profile, supra
note 390.
402 The Framers’ acceptance of the death penalty is apparent from the text of the
Constitution. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 177. Without maturing, the Magna Carta’s
denouncement and the Constitution’s acceptance conflict with one another.
403 U.S. CONST. amend V. (“No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or
otherwise infamous crime . . . nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law[.]”).
404 Thurgood Marshall, Justice, U.S. Sup. Ct., Remarks at the Annual Seminar of the
S.F. Pat. and Trademark Law Ass’n, The Bicentennial Speech (May 6, 1987), transcript
available at http://thurgoodmarshall.com/the-bicentennial-speech/ [https://perma.cc/66
PE-PKP5].
405 Jason Swindle, Originalism vs. “Living Document”, SWINDLE L. GRP. P.C. (Oct.
29,
2017),
https://www.swindlelaw.com/2017/10/originalism-living-constitutionheritage/ [https://perma.cc/8CTV-KER8].
406 Id.
407 Id.
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creating law, 4) the Founders understood humans have selfmotivated impulses, so the Constitution tries to limit those impulses
while allowing amendment, and 5) originalism is not resultoriented. 408 Under originalism, the death penalty is not a valid form
of punishment because it is not expressly in the Constitution. In fact,
the living document theory of the Constitution is the more popular
theory for interpreting this theory. 409
The flexibility of the U.S. Constitution has been demonstrated
by providing protection to historically oppressed groups through the
Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments. 410 For instance, not only was slavery legal
at the inception of the U.S. Constitution, slaves were counted as
only three-fifths of a whole person for the purpose of census-taking
while Native Americans were wholly ignored. 411 It is through the
evolving interpretation of the Constitution’s words in parallel with
the evolution of the natural law, as well as by incorporation of its
protections to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, that
these same classes were afforded the same rights and protection. 412
The basis for this argument about a progressing explanation of
key constitutional concepts could come from the Great Charter’s
omission of the death penalty, as it only provided the king with the
ability to disseize freeholds, liberties, and customs. In other words,
the Constitution should be amended to state that there is a right to
impose the death penalty because without that provision the United
States is carrying out a “right” not stated in the Constitution. This
could serve as a foundation for the Supreme Court to show that the
previous interpretation of the Fifth Amendment is incongruent with
the new interpretation of the Magna Carta, focusing specifically on
Id.
See id.
410 Mark Charles, What if We Struck Racism and Sexism from the Constitution of the
United States, Actually Abolished Slavery, and Added 2 Simple Words Articulating Value
for Life?, WIRELESSHOGAN, (May 9, 2017) https://wirelesshogan.com/2017/05/09/whatif-we-struck-racism-and-sexism-from-the-constitution/ [https://perma.cc/3AUM-AZZT].
411 Id.; see also U.S. CONST. art. I, §2 (“Representatives and direct Taxes shall be
apportioned among the several States which may be included within this Union, according
to their respective Numbers, which shall be determined by adding to the whole Number of
free Persons, including those bound to Service for a Term of Years, and excluding Indians
not taxed, three fifths of all other Persons.”).
412 See generally Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (ruling
separate is not equal).
408
409
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a new definition of “life.” That approach is required as the United
States continues to create necessary human rights. Indeed, the entire
point of both the Magna Carta and the Fifth Amendment is that the
rights have existed since “time immemorial.” 413 It is not the
government that creates or grants these rights; rather, their
incorporation into these documents confirms rights that are
“endowed by the creator” and not able to be taken by the
government.
3. Protection Against Arbitrary Punishment
In Furman v. Georgia, Justice Douglas’s concurring opinion
cited to the Magna Carta to support the proposition that the Eighth
Amendment was intended to protect against arbitrary and
discriminatory punishments. 414 In Furman, the Court concluded
that imposing and carrying out the death penalty would constitute
cruel and unusual punishment within the meaning of the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments. 415 Justice Douglas explained: “[T]he
provision of the English Bill of Rights of 1689, from which the
language of the Eighth Amendment was taken, was concerned
primarily with selective or irregular application of harsh penalties
and that its aim was to forbid arbitrary and discriminatory penalties
of a severe nature.” 416
To support the proposition that one of the aims of the English
Bill of Rights was to protect against arbitrary and discriminatory
punishments, Justice Douglas cited to the Magna Carta; 417 he
explained that following the Norman conquest of England in 1066,
the old system of penalties was replaced by a system that imposed
discretionary amercements. 418 Although the system allowed the
particular circumstances of each case to be considered when
arriving at an amount to fine the defendant, arbitrary and excessive
amercements became prevalent. 419 As a result, three clauses of the
Magna Carta of 1215 were devoted to protecting against arbitrary
413 See supra Part I.A (noting that the Magna Carta did not create substantive rights,
but affirmed and codified rights present since “time immemorial”).
414 408 U.S. at 243 (Douglas, J., concurring).
415 Id. at 239–40.
416 Id. at 241.
417 Id. at 243.
418 Id. at 242–43.
419 Id. at 243.
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and excessive punishments. 420 Against this backdrop, Justice
Douglas concluded, the English Bill of Rights, from which the
Eighth Amendment was modeled after, was created. 421 As such, the
same protection against arbitrary and excessive punishments
survived.
4. Protection Against Punitive Damages
While not commonly granted, 422 punitive damages are another
area of punishments protected by the Magna Carta. Punitive
damages are compensation paid by the losing party in order to
discourage the losing party’s behavior in society. 423 The principle
of proportionality is invoked because punitive damages should be
calculated in proportion to the losing party’s wrongdoing. 424
Today, the Great Charter serves as protection against arbitrary
damages as it did against amercements in the era of King John. 425
Both amercements and punitive damages serve as punishment for
wrongdoing. The Magna Carta does not prohibit punitive damages
from being awarded, despite few clear ways of determining what

420 Furman, 408 U.S. at 243–45 (1972) (Douglas, J., concurring) (“The problem of
excessive amercements became so prevalent that three chapters of the Magna Carta were
devoted to their regulation. . . . The words ‘cruel and unusual’ certainly include penalties
that are barbaric. But the words, at least when read in light of the English proscription
against selective and irregular use of penalties, suggest that it is ‘cruel and unusual’ to
apply the death penalty - or any other penalty - selectively to minorities whose numbers
are few, who are outcasts of society, and who are unpopular, but whom society is willing
to see suffer though it would not countenance general application of the same penalty
across the board.”); Magna Carta (1215), supra note 73, cl. 20, 21, 22. The protection
continued into subsequent editions of the Magna Carta. Magna Carta (1225), supra note
194, cl. 14.
421 Furman, 408 U.S. at 242–43.
422 Fact Sheet: Punitive Damages: Rare, Reasonable, and Limited (2011), CTR. FOR
JUST. DEMOCRACY AT N.Y. L. SCH., https://centerjd.org/content/fact-sheet-punitivedamages-rare-reasonable-and-limited-2011 [https://perma.cc/A8FH-22XN] (last updated
Apr. 2011) [hereinafter Fact Sheet: Punitive Damages].
423 James F. Ferrelli & Trevor H. Taniguchi, Roots of New Jersey Punitive Damages
Law in Magna Carta, 294 N.J. LAW. MAG. 36, 36 (2015).
424 Id. See BMW of N. Am. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 575 (1996).
425 Generally, the Great Charter continues to be invoked, in any number of common
law countries, for its prohibition of any number of arbitrary governmental actions. In
Australia and New Zealand, for example, the Magna Carta is considered when deciding
the following: sentencing principles, the right to trial according to law, a prohibition on
arbitrary detention, and the foundation of prohibitions against cruel or unusual
punishments. Clark, supra note 176, at 875.
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the financial equivalent of a “punishment” is. 426 As noted in statutes
and in the common law, punitive damages are only required to be
proportional. 427 In a more radical sense, it could be argued that the
Magna Carta protects the granting of punitive damages when such
a grant is not in proportion to the offense.
Under the Civil Law system, which generally has not adopted
the Magna Carta, punitive damages are very unlikely to be
awarded. 428 On the other hand, almost all common law countries
which have adopted the Magna Carta in some form allow punitive
damages to harmed litigants. 429 In fact, in the United States, some
states have used the Magna Carta to craft punitive damage
statutes. 430 Internationally, New Zealand, a country with roots in
the Magna Carta, 431 allows entire cases based solely on punitive
damages. 432
Unfortunately, with the slow decline in the awarding of punitive
426 Punitive damages were awarded during the time of the Magna Carta. Mimi B.
Miller, Torts – Punitive Damages: A New Finish on Punitive Damages. BMW of North
America v. Gore, 116 S. Ct. 1589 (1996), 19 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 519, 523 (1997)
(noting that English common law has been using punitive damages since the thirteenth
century).
427 Ferrelli & Taniguchi, supra note 423, at 36. Note, however, not all jurisdictions
require proportionality. Some states only set maximum caps. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 1655-208 (2003) (declared unconstitutional by Bayer CropScience LP v. Schafer, 385
S.W.3d 822 (Ark. 2011)).
428 ROBERT W. EMERSON, BUSINESS LAW 477 (6th ed. 2015) (stating that a large
majority of Civil Law countries do not permit the awarding of punitive damages). The
purpose of this Article is not to identify why Civil law nations have chosen to adopt “moral
damages” as opposed to “punitive damages.” It could be attributed to the “end goal.”
429 Id.
430 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:15-5.14 (2006) (“[T]he trial judge shall ascertain that
the award is reasonable in its amount and justified in the circumstances of the case.”).
431 When New Zealand was incorporated into the British Empire, the native
inhabitants of New Zealand were provided with the same rights as British Englishmen.
STEPHEN LEVINE, NEW ZEALAND AS IT MIGHT HAVE BEEN 42 (2006). In fact, the Magna
Carta’s imprint can be seen in the adopting legislation of both independent Australia and
New Zealand; thus, in statutes enacted from 1969 to 1998, the Magna Carta’s preamble
and Clause 29 appear in the Imperial Acts Application Ordinances of several Australian
states (Victoria, New South Wales, Queensland, and the Australian Capital Territory) and
of the New Zealand national government. Clark, supra note 176.
432 New Zealand Legal Environment – A Summary of the Major Differences Between
the New Zealand Legal System and Other Legal Systems., WILSON HARLE,
https://www.wilsonharle.com/legal-information/nz-legal-guides/new-zealand-legalenvironment [https://perma.cc/Y2TY-YPLV] (last visited Jan. 13, 2021) (noting that
English law serves as the source of awarding punitive damages New Zealand).
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damages, this may not be a necessary path for the Great Charter to
continue. 433 In 2007, the Supreme Court ruled that excessive
punitive damages are takings of property without due process. 434
Along these lines, substantive due process may justify denial or
diminution of punitive damages when a losing party has personal
circumstances preventing such a large payment. Sometimes, when
an excessive fine is imposed, a defendant may feel compelled to
declare bankruptcy, 435 thus resulting in the plaintiff’s getting less
than the plaintiff may have received if a more “reasonable” damages
award had been imposed. 436 Nonetheless, the Great Charter may
continue to protect defendants from excessive punitive damages,
regardless of whether the wrongful act causes physical harm or
harm that is less tangible or visible. A recent example of this
protection offered to Defendants is found in Payne v. Jones. In
Payne, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
interestingly ruled that $300,000 was excessive punitive damages in
an excessive force and battery claim committed by a police
officer. 437 The English Bill of Rights, 438 in some states’ Declaration
433 There was a decrease in the recovery of punitive damages from 2001 to 2005. Fact
Sheet: Punitive Damages, supra note 422. But see Daniel M. Braun, The Risky Interplay
of Tort and Criminal Law: Punitive Damages, 11 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J.
449, 449–50 (2013) (claiming the size of punitive damage awards has increased).
434 Phillip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346, 349 (2007).
435 While awards based on fraud or other intentional wrongdoing ordinarily are not
dischargeable, punitive damages may be discharged, depending on the underlying facts.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reiterated in TKC Aerospace
Inc. v. Muhs, 923 F.3d 377 (4th Cir. 2019), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 607 (2019), that such
debts may be dischargeable if the debtor did not intend to cause injury. Thus remains
strong the longstanding principle expressed in Kawaauhau v. Geiger, 523 U.S. 57 (1998),
that a bankruptcy discharge under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) requires “a deliberate or
intentional injury, not merely a deliberate or intentional act that leads to injury.”
Kawaauhau, 523 U.S. at 61.
436 In bankruptcy, for example, when a judgment debtor is able to discharge some of
that debt, the plaintiff creditor may get paid in “bankruptcy dollars,” perhaps just pennies
on the dollar.
437 711 F.3d 85, 87 (2d Cir. 2013) (recounting that the defendant police officer
verbally agitated and repeatedly punched the plaintiff war veteran, who was being admitted
into a mental hospital after experiencing a post-traumatic stress disorder episode at another
hospital).
438 An Act Declaring the Rights and Liberties of the Subject, and Settling the
Succession of the Crown 1689, 1 & 2 W. & M. c. 2 (Eng.), available at English Bill of
Rights, 1689, an Act Declaring the Rights and Liberties of the Subject, and Settling the
Succession of the Crown (Bill of Rights), U. OF MINN. HUM. RTS LIBR.,
http://hrlibrary.umn.edu/education/engbillofrights.html
[https://perma.cc/3F62-F3D5]
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of Rights 439
as well as the U.S. Constitution’s Eighth
440
Amendment,
reaffirms the Magna Carta’s idea of no excessive
bail or fines.
Consider Clause 14 (1225) of the Magna Carta: “A free man
shall not be amerced for a small fault, but after the manner of the
fault; and for a great fault after the greatness thereof, saving to him
his contenement . . . .” 441 In other words, the “Magna Carta required
that economic sanctions ‘be proportioned to the wrong’ and ‘not be
so large as to deprive [an offender] of his livelihood.’” 442 It creates
a proportionality requirement that has been demonstrated in most
Supreme Court decisions. 443 In most instances, punitive damages
are awarded for grave offenses. 444 The Great Charter has no
requirement that the offense requiring due process occur in the civil
or criminal prosecution, therefore it should be applicable to punitive
damages that arise in either situation. 445
The Supreme Court has already determined that civil suit
punitive damages are not restricted by the Excessive Fines Clause,
so a civil defendant cannot rely solely on constitutional protection
from arbitrary punitive damages. Browning-Ferris Industries held
that the Excessive Fines Clause does not apply in civil cases, 446 but
this could change. At the very least, a reasoned, nuanced judgment
(last visited Jan. 14, 2021).
439 See Timbs v. Indiana, 139 S. Ct. 682, 688 (2019).
440 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
441 Magna Carta (1225), supra note 194, cl. 14.
442 Timbs, 139 S. Ct. at 688 (alteration in original) (quoting Browning, 492 U.S. at
271). Finding the Excessive Fines Clause to be an incorporated protection applicable to
the states under the Due Process Clause, the Court held that the safeguard “is ‘fundamental
to our scheme of ordered liberty,’ with ‘dee[p] root[s] in [our] history and tradition.’” Id.
at 686–87 (alterations in original) (quoting McDonald, 561 U.S. at 767).
443 See supra Part II.C.i.
444 Punitive Damages, CORNELL L. SCH., https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/punitive_
damages [https://perma.cc/9PXY-987J] (last visited Jan. 14, 2021).
445 By the lack of a restriction, the Magna Carta may protect defendants where the
Excessive Fines Clause may not. See Jim Gash, The End of an Era: The Supreme Court
(Finally) Butts Out of Punitive Damages for Good, 63 FLA. L. REV. 525, 532 (2011) (noting
that punitive damages are outside of the scope of the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth
Amendment).
446 Browning, 492 U.S. at 263–64 (1989) (“[W]e now decide [that the Excessive Fines
Clause] does not constrain an award of money damages in a civil suit when the government
neither has prosecuted the action nor has any right to receive a share of the damages
awarded.”).
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may take hold. Some lower courts have imposed a proportionality
test to determine if the award of punitive damages is proportional. 447
In response, defendants could invoke the venerable, jurisprudential
architecture of the Magna Carta and its requirement that there be
proportional payment for grave or trivial offenses. With its central
place in the Anglo-American legal firmament, the Magna Carta may
show a clearer path of how punitive damages can be fairly awarded.
Some courts seem to have even created an informal formula for
determining whether punitive damages are excessive. Two years
after Payne, the Tenth Circuit reduced the punitive damages
awarded to the plaintiff apartment tenant, who was exposed to
carbon monoxide, from $22 million to $1.95 million to reflect a 1:1
ratio to the compensatory damages the jury awarded the plaintiff. 448
However, there have been instances where courts have extended the
ratio to 2:1 when it is found that the defendant’s conduct was
egregious or intentional. 449
By requiring a defendant’s personal circumstances to be
considered, the Magna Carta can continue serving a purpose
through its “salvo contenemento suo” principle. An individual’s
inability to pay may deprive him or her of the necessary enjoyment
of life and liberty. 450 Studies have demonstrated that, in the criminal
arena, economic sanctions have some extremely harsh results. 451
The Magna Carta has already influenced legislation in providing
a reasonableness requirement on the amount of punitive damages
that may be awarded. Some states have employed a reasonableness
standard, while others weigh the defendant’s financial situation. 452
447 See In re Actos Prod. Liab. Litig., No. 6:11-md-2299, 2014 WL 5461859, at *15–
23 (W. D. La. Oct. 27, 2014); Hawks v. Greene, No. M1999-02785-COA-R3-CV, 2001
WL 1613889, at *7–8 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 18, 2001); United States v. One Parcel Prop.
Located at 427 & 429 Hall St., 74 F.3d 1165, 1170 (11th Cir. 1996).
448 Lompe v. Sunridge Partners, LLC, 818 F.3d 1041, 1076 (10th Cir. 2016)
(concluding that because the amount of compensatory damages was so substantial, the
equal amount awarded as punitive damages would represent the maximum amount that
due process would allow).
449 Turley v. ISG Lackawanna, Inc., 774 F.3d 140, 146 (2d Cir. 2014) (holding that a
2:1 ratio is appropriate where defendants subjected the plaintiff to “an extraordinary and
steadily intensifying drumbeat of racial insults, intimidation, and degradation over a period
of more than three years”).
450 Beth A. Colgan, Reviving the Excessive Fines Clause, 102 CALIF. L. REV. 277, 281
(2014).
451 Id. at 290–95.
452 MINN. STAT. § 549.20 (1990); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3701(b)(6), (7) (1998).
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These latter ruminations may be vital if one is to shelter a
defendant’s lifestyle and livelihood, while still discouraging that
defendant’s inappropriate or outright wrongful behavior. For
example, if Smith and Jones are both defendants for lawsuits based
upon allegedly reckless driving, but Smith has no disposable
income, a punitive award may strip away Smith’s way of life while
leaving Jones in an increasingly superior financial situation
compared to Smith.
The main purposes of punitive damages are to punish and deter
similar conduct. In the United States, punishment is normally
handled by the criminal justice system. There is not typically a
necessity for it to bleed into civil law and remove distinctions
between tort and criminal law. 453 As punitive damages continue to
increase in size or at least possibilities of an award, the U.S.
Supreme Court must intervene to allow for consideration of an
individual’s financial circumstances. Recently, the U.S. District
Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana upheld a $20 billion
settlement for British Petroleum’s Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill,
which included the imposition of punitive damages. 454 To wrest
punitive damages from defendants necessitated that courts consider
the resources of British Petroleum, the ability of the corporation to
pay the fines as well as continue functioning, and the deterrent value
of such an imposition. 455 In the future, it appears highly likely that
in the civil arena large corporations will still face the risk of punitive
damages when committing gross negligence or willful misconduct.
IV. Conclusion
The Magna Carta, as enacted at Runnymede, affirmed liberties
that had existed “since times immemorial” 456 but had heretofore
Braun, supra note 433, at 453.
In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig “Deepwater Horizon,” 21 F. Supp. 3d 657, 757 (E.D
La. 2014); see Devin Henry, Judge Approves $20B BP Oil Spill Settlement, THE HILL (Apr.
4, 2016), https://thehill.com/policy/energy-environment/275100-judge-approves-20bsettlement-over-bp-oil-spill [https://perma.cc/R8BU-W6MV].
455 Id. at 751 (“The Ninth Circuit’s maritime rule follows the Restatement, which
allows punitive damages against the corporate entity when the actor was in a ‘managerial
capacity’ and performing within the scope of his employment. . . . The First Circuit
appears to also use the managerial agent theory, but with the added requirement that there
be ‘some level of [corporate] culpability for the misconduct.’ The Court finds that punitive
liability would attach to BPXP under this standard as well.”).
456 See discussion supra Part I.
453
454
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been indefinite and uncodified. Although the Magna Carta fell into
disuse throughout the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, continued
invocation of the Magna Carta on solemn occasions helped provide
a luster that it retains to this day. Judge Coke initiated the Magna
Carta’s renaissance in the early seventeenth century, as he
effectively used the Charter to place the legislative power of
Parliament beyond monarchical authority as well as within the
foundational common law. 457
When England established its first American colony in the same
time frame (the seventeenth century), the English brought with them
the traditions of the Magna Carta and the common law. 458 The
common law traditions inspired the early Americans to codify the
Magna Carta’s guarantees in their statutes, state constitutions, and
the U.S. Constitution. Therefore, the time of the Magna Carta and
early English common law is of particular relevance to courts
analyzing the original meaning of rights guaranteed by the U.S.
Constitution. Accordingly, the Court has analyzed the meaning of
“due process” by analyzing the meaning of the Magna Carta’s “law
of the land” provision, 459 the meaning of “life, liberty, and
property” by looking to what rights have been historically protected
by the Magna Carta, 460 the right to a jury trial by looking at the
meaning of “lawful judgment of his peers,” 461 and the meaning of
“cruel and unusual punishment” by looking at English common law
and Clause 20’s prohibition of excessiveness in the context of
amercements. 462
These uses have expanded the fundamental liberties upon which
American jurisprudence is based. As evidenced by the large
number of cases under Appendix A discussing due process 463 when
compared to the relatively few cases discussing jury trials and cruel

Id.
Id.
459 See discussion supra Part II.A.i.
460 See discussion supra Part II.A.ii.
461 See discussion supra Part II.B.
462 See discussion supra Part II.C.
463 There have been twenty-one majority opinions discussing due process and the
Magna Carta, and twenty-three other opinions likewise featuring the Magna Carta in a
non-majority opinion such as concurrences or dissents. See infra Appendix A.
457
458
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and unusual punishment in Appendices B 464 and C, 465 the Magna
Carta’s capacity to further define American liberties may lie not
simply with due process, but with the Sixth and Eighth
Amendments. The Magna Carta will continue to play a quieter and
perhaps undefined role as a foundation to rights and liberties
protected by the U.S. Constitution. While the Magna Carta may see
its direct citations decrease, 466 the principles contained in the Great
Charter may continue to inspire our understanding and
interpretation of foundational rights.
Regardless of whether the U.S. Supreme Court will continue
alluding to the Magna Carta on any particular issue, the Great
Charter is by no means finished with demonstrating its value. 467
Instead, the Magna Carta will simply transition into a different role.
It can once again be characterized as a restriction on the executive
power of a country, like how it was used to restrict the authority of
King John in 1215. But there is much more to see and consider
than an allusion between the rule of a medieval king and a modern
U.S. President. The U.S. Supreme Court could use the Magna Carta
in the future to produce a modern justice that is, nonetheless, nearer
to both (1) the earlier document’s words and its interpretation in
subsequent centuries, such as by the great Sir Edward Coke, and (2)
the U.S. Constitution’s text as well as its framers’ intent. The
Magna Carta as the people’s protection against a despotic English
monarchy in both the thirteenth and eighteenth centuries, as well as
in service to Coke’s rebellion against the Stuarts in the seventeenth
century, remains a useful tool for twenty-first century U.S. common
law and constitutional jurisprudence.
It is worth noting the Magna Carta’s use in efforts against the

464 There have been eleven majority opinions discussing the right to jury trial and the
Magna Carta, and ten other opinions, mainly dissents, likewise featuring the Magna Carta.
See infra Appendix B.
465 There have been six majority opinions discussing cruel and unusual punishment
as well as the Magna Carta, with eight other opinions – seven dissents and one concurrence
– similarly featuring the Magna Carta. See infra Appendix C.
466 Presently, it is exactly the opposite: the number of citations to the Great Charter of
1215 is, if anything, on the rise in U.S. federal and state courts. See supra notes 30–34
and accompanying text; infra Appendices A, B, and C (showing that U.S. Supreme Court
opinions discussing the Magna Carta and due process, jury trial, or cruel and unusual
punishment have increased dramatically since the 1960s).
467 Outside of creating substantive rights, the Magna Carta may continue to be used
by the Supreme Court for statutory construction. See Helmholz, supra note 372, at 886.
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“War on Terror” over a decade ago. There, we see that the Magna
Carta may revert from a “source of rights” into a “restraint on the
government.” Indeed, due process must be granted. Consider the
cases of Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, a “War on Terror” case in which the
Magna Carta was acknowledged in the concurrence. 468 Justice
Souter believed that the Magna Carta’s protection fell short with
respect to Hamdi’s right of Habeas Corpus. 469 Though the focus on
the War on Terror has declined, the Supreme Court may continue to
use the Magna Carta in guaranteeing a trial for an unpopular
defendant. In the early 2000s, it was terrorists or enemy
combatants. Perhaps, in the future, the Magna Carta can be used to
protect the jury trial rights of alleged domestic terrorists.
As noted in Harmelin v. Michigan, there is no proportionality
guarantee in the Eighth Amendment. Thus, with respect to
punishments, the future of the Supreme Court is limited on this
front. However, the Magna Carta may still be of influence with
regards to excessive fines. After Bajakajian, lower courts were still
left confused on determining 1) whether a certain punishment was
“cruel” and 2) whether the punishment was unconstitutional given
the crime. 470 The Magna Carta may continue to be of use by
connecting U.S. common law to the English case law that provides
those sorts of measurements.
Secondly, Harmelin did not restrict the Magna Carta’s link
between the penalty and the circumstances of the offender. 471 The
Magna Carta may continue to demonstrate its value by protecting
an offender in a situation in which the amount of punitive damages
is not proportioned according to the person’s circumstances.
Whether the offender’s circumstances may be considered in
deciding if a punishment is constitutional was expressly reserved in
Bajakajian. 472
Lastly, the Magna Carta may provide a way forward for
reevaluating the death penalty, punitive damages, and jury trials. It
may even provide guidance to newly evolving frontiers such as
internet protection and access to needed products such as drugs. In
Kasper, supra note 86, at 569.
Id.
470 McLean, supra note 358, at 845.
471 Id. at 836 (noting two constitutional principles come from the Excessive Fines
Clause of the Eight Amendment).
472 Id. at 847.
468
469
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Raich v. Gonzalez, 473 for example, the court heard the issue of a
fundamental right of access to unapproved products. The appellate
court analyzed the asserted right by asking whether it was deeply
rooted in our nation’s history:
It is tempting, as a means of curbing the discretion of federal
judges, to suppose that liberty encompasses no more than those
rights already guaranteed to the individual against federal
interference by the express provisions of the first eight
Amendments to the Constitution. But of course, this Court has
never accepted that view. 474

While the United States continues to mature, the Magna Carta,
with its age and influence, remains a highly valuable interpretive
tool, if not an imperative. Though the future of the Great Charter is
not secure for all matters, its presence in the courtroom will continue
to determine paramount legal questions. The Magna Carta is not
only to be invoked for historical purposes, but it can serve a
functional role: to keep playing a part in identifying fundamental
rights. History is, indeed, a very important aspect of finding
fundamental rights. With that in mind, we see the ability of a
venerable but also vibrant Magna Carta to influence the declaration
or expansion of a set of fundamental, modern rights.
Appendices
Appendix A: U.S. Supreme Court Opinions About Due
Process that Cite to the Magna Carta
Year

Case

Citation

Type of
Opinion

Magna Carta
Treatment

1856

Murray’s Lessee
v. Hoboken Land
& Improvement
Co.

59 U.S.
272, 276

Majority

Linkage of “law
of the land” with
“due process”

1877

Davidson v. New
Orleans

96 U.S.
97, 101

Majority

Linkage of “law
of the land” with
“due process”

473
474

500 F.3d 850, 857 (9th Cir. 2007).
Id. at 862 (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 847).
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1878

Beckwith v.
Bean

98 U.S.
266, 294

Dissenting

Linkage of “law
of the land” with
“due process”

1884

Hurtado v.
California

110 U.S.
516, 522,
540

Majority,
Dissenting

Linkage of “law
of the land” with
“due process”

1908

Twining v. New
Jersey

211 U.S.
78, 100

Majority

Right is longstanding

1940

Chambers v.
Florida

309 U.S.
227, n.10

Majority

Citing Magna
Carta as support
for due process

1945

Malinski v. New
York

324 U.S.
401, 414

Concurring

Right is longstanding

1947

Louisiana ex rel.
Francis v.
Resweber

329 U.S.
459, 467

Concurring

Right is longstanding

1958

Kent v. Dulles

357 U.S.
116, 125

Majority

Meaning of
“liberty”

1959

Bartkus v.
Illinois

359 U.S.
121, 126

Majority

Due process has
been expanded
since the time of
the Magna Carta

1961

Poe v. Ullman

367 U.S.
497, 541

Majority

Due process has
been expanded
since the time of
the Magna Carta

1963

Kennedy v.
MendozaMartinez

372 U.S.
144, 186

Majority

Right is longstanding

1964

Bell v. Maryland

378 U.S.
226, 293
n.10

Concurring

Roots of due
process of law in
Magna Carta;
Meaning of
“liberty”
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1965

Republic Steel
Corp. v. Maddox

379 U.S.
650, 669

Dissenting

Roots of “law of
the land” and due
process in
Magna Carta

1968

Duncan v.
Louisiana

391 U.S.
145, 151,
169

Majority,
Concurring

Magna Carta as
assurance of due
process of law

1970

In re Winship

397 U.S.
358, 378

Dissenting

Linkage of “law
of the land” with
“due process”

1971

McGautha v.
California

402 U.S.
183, 243

Dissenting

Roots of due
process of law in
the Magna Carta;
Magna Carta as
restraint on the
executive

1972

Furman v.
Georgia

408 U.S.
238, 243

Concurring Magna Carta was
intended to
protect against
arbitrary powers
of government

1976

Moody v.
Daggett

429 U.S.
78, 92

Dissenting

Magna Carta as
foundational for
the due process
right to speedy
trial

1977

Ingraham v.
Wright

430 U.S.
651, 673

Majority

Right is longstanding

1980

Rummel v.
Estelle

445 U.S.
263, 288

Dissenting

Magna Carta was
intended to
protect against
arbitrary powers
of government

1980

O’Bannon v.
Town Nursing

447 U.S.
773, 792

Concurring

Linkage of “law
of the land” with
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“due process”

1986

Daniels v.
Williams

474 U.S.
327, 332

Majority

Magna Carta was
intended to
protect against
arbitrary powers
of government

1989

Browning-Ferris
Indus. v. Kelco
Disposal

492 U.S.
257, 268

Majority

Magna Carta was
intended to
protect against
arbitrary powers
of government

1991

Pac. Mut. v.
Haslip

499 U.S.
1, 28

Concurring

Linkage of “law
of the land” with
“due process”

Majority

Magna Carta was
intended to
protect against
arbitrary powers
of government

1992

Collins v. City of 503 U.S.
Harker Heights 115, n.10

1992

Planned
Parenthood v.
Casey

505 U.S.
833, 847

Majority

Magna Carta was
intended to
protect against
arbitrary powers
of government

1994

Albright v.
Oliver

510 U.S.
266, 272

Majority

Magna Carta as
protection
against arbitrary
use of powers of
government

1996

BMW v. Gore

517 U.S.
559, 588

Concurring Magna Carta was
intended to
protect against
arbitrary powers
of government
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1996

Seminole Tribe
of Fla. v. Florida

517 U.S.
44, 135
n.32

Dissenting

Magna Carta as
foundational for
due process.

1997

Washington v.
Glucksberg

521 U.S.
702, 757

Concurring

Linkage of “law
of the land” with
“due process”

1998

E. Enters. v.
Apfel

524 U.S.
498, 559

Dissenting

Right is longstanding

1998

County of
Sacramento v.
Lewis

523 U.S.
833, 845

Majority

Magna Carta was
intended to
protect against
arbitrary powers
of government

2003

State Farm v.
Campbell

538 U.S.
408, 417

Majority

Magna Carta was
intended to
protect against
arbitrary powers
of government

2004

Hamdi v.
Rumsfeld

542 U.S.
507, 553

Dissent

“Law of the
land” as
foundational for
confining
executive power

2005

U.S. v. Booker

543 U.S.
220, 239

Majority

Magna Carta
intended by
founders to
protect against
tyranny

2008

Boumediene v.
Bush

553 U.S.
723, 740

Majority

Right is longstanding

2010

McDonald v.
Chicago

561 U.S.
742, 815

Concurring

Magna Carta as
foundational to
the Privileges or
Immunities
Clause
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2015

Dep’t of Transp.
v. Ass’n of Am.
R.Rs.

575 U.S.
43, 72

Concurring

Magna Carta as
foundational for
protection of
private rights
against
government
intrusion

2015

Kerry v. Din

576 U.S.
86, 91–92

Plurality

Magna Carta and
application of
“liberty” for due
process in
immigration/mar
riage

2015

Obergefell v.
Hodges

576 U.S.
644, 723–
26

Dissenting

Meaning of
“liberty”

2018

Jennings v.
Rodriguez

138 S. Ct.
830, 861

Dissenting

Mentioning
Magna Carta

Majority

Citing Magna
Carta and
deciding that the
Excessive Fines
Clause in the
Eighth
Amendment
applies to the
states through
the 14th
Amendment’s
Due Process
Clause

2019

Timbs v. Indiana 139 S. Ct.
682, 687–
88
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Appendix B: U.S. Supreme Court Opinions on Right to Jury
Trial Citing the Magna Carta
Year

Case

Citation

Type of
Opinion

Magna Carta
Treatment

1879

Strauder v. West
Virginia

100 U.S.
303, 308–
09

Majority

Blackstone, in
his
Commentaries,
“The right of
trial by jury, or
the country, is a
trial by the peers
of every
Englishman, and
is the grand
bulwark of his
liberties, and is
secured to him
by the Great
Charter”

1888

Callan v. Wilson

127 U.S.
540, 552

Majority

Discussing
linkage of
“lawful judgment
of his peers”
with the right to
jury trial

1899

Capital Traction
Co. v. Hof

174 U.S.
1, 19

Majority

Right is longstanding

1895

Sparf v. U.S.

156 U.S.
51, 114

Dissent

Right is longstanding

1900

Maxwell v. Dow

176 U.S.
581, 609

Dissenting

Right is longstanding and
requires
protection
against arbitrary
power of juries
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1942

Glasser v. U.S.

315 U.S.
60, 85

Majority

Discussing
origins of jury
trial as
“privilege” under
English law

1958

Green v. U.S.

356 U.S.
165, 187

Majority

Noting that
Magna Carta and
constitutional
concepts of a
right to jury trial
does not extend
to many cases
involving
contempt

1967

Klopfer v. North
Carolina

386 U.S.
213, 223

Majority

Right is longstanding

1968

Duncan v.
Louisiana

391 U.S.
145, 151

Majority

Right is longstanding

1970

Williams v.
Florida

399 U.S.
78, 91

Majority

Discussing
linkage of
“lawful judgment
of his peers”
with the right to
jury trial

1971

McGautha v.
California

402 U.S.
183, 244

Dissenting

Discussing that
right to jury trial
cannot be frozen
to the time of the
Magna Carta

1971

McKeiver v.
Pennsylvania

403 U.S.
528, 563

Dissenting

Making the
textual argument
that “freeman”
extends to
juveniles

1974

Pernell v.
Southall Realty

416 U.S.
363, 371

Majority

Distinguishing
trial by assize
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and trial by jury
1976

Moody v.
Daggett

429 U.S.
78, 92

Dissenting

Right is longstanding

1977

U.S. v. Lovasco

431 U.S.
783, 800

Dissenting

Right is longstanding

1990

Walton v.
Arizona

497 U.S.
639, 711

Dissenting

Right is longstanding

2005

U.S. v. Booker

543 U.S.
220, 239

Majority

Right is longstanding

2010

McDonald v.
Chicago

561 U.S.
742, 815

Concurring

Magna Carta as
foundational for
the right to a jury
trial

2012

S. Union Co. v.
U.S.

567 U.S.
343, 370

Dissenting

Historical
analysis of
Magna Carta’s
limitations on a
judge in a jury
trial

2016

Betterman v.
Montana

136 S. Ct.
1609,
1617–18

Majority

Sixth
Amendment
Speedy Trial
Clause did not
apply to a delay
between the
defendant’s
conviction and
sentencing

2021
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Appendix C: U.S. Supreme Court Opinions About Cruel and
Unusual Punishment that Cite to the Magna Carta
Year

Case

Citation

Type of
Opinion

Magna Carta
Treatment

1910

Weems v. U.S.

217 U.S.
349, 376

Majority

Meaning of cruel
and unusual
punishment

1958

Trop v. Dulles

356 U.S.
86, 100

Majority

Meaning of cruel
and unusual
punishment

1971

McKeiver v.
Pennsylvania,

403 U.S.
528, 563

Dissenting

Magna Carta
prohibited
punishment
without “lawful
judgment”

1972

Furman v.
Georgia

408 U.S.
238, 243

Concurring

Meaning of cruel
and unusual
punishment

1979

Carmona v.
Ward

439 U.S.
1091,
1094

Dissenting

Meaning of cruel
and unusual
punishment

1980

Rummel v.
Estelle

445 U.S.
263, 288

Dissenting

Meaning of cruel
and unusual
punishment

1983

Solem v. Helm

463 U.S.
277, 284

Majority

Meaning of cruel
and unusual
punishment

1984

Spaziano v.
Florida

468 U.S.
447, 473
n.9

Dissenting

Eighth
Amendment was
derived from the
Magna Carta

1987

McCleskey v.
Kemp

481 U.S.
279, 339
n.10

Dissenting

Magna Carta
restricted
discretionary
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fines

1989

Browning-Ferris
Indus. v. Kelco
Disposal

492 U.S.
257, 268

Dissenting

Discussing the
principle of
proportionality
between the
crime and
punishment

1991

Harmelin v.
Michigan

501 U.S.
957, 967

Majority

Discussing the
principle of
proportionality
between the
crime and
punishment

1998

U.S. v.
Bajakajian

524 U.S.
321, 335

Majority

Discussing
Magna Carta and
its
proportionality
requirement

2012

S. Union Co. v.
U.S.

567 U.S.
343, 370

Dissenting

Discussing
limitations of
excessive fines
and “depriv[ing]
offender of
means of
livelihood”

2015

Horne v. Dep’t
of Agric.

576 U.S.
350, 358

Majority

Discussing
Magna Carta’s
protections
against
uncompensated
takings and
excessive fines

